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Abstract 
 
‘The Efficacy of Song Itself’: Seamus Heaney’s Defence of Poetry 
Sarah Rowan, February 2009 
 
The defence of poetry dates back, in English literature, to Sidney‘s ‗An Apology for 
Poetry‘ (1595), and the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen an increasing 
number of writers advancing arguments in support of an art form that seems, more than 
ever, to be under threat. In this thesis, Seamus Heaney‘s essays on the purpose of poetry 
are considered as they constitute a defence of the art form. While Heaney‘s poetry and 
prose have, as a result of his popularity and standing as a poet, generated an almost 
unprecedented body of critical work, his defence of poetry has not been recognised as 
such, nor has it come under sufficient critical scrutiny. Essentially a defence of a defence, 
this thesis redresses that omission by examining Heaney‘s apology as it takes shape in his 
essays, and in its application to a selection of his own poems. It argues that his defence is 
important not for the originality of its ideas, many of which derive from the work of his 
predecessors, but for the way in which Heaney combines and interprets those ideas to 
produce an argument that is uniquely persuasive. His prose style, and the consistent 
grounding of his argument in examples provided by individual poems, constitute a 
witness to the pleasure and the potency of the art form which is itself both notably 
pleasurable and potent. 
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Introduction 
[Poetry has taught me] that there‘s such a thing as truth and it can be told – slant; that subjectivity 
is not to be theorized away and is worth defending; that poetry itself has virtue, in the first sense of 
possessing a quality of moral excellence and in the sense also of possessing inherent strength by 
reason of its sheer made-upness, its integritas, consonantia and claritas. 
 
     Seamus Heaney, interview with Dennis O‘Driscoll1 
 
I 
In 2002, my fourth year of tertiary study at the University of Cape Town, I did a course 
entitled ‗Poetry at the Millennium‘, in which the status of poetry at the turn of the 
twentieth century was explored through a variety of texts on the subject. My final 
assignment for the course entailed selecting, from those we had studied, the defence of 
poetry that I thought most convincing, and demonstrating in an essay what it was that I 
found so persuasive about that defence. My chosen reading was Seamus Heaney‘s ‗The 
Redress of Poetry‘, and in that assignment lay the seeds of this thesis. 
 I had determined before reaching university that my doctoral thesis would be on 
Ted Hughes, a poet whom I had discovered – like so many teenage girls, no doubt – via 
Sylvia Plath, and whose work I had swiftly come to prefer. By the time I had read him 
more extensively, however, I had doubts about spending three or four years immersed in 
his life and poetry: the ‗savagery and beautiful bleakness‘ of that poetry, the necessity of 
delving into a life characterised by an extraordinary degree of personal tragedy, made me 
wonder at the wisdom of such a pursuit, at least for someone like myself at this point in 
my life.
2
 My discovery of Seamus Heaney‘s defence of poetry, and with it his 
extraordinary verse – as weighty, as expansive as Hughes‘, but in a manner quite 
different – provided me with an alternative preferable for a number of reasons; and when, 
in 2005, I registered for my PhD, it was with relish at the thought of devoting an 
extended period of time to Heaney‘s work. I was, by that stage, an unashamed 
‗Heaneybopper‘ – a now common term for members of the poet‘s prodigious fan base. 
                                                 
1
 Seamus Heaney, Stepping Stones: Interviews with Seamus Heaney, ed. D. O‘Driscoll, (London: Faber & 
Faber, 2008), 467. 
2
 Nicci Gerrard, ‗The Colossus Diminished: Review of Ted Hughes: The Life of a Poet by Elaine 
Feinstein‘, The Observer, October 28, 2001. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2001/oct/28/biography.poetry (January 6, 2009). 
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 ‗A man‘s theory of the place of poetry,‘ T.S. Eliot wrote in ‗Matthew Arnold‘, ‗is 
not independent of his view of life in general‘; and Heaney is no exception.3 His 
background is by no means lacking in tragedy of its own. Growing up in Northern Ireland 
as a Catholic Derryman, his early life took place in an environment always on the brink 
of a violence that was ubiquitous and self-perpetuating. As such, his development as a 
writer took place in a context which made the conflict between poetry and politics very 
real and very immediate. For all the anguish and difficulty that such issues have caused 
Heaney, however, he has retained, both as a man and as a writer, an astonishing 
equilibrium. His domestic life is, by all accounts, tranquil and untouched by scandal. He 
has been married for forty years, it would appear happily, and for thirty of those has 
lived, when not abroad, in the same house in Dublin.
4
 The success of his professional life 
has been measured out in a series of accolades culminating in, but not ending with, the 
award of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1995. The public criticism and contention that 
he has endured – inevitably to do with politics, and his degree of involvement therein – 
have done little, it seems, to disrupt the balance of his beliefs or principles, and his urge 
to celebrate life (often in its simplest forms) is undiminished, a basic given of his 
personality. One‘s sense of him is of a man firmly grounded in every sense of that word, 
both in his preoccupation with the landscape of his native Ireland and, not least, in his 
assured sense of his vocation as a poet. 
 That equilibrium, that urge to celebrate, are everywhere present in Heaney‘s 
poetry. As a result, its effect on the reader is uniquely harmonising. The aftertaste of his 
work is never that which accompanies malaise, however much a sense of disquiet might 
at times be its point of origin. Those same characteristics are to become, as Eliot might 
have predicted, the bedrock of Heaney‘s defence of poetry: poetry creates balance, it 
redresses, and in so doing it both defends and extends the mind, the senses. It is the 
embodiment of joy, first and last. That exuberance is often represented as offensive in the 
face of tragedy and suffering, as Heaney well knows, and his task as defender is, in large 
part, to answer that accusation against poetry. As he does so, his passionate conviction as 
                                                 
3
 T.S. Eliot, ‗Matthew Arnold‘, in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism: Studies in the Relation of 
Criticism to Poetry in England, (London: Faber & Faber, 1964), 119. 
4
 Sam Leith, ‗Return of the Naturalist‘. The Telegraph, April 16, 2006. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/3651313/Return-of-the-naturalist.html (December 12, 2008). 
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to the necessity of poetry – a faith, as he calls it repeatedly, the grounds for which it is the 
purpose of his defence to reveal – finds expression in passages and images that are very 
nearly as resonant, as striking, as the greatest moments of his poetry. The strength of 
Heaney‘s defence, I will argue, lies primarily not in its originality. Many of his ideas – as 
well as the terms that he utilises, the contradictions he attempts to negotiate – find their 
origin in the work of his literary forebears. Rather, his defence is extraordinary because 
of his ability to interweave those ideas as no other defender of poetry has done; to select 
and set side-by-side quotations from a wide and sometimes unexpected range of thinkers. 
In so doing, Heaney displays his prose style at its most virtuosic. As we will also see, the 
importance of the energy, vividness and acuity of that style, the poetic and metaphoric 
verve of his essays, cannot be overestimated in its contribution to the quality and status of 
his defence.  
 
II 
It is surprising, therefore, that work dealing with Heaney‘s defence of poetry is all but 
absent from the body of critical literature on the poet – a body which is unprecedented in 
size. ‗By now,‘ one recent critic has said, ‗the number of specialising [sic] books on 
Heaney is too large to itemise because it is likely to be out of date as soon as it is 
published … No other current poet is nearly as much written about as Heaney has been‘.5 
Most of that literature, of course, deals with the poetry itself, while touching on Heaney‘s 
general statements about the art as an introductory measure to analyses of his verse. 
Helen Vendler‘s definitive study, entitled simply Seamus Heaney, is one such book. In 
her introduction, Vendler makes it clear that she has not commented on Heaney‘s prose 
for reasons of length; she does, however, go on to quote from The Government of the 
Tongue in the concluding paragraphs of the introduction, as a means of demonstrating 
Heaney‘s attitude to the lyric form.6  
Neil Corcoran‘s The Poetry of Seamus Heaney: A Critical Study – still one of the 
best-known studies on Heaney – devotes, uncommonly, a section to a discussion of 
Heaney as essayist. Corcoran does not, however, engage with Heaney‘s prose specifically 
                                                 
5
 Bernard O‘Donoghue, ‗Introduction‘, in The Cambridge Companion to Seamus Heaney, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2. 
6
 Helen Vendler, ‗Introduction‘, in Seamus Heaney, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1998), 5, 11-12. 
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as it defends poetry; his is, instead, a broad examination of Heaney as critic, which 
focuses on Heaney‘s readings of other poets as much as it does on his own conception of 
poetry.
7
 Similarly, Peter McDonald‘s chapter on ‗Seamus Heaney as Critic‘ in Poetry in 
Contemporary Irish Literature concentrates on Heaney‘s facility as a critic of poetry, 
rather than the general poetic principles which he extracts from such readings.
8
 In his 
more recent Serious Poetry: Form and Authority from Yeats to Hill, McDonald discusses 
in some detail Heaney‘s notion of redress as articulated in his Oxford Lectures, but 
McDonald is preoccupied – to critically interesting effect – with Heaney‘s argument as 
expressed in the very public context of his position as Professor of Poetry. As a result, he 
attributes some of the more singular of Heaney‘s claims to the poet‘s awareness of an 
expectation, on the part of his audience, that he will make precisely such sweeping 
declarations for his art form from that Oxford lectern. There is no sense, in McDonald‘s 
analysis, of the convictions and formulations underlying Heaney‘s notion of redress, in 
particular his very well-developed theory of how poetry actually works; and thus 
McDonald‘s argument, however intriguing, is itself necessarily lacking in sufficient 
contextual background.
9
  
Hazard Adams‘ The Offense of Poetry – to take one more example – offers the 
most focused, albeit somewhat abbreviated, discussion of Heaney‘s prose as it constitutes 
a defence of poetry that I have encountered. His study devotes a short chapter to 
Heaney‘s essays on the subject. Adams‘ concern is with the relationship of poetry to 
politics in the Irish writer‘s work, and by stringing together key quotations from 
Heaney‘s prose, he presents the reader with a summary of the poet‘s defence as it relates 
to the political. Much of Adams‘ discussion involves Heaney‘s use of Yeats and 
Kavanagh as exemplars, and his three-page analysis of The Redress of Poetry considers 
it, likewise, as part of Heaney‘s response to the political pressure that is often brought to 
bear on the art form itself.  
                                                 
7
 Neil Corcoran, The Poetry of Seamus Heaney: A Critical Study, (London: Faber & Faber, 1998). 
8
 Peter McDonald, ‗Seamus Heaney as Critic‘, in Poetry in Contemporary Irish Literature, ed. M. 
Keneally, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 174-189. 
9
 Peter McDonald, Serious Poetry: Form and Authority from Yeats to Hill, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 83-94. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 5 
Essays on Heaney – which, collected, constitute the bulk of publications about his 
work – deal predominantly with one or more of the major themes in his poetry: politics,10 
identity,11 childhood,12 land,13 and the pressure of Irish history on all of these. There are 
numerous essays on each of his collections of poetry, on individual poems, and 
occasional essays – rather than reviews, of which there are a multitude – on his prose 
collections.14 Corcoran is one of an exceptional few who consider Heaney‘s entire body 
of prose, and Adams is similarly exceptional in his response to that prose as a defence per 
se; I have encountered very little other discussion of Heaney‘s arguments for poetry, 
particularly as they develop across the decades of his career. Those texts which do 
concentrate to some degree on his prose, like Eugene O‘Brien‘s Seamus Heaney and the 
Place of Writing, inevitably examine it as it relates to issues of politics, identity, 
Irishness, or any of the other dominant themes in Heaney‘s poetry.15 Somewhat to my 
astonishment, I have discovered that in all the academic and critical writing about Heaney 
no one has focused sufficiently on his essayistic intervention into the status of poetry; 
there has been a marked lack of response to the extent and the complexity of his defence. 
Indeed, the very fact that his prose constitutes a coherent defence of poetry has not been 
adequately recognised. In his ‗Introduction‘ to The Cambridge Companion to Seamus 
Heaney, published in December 2008, Bernard O‘Donoghue goes so far as to diminish 
somewhat the importance of Heaney‘s prose in relation to his achievements as poet and 
translator. In comparison to Yeats, O‘Donoghue points out, Heaney ‗has been a busy 
career-teacher of literature as well as writer, rather than a ―man of letters‖‘, and, unlike 
                                                 
10
 See for example Jeffery Alan Triggs, ‗Hurt Into Poetry: The Political Verses of Seamus Heaney and 
Robert Bly‘, in The New Orleans Review 19.3-4 (1992): 162-73; Eileen Cahill, ‗A Silent Voice: Seamus 
Heaney and Ulster Politics‘, in Critical Quarterly , 29 (1987): 55-59; Rita Zoutenbier, ‗The Matter of 
Ireland and the Poetry of Seamus Heaney‘, in Seamus Heaney, ed. H. Bloom, (New York: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1986), 51-68. 
11
 See for example David Lloyd, ‗―Pap for the Dispossessed‖: Seamus Heaney and the Poetics of Identity‘, 
in Seamus Heaney: Contemporary Critical Essays, ed. M. Allen, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1997), 
155-184. 
12
 See for example Adrian Frazier, ‗Anger and Nostalgia: Seamus Heaney and the Ghost of the Father‘, in 
Eire-Ireland: Journal of Irish Studies 36.3-4 (Fall-Winter 2001): 7-38. 
13
 See for example Dianne Meredith, ‗Landscape or Mindscape? Seamus Heaney‘s Bogs‘, in Irish 
Geography 32.2 (1999): 126-134; Brian Robinson, ‗Negotiations: Religion, Landscape, and the 
Postcolonial Moment in the Poetry of Seamus Heaney‘, in Mapping the Sacred: Religion, Geography and 
Postcolonial Literatures, ed. J.S. Scott and P. Simpson-Housley, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), 5-38. 
14
 See for example Anne Stevenson, ‗The Peace within Understanding: Looking at Preoccupations‘, in The 
Art of Seamus Heaney, ed. T. Curtis, (Mid Glamorgan: Poetry Wales Press, 1982), 129-137. 
15
 Eugene O‘Brien, Seamus Heaney and the Place of Writing, (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2002). 
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his compatriot predecessor‘s, Heaney‘s critical prose only gained ‗substance‘ some way 
into his poetic career. For that reason, ‗although Heaney‘s status as critic-practitioner is 
of undoubted significance‘, O‘Donoghue chooses – like every editor before him – to 
place ‗the emphasis in this book … on him as poet, and to a lesser extent as poet-
translator engaging with other poets‘.16  
 
III 
In an essay on Eliot, ‗The Poet as Critic‘, Graham Hough long ago observed that ‗one of 
the tedious automatisms of literary history is the hostility, real or alleged, between poetry 
and criticism; and every age needs a poet-critic sufficiently powerful in both spheres to 
transcend such civil strife‘.17 My argument in this thesis, contra O‘Donoghue, is that 
Heaney is that poet-critic for our age, and that he has played a leading and vital role as 
‗man of letters‘ – that essential intermediary between the general reading public and a 
specialist audience – during the last thirty years. It is arguable that there are critics – 
Christopher Ricks springs immediately to mind – who are, qua critics, more intricate in 
their readings of individual poets (witness Ricks‘ work on Geoffrey Hill, for instance) 
and intellectually more sophisticated. Frank Kermode would be another singular instance. 
But neither of these brings to his work the authority of his own status as a poet. Nor is 
their ear so acutely attuned to the problematic status of poetry in the contemporary 
English-speaking world – and the manner in which it might best be ‗forwarded‘ (one of 
Heaney‘s favourite verbs). With this in mind, I argue that Seamus Heaney‘s defence of 
poetry has significance far beyond that with which current critical work credits it.  
Vendler reveals one reason for the importance of engaging with Heaney‘s prose 
work in its entirety – a reason which provides a further justification for this thesis – in her 
introductory comments to Seamus Heaney: 
 
though fundamental aspects of [Heaney‘s] thought remain – the abiding anxiety 
over the social function of poetry, for instance, or the quarrel between aesthetic 
form and moral urgency – the metaphors in which he embodies such worries do 
alter from essay to essay, from poem to poem. It is for this reason that quoting a 
                                                 
16
 O‘Donoghue, Cambridge Companion, 2. 
17
 Graham Hough, ‗The Poet as Critic‘, in The Literary Criticism of T.S. Eliot: New Essays, ed. D. Newton-
De Molina, (London: The Athlone Press, 1977), 42. 
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sentence or a stanza from Heaney and adducing that it gives ‗his opinion‘ on this 
or that … betrays the fluidity and responsiveness of his mind.18 
 
My project in this thesis is to explore Heaney‘s defence as it has developed, as its terms 
have changed, between Heaney‘s earliest and most recent prose publications, thereby 
avoiding the limited, partial perspective of which Vendler warns above. I approach his 
essays specifically as they constitute a defence of poetry, and so my focus is exclusively 
on those individual essays which contribute to that defence – this is neither a general 
overview nor a comprehensive study of all the implications of Heaney‘s critical writing. 
Neither is it merely exegesis. It is also an appreciation of Heaney‘s prose, of his power to 
express – in the most vivid imagery and vigorous style – truths about our experience of 
poetry (and indeed of poetic ‗truth‘ itself) which, articulated by him, are so gracefully 
rendered as to impress us, on an almost visceral level, with their intuitive rightness.  
In the final chapter of this thesis I quote Eliot‘s remark that his own criticism is ‗a 
by-product of [his] private poetry-workshop‘, and suggest that this applies equally to 
Heaney; and here I should affirm that the same is true of my approach to Heaney‘s 
writing.
19
 Taking my cue from the latter, both the manner and the matter of his prose 
style, I have not brought any specific critical theory to bear, though I have taken pains to 
elucidate and subject to scrutiny both the general tendency of his argument as well as its 
specifics. Distrust is not my method. As a poet myself, in a world increasingly, it has 
sometimes seemed, hostile to and scornful of that vocation, not least in my native South 
Africa,
20
 I have found in Heaney‘s defence an expression of and a justification for my 
faith in poetry‘s usefulness, its necessity to our lives. My reading of his defence reflects 
that, and indeed celebrates it. Resentment and envy, Albert Camus once remarked, might 
be the hallmark of the relations between writers and their predecessors. But, as he went 
on to say, there can be another kind of relation as well: that of admiration. 
 
                                                 
18
 Vendler, Seamus Heaney, 10-11. 
19
 T.S. Eliot, ‗The Frontiers of Criticism‘, in On Poetry and Poets, (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), 106. 
20
 In South Africa, poetry currently enjoys a status so negligible that one of its recent, most eminent 
practitioners here, Douglas Livingstone, was not merely joking when he remarked that the white, English-
speaking poet in South Africa was ‗the lowest form of life‘. (Douglas Livingstone, ‗Douglas Livingstone: 
Poet Scientist‘, interview by Michael Chapman, Leadership SA 4.3 (1985): 112.) 
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For it is indeed lucky to be able to experience, at least once in one‘s lifetime, this 
enthusiastic submission to another person. Among the half-truths that delight our 
intellectual society this stimulating thought can be found – that each conscience 
seeks the death of the other. At once we all become masters and slaves, dedicated 
to mutual annihilation. But the word master has another meaning, linked to the 
word disciple in respect and gratitude. It is no longer a question of one mind 
seeking to kill the other, but of a dialogue, which never ceases once it has begun, 
and which brings absolute satisfaction to certain lives.
21
 
 
So it can be for critics, as well. Such, at any rate, is the conviction of this thesis-writer. 
The history of English poetry is also a history of its defence. Hardly a significant 
poet in the last few centuries has failed to produce, whether by design or in passing, a 
piece of writing or verse which justifies the exercise of his or her art. This is my starting-
point in Chapter 1, ‗The Genealogy of a Defence‘, in which I give an overview of some 
of the most historically prominent of such apologies, sketching a line of descent from 
Sidney to Heaney. That line is, of necessity and also by the logic of this thesis, limited to 
those poets whose defences have had a recognisable effect on Heaney‘s own or reflect 
concerns which are echoed by him, deliberately or not. I refer, among others, to Heaney‘s 
Modernist forebears, T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and Wallace Stevens, and those who follow 
in their footsteps, notably W.H. Auden and Randall Jarrell. In the latter part of the 
chapter, I turn my attention to two of Heaney‘s contemporaries whose defences are 
particularly noteworthy, and who have moved in the same orbit of widespread 
international recognition as Heaney: Joseph Brodsky and Czeslaw Milosz.
22
 My 
argument, both in the case of Heaney‘s predecessors and that of his peers, is that 
Heaney‘s defence is exceptional – not necessarily in its fundamental claims (all would be 
of one mind in their insistence on the centrality of the art form), but in the brio of its style 
and its synthesis of ideas. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are a detailed study of three strands of Heaney‘s defence. 
Here I look at the ideas that form and animate his argument, always bearing in mind that 
Heaney is himself never a theoretician; and in my explication of his claims, I highlight 
                                                 
21
 Albert Camus and Jean Grenier, Correspondence 1932-1960, trans. J.F. Rigaud, (Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2003), 264. 
22
 Figures like these have come, in recent decades, despite their varying points of origin, to constitute 
something like a ‗poetry international‘. Derek Walcott belongs in this same company, but his critical 
writing does not include the kind of extended defence of poetry one finds in the others. 
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those elements which make the defence unique and uniquely important to our 
contemporary moment. Heaney‘s ‗defence in theory‘ is contained in his four main 
collections of essays – Preoccupations: Selected Prose 1968-1978, The Government of 
the Tongue: Selected Prose 1978-1987, The Redress of Poetry: Oxford Lectures and 
Finders Keepers: Selected Prose 1971-2001 – and in a handful of his other essays, 
including his Nobel lecture. Chapter 2, ‗The Processes of Poetry‘, focuses on the creative 
act itself as conceived of by Heaney in Preoccupations and The Government of the 
Tongue, and on the way in which the originating dynamics of the art form itself enable its 
efficacy, its forcibleness. Heaney‘s formulations in this regard constitute the substratum 
of his defence, of his claims for poetry, and in the following chapter, ‗The Political 
Accusation‘, I explore those claims with respect to what has always been, for Heaney, 
poetry‘s greatest accuser; it is once more in the essays from his two earliest prose 
collections that we find this argument taking shape.  
Heaney‘s central arguments are, despite Vendler‘s caveat in the extract already 
quoted, remarkably consistent across thirty-five years of writing and thinking. In many 
cases, they simply find a more eloquent and assured expression in his later work. The 
Redress of Poetry, however, represents the culmination of those ideas, its title essay 
providing the metaphor that is, ultimately, central to the defence as a whole. Thus my 
devotion of the entire fourth chapter of this thesis to that work and its title essay, in which 
Heaney‘s conception of poetry‘s potential as an art form extends beyond its capacity to 
respond to socio-political pressures, and becomes rather a claim for poetry‘s sufficiency 
as a counterbalance to the world and the weight of reality itself.    
 Given Heaney‘s own unfailing provision of both exempla and exemplars in his 
critical writing, it is instructive to demonstrate the relevance of his defence to his own 
practice as a poet. Chapter 5, ‗The Defence in Practice‘, presents five of Heaney‘s poems 
and demonstrates the ways in which, in one or another respect, they too exemplify what 
he maintains in his critical essays. These poems, while each recognizably Heaneyesque, 
are in a range of styles, on a variety of themes, and they date from the very beginning of 
Heaney‘s career to his more recent work. While not chosen at random, they nevertheless 
reveal the consonance between the literary critic and the practitioner – precisely that 
consonance which has added so much persuasive force to what we could call Heaney‘s 
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own witness to the importance of poetry. My analysis of them, even as it uses all of the 
touchstones to be found in Heaney‘s defence, should not, however, be read as an attempt 
to apply his literary-critical precepts to his verse in a mechanical fashion; that is neither 
the purpose of the defence nor that of the poems. Rather, my aim is to show how 
Heaney‘s central ideas of what poetry is and does are fulfilled in his own poetry, and how 
awareness of those ideas can deepen any reading of his verse.  
 
IV 
  A rowan like a lipsticked girl. 
Between the by-road and the main road 
alder trees at a wet and dripping distance 
stand off among the rushes. 
 
There are the mud-flowers of dialect 
and the immortelles of perfect pitch 
and that moment when the bird sings very close 
to the music of what happens.
23
 
 
I have spoken already – and I will speak again – of Heaney‘s ability, amounting at times 
to a kind of genius in itself, to give linguistic shape to the most apparently obscure, 
intuitive promptings, to give definitive expression to that which would otherwise seem to 
defy articulation. He does this in both his poetry and prose, and in the latter he does so 
most often when he writes of poetry‘s purpose in the world. The conviction that every 
poet must feel – the inner certainty that poetry is a worthwhile and indeed justifiable 
activity – is given the force of an argument, illuminated by any number of superbly 
chosen images, in Heaney‘s work. In his essays, I have found the satisfaction that I find 
otherwise only in the poems that move me most: that moment of recognition, the always 
surprising, always gratifying discovery that the art form has that within it which is 
inexhaustible in its capacity to mean. For that reason above all, I have chosen to write this 
particular thesis – for reasons which amount to a faith of the kind that Heaney has held 
throughout his career. In the matter of poetry and its place, Heaney‘s account is very 
close to – indeed, it is hardly a note away from – the music of what happens. 
                                                 
23
 Seamus Heaney, ‗Song‘, in New Selected Poems 1966-1987, (London: Faber & Faber, 1990), 127. 
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Chapter 1 
The Genealogy of a Defence 
[When poets] turn to the great masters of the past, they turn to an image of their own creation, one 
which is likely to be a reflection of their own imaginative needs, their own artistic inclinations and 
procedures. 
 
Seamus Heaney, ‗Envies and Identifications: Dante and the Modern Poet‘1  
 
I 
The defence of poetry in the history of English literature dates back, most famously, to 
Sir Philip Sidney‘s essay ‗An Apology for Poetry‘ (1595), written on the brink of a 
century that would see the emergence of, among others, Donne, Herbert, Milton and 
(perhaps most astonishingly of all) Shakespeare. Attempts to justify the art form 
continued – in largely unsystematic form – over the centuries. But it is with the advent of 
the nineteenth century, and specifically of Shelley and his ‗Defence of Poetry‘ (1821), 
that we are introduced to a whole tendency in the writing about poetry. As we approach 
the present, the number of ‗defences‘ would seem to grow exponentially as, more and 
more, the art form of poetry itself is seen to be in eclipse. Seamus Heaney‘s defence is, of 
course, part of the general genealogical line of apologies that begins with Sidney‘s. It is 
instructive, however, given the purpose of this thesis, to identify more specifically 
Heaney‘s direct and indirect influences, as well as writers whose defences of poetry form 
useful points of comparison and contrast. I use the term ‗genealogy‘ in this chapter 
loosely, therefore, to encompass the range of different relationships existing between 
Heaney‘s arguments and those of his predecessors and contemporaries. 
 On the face of it, given the literary-historical context in which both Sidney and 
Shelley made their arguments for poetry, it is difficult to imagine what their motivation 
for doing so might have been – or would be were it not for a paragraph in Sidney‘s 
defence in which he laments that poetry ‗from almost the highest estimation of learning is 
fallen to be the laughing-stock of children‘.2 His purpose, as soon becomes clear, is to 
defend poetry from the attack by ‗reason‘. Shelley, too, is concerned with defending 
                                                 
1
 Seamus Heaney, ‗Envies and Identifications: Dante and the Modern Poet‘, Irish University Review 15/1 
(1985): 5. 
2
 Sir Philip Sidney, ‗An Apology for Poetry Otherwise Known as The Defence of Poesy‘, in Sidney – An 
Apology for Poetry, Shelley – A Defence of Poetry, ed. H.A. Needham, (London: Ginn and Company, 
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poetry against the ‗challenge‘ of ‗reasoners and mechanists‘, whose view that ‗reason is 
more useful‘ threatens to relegate poetry to the realm of frivolity.3 In short, the art form 
would seem to have had as its chief denigrator science and the scientific method, and, 
more broadly, the materialist interpretation (and critique) of the world ever more 
dominant since the seventeenth century – what Blake contemptuously referred to as ‗the 
Baconian succession‘.  
Four hundred years later, this state of affairs is often said – by any number of 
critics, cultural commentators and poets themselves – to have reached a point of crisis. 
More than ever (and certainly more than Sidney could have imagined) poetry in the 
English-speaking world has been reduced to a ‗laughing-stock‘, and perhaps worse; in the 
eyes of many, particularly those educated readers who might once have given the art 
form some attention, it holds no interest at all. Rather, it has been relegated to the uneasy 
status of a specialist interest, its audience largely confined to students (that is, the 
classroom) and its practitioners to the ‗closed circuit‘ of the poetry reading circuit, 
whether in the United States, the United Kingdom or elsewhere. Those in the world 
outside this clique, if they pay it any heed at all, know that poetry is dead. Nor do they 
seem to consider this reason for lamentation. It is, quite simply, an art form – and not the 
first, historically speaking – that has been superseded by others. 
The claims made in the previous paragraph might seem too general and 
generalising. There are, after all, those who would maintain that poetry now reaches a 
wider audience than ever before and that the anxiety, not to say anguish, that underlies so 
many defences of the art form is unnecessarily defensive, even uncalled for. The Mexican 
poet Octavio Paz, for example, writing in the last part of the twentieth century about the 
American poetry scene, claims as much in The Other Voice.
4
 Nevertheless, there is by 
now a body of critical literature that affirms what Christopher Clausen, at the outset of his 
The Place of Poetry puts bluntly: the status of the art form ‗in English and American 
civilisation has become more and more peripheral‘. This is a problem, he continues, that 
has already been in existence for two centuries or so; it has ‗faced every poet since 
                                                 
3
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‗A Defence of Poetry‘, in Sidney – An Apology for Poetry, Shelley – A Defence of 
Poetry, ed. H.A. Needham, (London: Ginn and Company, 1931), 97. 
4
 Octavio Paz, ‗The Few and the Many‘, in The Other Voice: Essays on Modern Poetry, trans. H. Lane, 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), 84. 
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Wordsworth, and … has never been resolved‘.5 In his conception, all the poetic 
innovations of recent centuries, most obviously conspicuous in the Romantic revolution 
and thereafter the Modernist revolution, have, despite their innovative brilliance, come to 
nought. However much these innovations might have been appreciated, establishing a 
new audience for poetry (at least for a while), there persists a widespread consensus 
among critics and writers, particularly when it comes to the latter half of the twentieth 
century and beyond, that poetry is dying or is otherwise moribund. There have been 
recent critical studies whose very titles are based on the assumption that this death has 
already taken place – Vernon Shetley‘s After the Death of Poetry, obviously borrowing 
its title from the anti-theology of the 1960s which took it as read that God was dead, is 
only one such book.
6
  
The American essayist Joseph Epstein‘s famous 1988 article ‗Who killed 
poetry?‘, published in Commentary, is based on the same premise, and Epstein attempts 
to explain why and how with a pointed and critical assessment of poetry‘s place in 
America during the decades previous to the 1980s. ‗Contemporary poetry in the United 
States flourishes in a vacuum‘ is the statement which best encapsulates the crux of his 
argument. While creative writing programmes grow ever fuller, while poets are employed 
to teach such programmes, and while poetry readings happen almost nightly on campuses 
around America, poetry has lost its place in the world outside of this particular ghetto – 
which is to say, in the hearts and minds and, not least, the memories of the general 
American reader – and is dying, or is dead, as a result of this.7 It is, after all, that general 
reader who ensures the existence of the art form as a vital one. 
As evident in the Letters page of Commentary, there was a blizzard of attempted 
rebuttals to Epstein‘s central thesis. Its durability, not to say soundness, however, were 
demonstrated when, in 1991, the American poet and critic Dana Gioia published an 
essay, entitled ‗Can Poetry Matter?‘, which would become one of a series by that writer 
on the status of poetry in the United States. In this pivotal essay, Gioia echoes many of 
the observations of Randall Jarrell, who, in the middle part of the twentieth century, was 
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 Christopher Clausen, The Place of Poetry: Two Centuries of an Art in Crisis, (Kentucky: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1981), 1. 
6
 Vernon Shetley, After the Death of Poetry: Poet and Audience in Contemporary America, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993). 
7
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among the first and most prominent critics to notice and lament the poet‘s ‗social 
irrelevance‘, exploring issues like the ‗professionalisation of the poet‘ and poetry‘s 
increasing obscurity. Gioia‘s conclusions are, like Epstein‘s too, deeply pessimistic.8 
Poetry has vanished from the public eye to exist as a subculture, one characterised by an 
absence of sound criticism and dominated by the tacit understanding that poetry is no 
longer published to be read, but exists primarily as a means to achieving tenure in the 
academy.
 
Cut off from the cultural role it once fulfilled, poetry cannot regain its status, 
Gioia argues, until poets redirect their attention to the primary concerns and needs of 
human beings. As things stand at the time of his writing, however, poetry has become the 
coterie concern of a group distinguished by its isolation. Hence, again, its sickness. Gioia 
concludes his essay by offering, without Swiftian irony, ‗six modest proposals‘ for the 
reinstatement of poetry as a popular and relevant art form. These include honest criticism 
(he cites Jarrell as an example of such writing), an increased number of poetry 
performances (more public readings in conjunction with other art forms), and the 
inclusion of the poetry of other writers in any reading by an individual poet. The modesty 
of these suggestions, however, is such that they scarcely bear up against the weight of 
Gioia‘s gloom in the preceding ten pages of the essay. Though his final image is of 
poetry as an ‗ancient, spangle-feathered, unkillable phoenix rising from the ashes‘, the 
reader is neither persuaded nor particularly inspired.
9
 All the evidence simply adds 
weight to Epstein‘s contention that poetry has died. 
The picture, though with certain culturally specific modifications, has hardly been 
different in the United Kingdom or the rest of the English-speaking world, whether 
Australia or South Africa. In the 1950s, presenting a series of lectures at Harvard 
University, the Scottish writer Edwin Muir was referring to the selfsame predicament of 
poets back home when he spoke of their horrified realisation that their former audience 
had literally evaporated.
10
 And many of Philip Larkin‘s statements on poetry, including 
some of his most famous, are best read as his recognition of the ill-health, not to say 
                                                 
8
 Brad Leithauser, ‗Introduction‘, in No Other Book: Selected Essays, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 
xii. By ‗obscurity‘, Jarrell did not mean ‗difficulty‘, but rather the degree to which poetry had become 
obscured from the view of the general public. 
9
 Dana Gioia, ‗Can Poetry Matter?‘, The Atlantic Monthly 267.5 (1991): 105-106. 
10
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terminal decline, of an art form which has lost its former pleasure-seeking, and hence 
cash-paying, audience.
11
 In short, the plight of poetry is trans-Atlantic.  
 
II 
Given poetry‘s effective disappearance from public recognition and response, the 
culmination, if you like, of what Clausen calls its ongoing crisis, it is no wonder that a 
defence of poetry should now be the accepted companion to the poetic work of many 
writers. It is even, as Adam Zagajewski points out in ‗Against Poetry‘, expected.12 Any 
number of instances are to hand: Adrienne Rich‘s ‗Legislators of the World‘, Donald 
Hall‘s Death to the Death of Poetry, and Jorie Graham‘s ‗Introduction‘ to The Best 
American Poetry 1990, among a multitude of others.
13
 Yet none of these, despite the 
intentions and talents of their proponents, has constituted anything like a definitive 
rejoinder to all that is now ranged against poetry and its worth. In any case, the neglect of 
the art form has continued unabated.  
In previous history, at least up to the nineteenth century, it is science and the 
scientific method that have, in general, presented the greatest threat to poetry; this is the 
first of the foes against which poetry has had to contend historically. As Clausen implies, 
early defences have often enough been based on the premise that, contrary to the 
assumptions of science, the poetic imagination gives us truths which are as valid as 
anything science can offer.
14
 But the way of apprehending the world, indeed 
understanding it, which science makes possible, is the only form of knowing which now 
has credence – such has been the conviction of poetry‘s derogators. The truths of the 
imagination, however attractive, are not the truths of science: they belong to a mind, an 
epoch, characterised by a kind of intellectual infancy.  
                                                 
11
 See Philip Larkin, ‗The Pleasure Principle‘, in Required Writing: Miscellaneous Pieces 1955-1982, (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1982). Similar sentiments are expressed elsewhere in his writing. 
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 Adam Zagajewski, ‗Against Poetry‘, in A Defense of Ardor: Essays, trans. C. Cavanagh, (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 127. 
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 Adrienne Rich, ‗Legislators of the World‘, The Guardian, November 18, 2006; Donald Hall, Death to 
the Death of Poetry: Essays, Reviews, Notes, Interviews, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); 
Jorie Graham, ‗Introduction‘, in The Best American Poetry 1990, (New York: Collier Books, 1990), xv-
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 It is no doubt this particular denigration of his chosen art that Sir Philip Sidney 
has in mind when, in the opening paragraphs of his ‗Apology for Poetry‘ (or ‗The 
Defence of Poesy‘, to give it its full title), he chastises poetry‘s opponents for failing to 
acknowledge that poetry – not science – has been ‗the first light-giver to ignorance‘, the 
original form of all knowledge and teaching.
15
 This is one strand of what is, broadly 
speaking, a double-stranded defence. Written in response to the Puritan accusation, 
levelled by Stephen Gosson, of the immoral influence of poets, Sidney‘s argument is that, 
firstly, poetry in fact encourages the inclination towards moral goodness in its readers; 
and secondly, that poetry is a superior form of knowledge and pedagogy.
16
 Starting with 
poetry‘s broad cultural effects – as Gosson does in his essay on ‗The Schoole of Abuse‘ 
constituted by ‗Poets, Pipers, Plaiers, Iesters and suchlike Caterpillars of the 
Commonwealth‘17 – Sidney pays particular attention to the response of the individual 
character to poetry, showing how the art form is both socially and individually 
beneficial.
18
  
For our purposes, however, Sidney‘s defence is historically interesting for two 
reasons. Most importantly, it establishes poetry‘s first major foe: science. Listing the 
objections to poetry which he is attempting to refute – ‗the most important imputations 
laid to the poor poets‘ in the sixteenth century – Sidney‘s attention is given first to the 
claim there are ‗more fruitful knowledges‘ by comparison with which poetry appears a 
waste of time.
19
 His whole defence turns on the assertion that poetry‘s purpose is ‗to 
teach‘ – as do the sciences – ‗and delight‘ – an ability which, combined with poetry‘s 
educative properties, enables it in Sidney‘s view to surpass the natural sciences in its 
advantages to humankind.
20
 As a teacher of history, philosophy, morality and culture it is, 
he argues, unparalleled. Furthermore, poetry is deserving of all praise, according to 
Sidney, because it is ‗full of virtue-breeding delightfulness, and void of no gift that ought 
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to be in the noble name of learning‘.21 It not only teaches truth in all its forms, but it also 
imparts righteousness to its readers, and it does so, crucially, through its ability to delight 
the reader.  
The connection between pleasure and instruction in Sidney‘s defence is, as one 
critic has pointed out, ‗one of its major strategies for defending poetry‘, and it establishes 
Heaney‘s critical heredity from Sidney – poetry‘s pleasure-giving properties are affirmed 
throughout the Irish writer‘s defence, although, as we will see, his understanding of their 
effects differs markedly from Sidney‘s.22 Delight, for the Elizabethan, is the ‗royal road‘ 
(to use Freud‘s term) to one‘s betterment, morally speaking, as a human being, and his 
emphasis on delight and pleasure is distinctly utilitarian. In the opening section of his 
defence, Sidney recites the different cultures and languages in which poetry has served, 
through its form and subject, as a vehicle for learning: the Greeks ‗sang their natural 
philosophy in verses‘, as well as their ‗moral counsels‘; the Romans wrote their histories 
in poetry; it was Italian poets who first ‗made [the language] aspire to be a treasure-house 
of science‘. And even in Heaney‘s homeland, Ireland, ‗where truly learning goeth very 
bare‘, poets are revered for their learning and ability to teach.23 
 The fundamental distinction Sidney claims for the poet is that, unlike practitioners 
of the sciences – astronomers, mathematicians, philosophers, linguists, doctors, even 
musicians – he or she is not constrained by the limitations of the natural world, by its 
laws: ‗he goeth hand in hand with Nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her 
gifts‘.24 The poet creates anew, while the scientist describes the existent creation, and 
operates within it like a mouse within the confines of a maze: the scientist‘s is the most 
determined of existences. In Sidney‘s assertion of such things, we find, in germinal form, 
something of the relationship between poetry and reality that Wallace Stevens, over three 
hundred years later, will emphasise and on which Heaney will elaborate: the poet creates 
a ‗better‘ version of nature, as Sidney puts it, a different reality, but one that is 
nonetheless linked to the actual. For Sidney, however, that relationship is significant 
because it gives poetry its pedagogical power – never a concern for either Stevens or 
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Heaney, for whom, as we shall see, poetry is faced with a rather different kind of enemy. 
‗Learning‘, in Sidney‘s definition, has as its ultimate purpose ‗the perfection … of our 
degenerate souls‘, and while none of the sciences alone can accomplish anything close to 
that perfection, poetry in all its forms (as he goes on to show through comparison with its 
scientific ‗competitors‘) deserves ‗the laurel crown‘ for the holistic betterment it enables 
through its conjunction of teaching and giving pleasure.
25
 Aesthetics leads directly to 
ethics, or, in Sidney‘s terms, morality. Thus Sidney is able to maintain that, in the realm 
of human learning, ‗is our poet the monarch‘.26 
 The other accusations against which Sidney defends poetry are telling, too, of the 
time in which he wrote, though they would later not assume nearly so much prominence. 
Given the effective equation seen to exist between art and morality, it is a particularly 
damaging charge against poetry that it is, according to its late sixteenth-century 
detractors, ‗the mother of lies‘, and ‗the nurse of abuse‘, suspect because of the 
immorality or amorality that it promotes. Both of these charges presuppose that poetry 
makes things happen, enacts change – immoral, corruptive change, indeed, but change 
nonetheless. Its lies are damaging only because we are seduced by them into false belief. 
The ‗abuse‘ it engenders is the transformation of moral men and women into hedonists 
and sinners.
27
 These accusations, of course, have a long history. They originate with 
Plato, who, ironically, in his The Republic, credited poetry with a greater degree of 
efficacy than poets themselves, by and large, would claim for it in the twentieth century. 
By that time, poetry would be fighting to be recognised as efficacious in any sense.  
 The pedagogical, truth-telling function of poetry had, by the nineteenth century, 
become far more significant than Sidney could have foreseen. In the eyes of many, the 
continued expansion of science and industry had come to threaten the spiritual health of 
the Western world – the very existence of spiritual humankind as such. In the two 
hundred years between Sidney‘s ‗Apology for Poetry‘ and Percy Bysshe Shelley‘s 
‗Defence of Poetry‘, religion was to lose much of its influence, its social agency, and, in 
its place, poetry came to be viewed as a source of revelation, as the origin of religious 
belief and experience, at least in the Romantic conception. Shelley‘s essay was a reply to 
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Thomas Love Peacock‘s ‗The Four Ages of Poetry‘, an attack on the Romantic poets 
which accused them of ‗wallowing in the rubbish of departed ignorance‘ while science 
and politics elevated and edified society as a whole.
28
 For this reason, perhaps, Shelley is 
more preoccupied than Sidney with refuting the notion that poetry is mere intellectual 
frivolity in comparison with more exalted, scientific forms of knowledge.
29
 In the 
Romantic era, science, and the kind of mind moulded by science, was still the greatest foe 
– greater, in fact, than it was for Sidney, and not surprisingly given the massive scientific 
advancement, and its technological application, that had taken place in the intervening 
centuries. Shelley, however, invokes a new, altogether different kind of weapon against 
the enemy: the imagination, that notion so central to most Romantic ideology, is set in 
opposition to reason. The concept of the imagination will recur in Heaney, making him 
an essentially neo-Romantic writer and poet, and it is useful to be more specific, at this 
point, about what this aspect of the mind amounts to in the Romantic conception.
30
 
The Romantic poets – including Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Blake and, of 
course, Shelley – conceived of poetry as an art form primarily in its relation to the 
imaginative faculty. In the history of Romanticism, as Stephen Prickett points out, there 
were two ways of viewing that faculty: firstly, as a means to perceive a transcendent 
order, as a point of access to the spiritual realm, so to speak; and secondly, as a lens 
through which we might view the world around us more clearly and minutely.
31
 Integral 
to both of these aspects is the imagination‘s status as a creative force, which, as Shelley 
declares, ‗creates anew the universe‘.32 In his defence, these two views are intertwined – 
poetry, the embodiment of the imagination, both ‗lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of 
the world, and makes familiar objects be as if they were not familiar‘ and also ‗redeems 
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from decay the visitations of the divinity in man‘.33 The power of the imagination as 
creator, as source of both sacred and secular revelation, aligns it in the Romantic view – 
and most certainly in Shelley‘s view – with a kind of surrogate divinity. 
It is perhaps to be expected, therefore, that Shelley should in his defence assign 
any number of roles to the poet, that human vessel of the imagination. These include, as 
Jeannine Johnson points out in Why Write Poetry?, ‗the duties of prosecutor and 
defendant, as well as the responsibilities of … judge, jury, political reformer, spiritual 
redeemer, prophet, lover, and, most famously, legislator‘.34 At the heart of each of these, 
indeed at the heart of poetry‘s worth, is the imagination. Like Sidney, Shelley 
understands the function of poetry – of the imagination – as being to ‗colour‘ reality 
‗with its own light‘, to take the actual and enhance it, combine its parts, create it afresh. 
Reason, for Shelley, describes (as science did for Sidney) that which is already known; 
the imagination, on the other hand, reveals the relationships between elements, and their 
value both individually and corporately. The relative importance of reason and the 
imagination is evident in Shelley‘s statement that ‗reason is to the imagination as the 
instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance‘.35 The 
world in the absence of imagination is, according to the Romantic poet, a hampered, 
tenuous place – not worth living in. 
It is the threat of this very state of affairs to which Shelley responds in his 
defence. Science, he declares, has outdistanced the imagination, and resulted in a 
spiritually and emotionally impoverished society: ‗the cultivation of those sciences which 
have enlarged the limits of the empire of man over the external world, has, for want of 
the poetical faculty, proportionally circumscribed those of the internal world‘. It is 
acknowledged that ‗the exercise of the imagination is most delightful‘, but it is claimed 
that the exercise of reason is ‗more useful‘; thus the human creature is now enslaved to 
reason. Furthermore, the predominance of science and industry has failed to alter society 
usefully. Shelley warns the ‗mechanist‘ and the ‗political economist‘ of the consequences 
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of their failure to retain contact with ‗those first principles which belong to the 
imagination‘: ‗the rich … become richer, and the poor … become poorer‘.36 
Early in his defence, Shelley attempts to establish the credibility of poetry by 
arguing that ‗language itself is poetry‘. According to this formulation, poetry is 
constitutional to humankind, by virtue of its exact relation to that which is most 
instinctual in us – namely, our linguistic faculty. Language, in turn, is the product of the 
imagination. Without the imagination, and without its manifestation in poetry, Shelley 
claims – in an assertion echoed by T.S. Eliot a century later – society‘s speech ‗will be 
dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse‘.37 The primary role of the poet, 
however, is not, for Shelley, guardian of the language. Poets in fact, in his conception, are 
seers, priests in everything but name. They ‗apprehend the true and the beautiful‘, and in 
so doing they become ‗prophets‘, seeing and understanding – indeed creating – both the 
present order and that within it which foreshadows a future one. They ‗draw into a certain 
propinquity with … that partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which 
is called religion‘.38 Consequently, poetry nourishes and sustains humankind‘s spiritual 
faculty. It is, for Shelley, religion by other means; and the imagination is God by other 
means, or the Holy Spirit moving, with its creative force, upon the waters of the intellect. 
Poetry itself is spoken of in terms which directly mirror the language of the Bible. In 
Shelley‘s view, therefore, the art form is nothing short of ‗eternal truth‘; the poet 
‗participates in the eternal, the infinite and the one‘.39  
Poetry‘s capacity as truth-teller, as source of revelation – indeed, its capacity to 
effect anything at all – is bound up, for Shelley as it was for Sidney, with its ability to 
give pleasure. Shelley defines ‗utility‘, both with reference to reason and to the 
imagination, as the means to produce the kind of pleasure that ‗strengthens and purifies 
the affections, enlarges the imagination, and adds spirit to sense‘. In these terms, poetry is 
ultimately and essentially useful, in contrast to science and reason, which provide instead 
the lesser pleasure of a factual grasp of the world and the security of that knowledge.
40
 
Not even scientific enlightenment, however, is out of reach of the imagination, for poetry 
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is also ‗the centre and circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends all 
science, and that to which all science must be referred. It is at the same time the root and 
the blossom of all other systems of thought‘.41 In short, poetry is superior to science in 
the most fundamental sense – the sense in which a parent, being older, being the 
originator, is superior to the child whom he or she has parented. 
Shelley concludes his defence with what T.S. Eliot, writing a hundred years later, 
calls ‗the highest point of exaggeration‘ in the claims made for poetry in that period.42 
And indeed the boldness of Shelley‘s contentions, the element of exaggeration that Eliot 
identifies in them, is perhaps the surest sign of Shelley‘s sense of the magnitude of the 
threat that poetry faces. His defence, for all its brilliance, is also a rhetorical pre-emptive 
strike, it seems, against his dismayed sense of an art form‘s inability to sustain itself in 
the face of the forces, historical and otherwise, ranged against it. This is nowhere more 
evident than in the flourish with which his defence of poetry ends. ‗Poets‘, Shelley 
notoriously claims, ‗are the unacknowledged legislators of the world‘ – a phrase more 
accurately describing, as Auden would later (facetiously) suggest, ‗the secret police‘.43 
Even if they are unrecognised, poets invisibly lay down through their work the very 
terms, indeed the laws, according to which the world and human cognition itself 
operate.
44
 Heaney will also make very large claims for the art form, though he, perhaps 
strategically, will never formulate his arguments for the centrality of poetry in such 
verbally extravagant fashion. Judging by Shelley‘s rhetoric, one sometimes gets the 
impression that the troubled space in which religion now finds itself is the consequence 
of a kind of fortunate fall, in that it has given, according to the Romantic poet, pre-
eminence to the imagination. Heaney, on the other hand, would appear to be at peace 
with religion, content to allow it whatever place it currently has in the world, and he does 
not try to erect poetry as an idol – indeed, as I will argue, he never sees poetry as a 
substitute for anything else. Nevertheless, he is in many respects in direct lineal descent 
from Shelley and the whole Romantic inheritance. 
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Science, however, figures almost nowhere in Heaney‘s work as a prominent threat 
to poetry. In fact, he gives all the appearance of someone quite comfortable with both the 
scientific method and the effects of applied science, even when a note of ecological 
concern appears, as well it might, in his later poetry.
45
 Almost all the great English poets 
from the Romantics to the Modernists, not excepting Eliot and Auden, may, as Clausen 
points out, have been antagonistic towards science, both in its social and intellectual 
effects. But with the turn of the twentieth century it becomes more and more apparent 
that there are a number of other foes with which poetry has to contend, and which, no less 
than science, are concerned to call into question its very raison d’être.  
Some, even until recently, do continue to see science as a threat that has by no 
means diminished – in the mind of Czeslaw Milosz, a poet in whom the Romantic legacy 
(in its Polish articulation) is also a living one, what he calls ‗the lesson of biology‘ has 
dealt the imagination an all but mortal wound.
46
 Such defenders are, however, rarities by 
now. And perhaps this reflects, broadly, the fact that the predominance of science is such 
that it has become pointless to argue with it; our lives are so governed by the applied 
sciences that to attack it as a social force would be at best futile, and at worst ludicrous. 
In any case, the scientific enemy has changed shape, over the last century in particular, 
and is now embodied, for some, like Heidegger, in technology, and the technology-based 
forms of popular culture increasingly available in contemporary societies. In his ‗The 
Question Concerning Technology‘, as Dreyfus and Wrathall indicate, Heidegger 
considers whether poetry is strong enough to resist ‗the dangers of technology‘ – the 
threat it poses to the clarity and meaning with which we see the world through poetic 
utterance.
47
 It is, moreover, the very success of science in its technological application 
that gives rise to the accusation presented by environmental concerns, prompting 
defences based in ecocriticism, a genre which ‗seeks to evaluate texts and ideas in terms 
of their coherence and usefulness as responses to environmental crises‘.48  
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The early Modernists, on the other hand, were alert to an entirely different set of 
enemies. In the eyes of writers like Ezra Pound, for instance, the principle obstacle to the 
continued flourishing of poetry was the advent of mass society, and the ‗dumbing down‘ 
that he, as one among a self-appointed elite, saw this as effecting. Writing in 1951, he 
claims that poetry cannot possibly survive in a world dominated by a dull-witted mob.
49
 
The Modernist revolution led by Pound brought about, ironically, a threat of a different 
order in the changed nature of poetry itself. The art form in this instance is not under 
attack by any external enemy, but is instead compromised by its own self-mutilation, its 
wilful obscurity and the very elitism exemplified by Pound‘s grievance above. The 
difficulty, not to say impenetrability, of much Modernist poetry makes it its own worst 
enemy, severing that line of connection it once had with its audience. This is, of course, 
the complaint of those like Laura Riding and Robert Graves, in their Survey of Modernist 
Poetry, and Philip Larkin.
50
  
These threats and the responses they provoke have, to be sure, little direct bearing 
on Heaney‘s defence or the enemy to which Heaney himself responds, although it is 
widely acknowledged that the current isolation of the art form owes something, at least, 
to the inaccessibility of its modernist and indeed postmodernist forms. Pound‘s argument 
brings to light, however, the kinds of challenges that poetry was perceived to be facing in 
the first half of the last century, those opponents which, importantly, signalled the decline 
in significance of the scientific challenge and paved the way for the socio-political 
pressures that would come to be exerted on the art form.  
For none of these adversaries (and I have by no means exhausted the possible 
candidates) has assumed the dominance of the accusation levelled against poetry by those 
whose first and last priority is the improvement or revolutionary restructuring of society: 
to whit, politics. In a sense, this merely reflects a broad tendency in late nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century history in the northern hemisphere. The unceasing transformation, of 
the most radical sort, that Marx saw as being definitive of nineteenth-century capitalism, 
was only another element in creating a broad social consensus that societies were 
designed to evolve; and always in the direction of an improved version of themselves. 
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Politics, understood as change, thus came to dominate the minds of men and women in a 
way which was unprecedented. And likewise the expectation – often the demand – that 
the only thing (whether object or action) that had value was that which contributed to 
social betterment. This increase in the influence of politics and the political is reflected in 
the quotation from Thomas Mann that Yeats, somewhat scornfully, uses to preface his 
poem ‗Politics‘: ‗In our time the destiny of man presents its meanings in political 
terms‘.51 Aided and abetted by an unrelenting series of social and political upheavals in 
the twentieth century, as well as its mass movements and revolutions, politics has come 
to take the place of science as the deity to which every aspect of society and culture must 
answer as to its relevance. 
Thus, with the advent of the twentieth century, poetry is culpable because it is 
useless – so the accusation goes. Socially, politically, it is without efficacy. It makes 
nothing happen or, if it makes something happen, it is the wrong thing. In short, if many 
twentieth-century practitioners have felt it necessary to defend poetry, it is, recalling 
Shelley and Sidney, because the art form is worthless; but the reason for that 
worthlessness has changed. It is politics, not science, which now says that poetry is 
without point and purpose. 
All of this is writ large in the case of Heaney and his career. It would be 
impossible to overemphasise the importance of Northern Ireland and its calamitous 
history in his development, had not numerous critics paid it detailed attention already and 
tracked the particular events impacting on that development.
52
 While there is no need to 
cover ground already traversed by so many critics, the Troubles of that country – its 
political turmoil – have been crucial in imbuing him with a sense that the relationship 
between poetry and politics, between aesthetics and ethics, is deeply conflictual. And it is 
the ideologues in that struggle, those all too ready to accuse him and his art form of gross 
irresponsibility towards a society in travail, who have been the figures with which 
Heaney has, above all, battled. Poetry, as he will argue, is efficacious, contrary to what 
those primarily governed by political imperatives might say; only it is efficacious in a 
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way which is infinitely more subtle than is generally appreciated or accepted. It might 
make nothing happen, as Auden claimed. But it is also, as Auden went on to say (and the 
second half of that sentence in his elegy for Yeats is often ignored), ‗a way of happening, 
a mouth‘. 
 
III 
That World War II should have prompted the chief Modernist protagonists to become 
ever more aware of the political accusation against poetry – that it should have given that 
accusation greater weight – is not surprising. In a 1942 letter to E. Martin Browne, T.S. 
Eliot, as he worked on ‗Little Gidding‘, wrote the following: 
 
in the midst of what is going on now, it is hard, when you sit down at a desk, to 
feel confident that morning after morning spent fiddling with words and rhythms 
is justified activity – especially as there is never any certainty that the whole thing 
won‘t have to be scrapped. And on the other hand, external or public activity is 
more of a drug than is this solitary toil which often seems so pointless.
53
 
 
Concerned though he may have been at this stage about the validity of his vocation, Eliot 
did not in fact see politics as the Goliath which it had already been for some poets in the 
1930s in the United Kingdom (Auden, Spender and MacNeice, for example), and which 
it would be for many others thereafter throughout Europe. His defence, nonetheless, 
implicitly answers one aspect of the political challenge, in that its argument for poetry is 
fundamentally utilitarian. For Eliot, as for Sidney and Shelley, poetry is useful to society; 
Eliot, however, unlike his predecessors, gives a new emphasis to that assertion.  
The view that poetry acts as a cleansing agent on the common language had long 
been held by Eliot‘s contemporary, Ezra Pound, who asserted in ‗Writers and Writing‘ 
that ‗good writers are those who keep the language efficient … keep it accurate, keep it 
clear‘.54 George Orwell, another of Eliot‘s contemporaries, was to write in ‗Politics and 
the English Language‘ of the deliberate opacity, the mendacity, of twentieth-century 
politics and its discourse, its propensity for leaching the language of meaning, or 
muddying its semantic waters in order to conceal the ugly truth of political matters as 
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they stood in that century.
55
 While Orwell himself was not concerned with poetry‘s 
potential as a weapon against that particular enemy, his sense that language was in need 
of such protection was typical of his time. In The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, 
Eliot – almost inadvertently – allows us to glimpse one of the impulses behind his own 
writing on poetry: ‗every poet would like, I fancy, to be able to think that he had some 
direct social utility‘. And although he goes on to insist that ‗poetry is of course not to be 
defined by its uses‘, the somewhat wistful foregoing comment and the substance of many 
of his essays on poetry – not to say their very titles, like ‗The Social Function of Poetry‘ 
– betray his determination to demonstrate that poetry does indeed have some kind of 
utility.
56
 Though, like Heaney‘s, the emphasis of Eliot‘s defence of poetry would change 
over time, the conviction that poetry is the highest form of language predominates. The 
ramifications of this conviction for other, later defenders of poetry, as well as for the 
identification of poetry‘s specific enemies, are clear. It serves, as we will see, as a point 
of contact between Heaney and Eliot, both in its direct influence on the Irishman and in 
its presence, however substratal, in the genealogical line of defences between the two 
writers.   
Defences of poetry are always a means of defining the poet‘s responsibilities, his 
or her primary allegiances. For Shelley, the deepest obligation is clearly to the 
imagination. For Eliot, however, as he asserts in ‗The Social Function of Poetry‘, the 
poet‘s first duty is ‗to preserve, and … to extend and improve‘ his or her ‗language‘, and 
his second duty, fulfilled via language, is to society as a whole:
57
  
 
[poetry] makes a difference to the speech, to the sensibility, to the lives of all the 
members of a society, to all the members of the community, to the whole people, 
whether they read and enjoy poetry or not; even, in fact, whether they know the 
names of their greatest poets or not.
58
 
 
The benefits of poetry result from its linguistic virtues: social amelioration begins, Eliot 
implies, with linguistic improvement. The art form, he writes, has value because it 
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expands the scope of our consciousness and ‗refines our sensibility‘; and rather like the 
fluoride added at the source of a water system, it has an effect on the oral, and 
consequently mental hygiene of all, whether they are aware of it or not.
59
 In this he is 
again like Pound, who claims that poetry ‗has to do with the clarity and vigour of ―any 
and every‖ thought and opinion … with maintaining the very cleanliness of the tools, the 
health of the very matter of thought itself‘.60 Poetry – by operating on the common coin 
of consciousness, language itself, cleansing it of the impurities that inevitably build up in 
it – is uniquely placed to benefit society and indeed to preserve the health of the body 
politic.
61
  
Furthermore, at the time of his writing, Eliot feels his nation to be on the brink of 
a sociolinguistic catastrophe; and his portrayal of the consequences should poetry fail in 
its sanitising mission clarifies the degree to which he holds the art form to be useful in the 
most practical, vital sense. His impression of his mother tongue in the middle part of the 
twentieth century is not unlike that expressed in a certain kind of ‗letter to the editor‘ in 
South African newspapers post-1994, inevitably written by the white, English-speaking 
and middle-aged – an impression of ‗a chaos of language, in which there are discoverable 
no standard of writing, and an increasing indifference to etymology and the history of the 
use of words‘. The remedy, for Eliot, is to remind poets and critics of their ‗responsibility 
… for the preservation of the language‘;62 and the consequences of their allowing 
linguistic chaos to perpetuate, of poets failing in their task to nurture and protect the 
language, to wring out the muck of unrefined and hackneyed expression, is described 
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frankly by the Modernist writer in the introduction to The Use of Poetry and the Use of 
Criticism:  
 
the people which ceases to care for its literary inheritance becomes barbaric; the 
people which ceases to produce literature ceases to move in thought and 
sensibility. The poetry of a people takes its life from the people‘s speech, and in 
turn gives life to it; and represents its highest point of consciousness, its greatest 
power and its most delicate sensibility.
63
 
 
From this we can see that, for Eliot, poetry is not just coincidentally useful; it is one of 
the foundation-stones of civilisation itself. If poetry is neglected, or otherwise subject to 
indifference, a society will – such is the dire force of Eliot‘s prediction – effectively 
disintegrate.  
 It is similarly clear that, in Eliot‘s conception, poetry is tasked with carrying an 
enormous burden. It is not just one source of that which Dr Johnson, for instance, was 
pointing to when he remarked that literature should ‗enable readers better to enjoy life or 
better to endure it‘, but it is also the very scaffolding that enables a social structure to 
stand.
64
 Why it should be seen in this light is demonstrated in Eliot‘s own writing. If 
poetry is the pre-eminent linguistic operation of which human beings are capable, it is not 
only prior to any other discipline or activity which one might care to name – sociology, 
philosophy, and science, not least – but it should be recognised and regarded as such. 
Whether this view carries real weight, or whether it is a kind of grandiloquent hope 
(despite Eliot‘s always staid phrasing of the matter) is, of course, open to debate. While 
we might agree that some of Eliot‘s own work does, in his paraphrase of Mallarmé in 
‗Little Gidding‘, ‗purify the dialect of the tribe‘ (his poetic rendering of the same 
argument), there seems no reason why good prose, for instance, should not be equally 
equipped to perform this function. Orwell, for one, would have been of this conviction. In 
any case, there are enough instances of poetry – even, it could be argued, certain passages 
in Eliot himself – which offend against Pound‘s maxim in ‗How To Read‘: ‗great 
literature is simply language charged with meaning to the utmost possible degree‘.65 
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Perhaps with a sense of the tenuousness of his own argument, its over-reaching 
nature, Eliot will, in the latter part of his career especially, claim a slightly different 
utility for poetry. As one of Eliot‘s biographers, Lyndall Gordon, affirms, for the later 
Eliot  
 
the rhythmic words of poetry must be an alternative to God‘s burning Word. A 
classic language, precise, ordered, wide open to both old and new, receptive to 
subtleties of thought and feeling, might become … a perfected vessel for timeless 
content.
66
 
 
This notion of poetry as a kind of ladder to God is the culmination of Eliot‘s thought 
about its role in relation to language: no longer merely a linguistically purifying force at 
work in society, poetry becomes a means of spiritual sanctification. There are states of 
consciousness in Eliot‘s conception of poetry which are finally, emphatically religious, 
moments of transcendent vision which it is the poet‘s duty – certainly it was Eliot‘s own 
self-appointed task – to adumbrate. In this way, poetry, always obliged to work with a 
language which, Eliot claimed, was subject to decay and imprecision, could not only 
perform the essential, socially hygienic function of refreshing that stale language, but it 
could aspire to using it in such a way that it was not something apart from the language of 
divine revelation, indeed the Word of God. The ambition for it to be such was, as Eliot 
was forced to acknowledge, a hopeless one both for himself as a writer and for poetry.
67
 
Yet it was, for him, finally the only worthwhile aspiration of the art form – the one that 
redeemed poetry itself (which being part of the fallen world was no less in need of 
redemption than any other aspect or activity).  
As we will see, Heaney stands in marked contrast to such ambitions for his art. 
While his defence is unapologetically and characteristically imbued with a sense of the 
numinous, as well as a wealth of religious metaphor, he never reduces poetry to the status 
of spiritual instrument, ancillary to religious illumination. In a sense, by grounding his 
defence in the imagination, ultimately of that Romantic provenance which Eliot 
ostensibly abhorred (although in practice, as C.K. Stead points out, he in fact ‗wore the 
ribbons of one party while in the secrecy of the polling booth compulsively voting for the 
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other‘), Heaney is able to provide a more far-reaching defence of poetry, unattached to 
any doctrinal ends, than Eliot.
68
 
Of course, every aspect of Eliot‘s central argument can be called into question. 
His fundamentally utilitarian view of poetry can be compared, for instance, with that of 
writers like Basil Bunting, who, as the contemporary Australian poet Les Murray points 
out, objected strongly to the idea of poetry as ‗useful‘ at all.69 Eliot, Bunting claimed, was 
unavoidably influenced by the utilitarian outlook of his time, in view of which  
 
it is wrong to loaf and gawp about instead of working steadily at something 
useful, and of course it is wrong and foolish to write poetry unless it can be seen 
to purify the dialect of the tribe or keep the plebs in order or perform some other 
useful function.
70
 
 
This, as we have seen, was the very conviction plaguing Eliot as he wrote ‗Little 
Gidding‘. In Bunting‘s opinion, poetry makes no significant contribution to the ‗process 
of thought‘ – a fact which does not lessen the pleasure we derive from poems.71 W.B. 
Stanford underlines the problems of the utilitarian stance in Enemies of Poetry, which is 
not unlike the position of all ‗moralist‘ critics, who consider it imperative that poetry 
contribute to a better society by positively influencing its citizens. That there is not, in 
our time or any other, evidence suggesting even a fragile connection between literary 
sophistication and moral rectitude is something that Stanford goes on to point out. And it 
makes the position of such critics untenable.
72
 Poetry, Bunting argues, needs no more 
justification than the singing of a bird; it is a natural, an instinctive part of the human 
creature.
73
  
Eliot, however, writes as a poet under pressure to conform his art to the utilitarian 
standard of his time and place, and doing so he betrays, in the exaggerated nature of his 
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claims, an understandable anxiety. His insistence, for example, that the scope of poetry‘s 
influence is not affected by the size of its audience, while not without its own, albeit 
somewhat strained, logic, seems characterised by desperation rather than complete 
conviction. Zagajewski, in ‗A Defense of Ardor‘, suggests that the entire genre of the 
defence is characterised by just this. 
 
It is a desperate genre, with something panic-stricken about it. The titles 
themselves, which struggle to convince us of poetry‘s ‗necessity‘, vitality, 
indispensability, sound nonetheless suspiciously close to capitulation. If you have 
to insist so strenuously…74 
 
Eliot‘s – and Pound‘s – abundant use of scientific metaphors for the work of poetry is 
also telling in this regard;
75
 adopting the language of the discipline which has, 
historically, most threatened their own, they try, in a sense, to smuggle poetry into the 
world of fact and function, to prove it acceptable and objective through figurative 
comparison.
76
 Heaney will inherit Eliot‘s anxiety, to be sure; but, as my next three 
chapters will show, his manner of allaying it will be rather different. 
 This is not to say that the Irish poet is without his own beliefs in the social, 
healthful benefits of poems.  
 
They do get something aggrieved out of their authors‘ systems, but their purpose 
is as public as it is personal. They act like their society‘s immunity systems, going 
to attack whatever unhealthy or debilitating forces are at work in the body politic. 
And in this, they manifest poetry‘s highest potential, its function as an agent of 
possible transformation, of evolution towards that more radiant and generous life 
which the imagination desires.
77
 
          
Heaney‘s reference to the health of society is strongly reminiscent of Eliot‘s terminology; 
in fact, they would seem to be of one mind on this score. As revealed in the above 
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quotation from one of his essays, for Heaney, as for Eliot, poetry is a kind of supreme 
antioxidant in the bloodstream of the body politic. Yet – and this distinction is critical – 
in the Irish writer‘s view, this apparently utilitarian function of the art form is merely a 
happy consequence of poetry‘s performing its most crucial function, which is, for 
Heaney, all about being itself. The exceptional thing about poetry, his essays reveal, is 
that simply by remaining true to that which uniquely constitutes it, the demands of its 
own form – without ulterior social purpose – it can, paradoxically, accomplish a wholly 
profitable range of effects, social not least. 
Many a critic has drawn attention to Eliot‘s extraordinary sensibility, his ability to 
divine and unearth poetry in places where others saw none. This is, one suspects, in good 
part a function of what Eliot called ‗the auditory imagination‘, that capacity unique to the 
poet, and always conspicuous in the great poet, to hear in language, at a pre-semantic 
level, those phonetic properties which would literally empower a poem, making the art 
itself the most potent and memorable form of human speech. (Almost every phrase that 
Eliot ‗steals‘ from another poet or dramatist gives evidence of this.) But at no point does 
Eliot make use of this concept, admittedly only briefly sketched in ‗Matthew Arnold‘, in 
advancing his argument for the social utility of poetry. He is, rather, describing those 
dynamics of creativity that are at work in any true poet‘s practice.  
For Heaney, on the other hand, the auditory imagination becomes the very 
essence of the matter of poetry‘s purpose. In fact, it is a mark of Heaney‘s own 
distinctive, if very different, sensibility, amounting like Eliot‘s to a kind of genius at 
times, that he is able to make use (albeit with his own modulations) of ostensibly minor 
notions like Eliot‘s, and deploy them to give added weight to his own defence of poetry. 
This is also one of his great characteristics as a critic, indeed as a reader: he is a supreme 
borrower and amalgamator of his sources. 
 
IV  
The idea of poetry‘s linguistically prophylactic effects remains as a constantly recurring, 
underlying element in the work of many another defender of poetry. And, given the 
nature of twentieth-century history, it could not have been otherwise. In the case of 
Wallace Stevens, however, we find a very different kind of reason advanced for the 
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necessity of poetry. In his conception, it is poetry‘s genetic ability to withstand not so 
much the degenerative effects of linguistic misuse, but the burden of reality itself, 
existential as well as political, that makes the art form all-important to humankind. Poetry 
again and again justifies its existence because, at root, it enables us not only to endure, 
but to prevail against the human condition as such. Central to this claim is the fact that 
the art form provides us with the most complete embodiment of the workings of the 
imagination. And – hence the importance of Wallace Stevens in any account of Seamus 
Heaney – this will be cardinal for the latter as well.  
 The Necessary Angel, Stevens‘ 1951 collection of critical prose, is subtitled 
Essays on Reality and the Imagination, and it is the opening essay, ‗The Noble Rider and 
the Sound of Words‘, which best presents his understanding of the relationship between 
these two aspects of our experience.  For Stevens, it is of paramount importance that the 
imaginative faculty exists in a symbiotic relationship with reality: if the imagination 
abandons all that is real for sheer fantasy, its effects may be intense, but they will be 
short-lived and ultimately impotent: 
 
the imagination loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to what is real. When it 
adheres to the unreal and intensifies what is unreal, while its first effect may be 
extraordinary, that effect is the maximum effect that it will ever have.
78
 
 
This caveat is, as we will see, the obvious precursor to Heaney‘s insistence in The 
Redress of Poetry that poetry be equal in its complexity and gravity to the reality out of 
which it arises.
79
 For both Stevens and Heaney, poetry is defined by its embodiment of 
the imagination, but that embodiment must have, in Stevens‘ words, ‗the strength of 
reality or none at all‘.80 Writers must at the same time beware, however, that they do not 
allow the imagination to give way under the weight of reality; a balance between the two 
is essential.
81
 More and more, Stevens writes, we are succumbing to what he calls ‗the 
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pressure of reality‘. In part, this is owing to changes in lifestyle and education; but these 
pale in comparison with ‗the pressure of an external event or events on the consciousness 
to the exclusion of any power of contemplation‘.82 The most obvious such event for 
Stevens, of course, is World War II. The task of poetry, in the face of such calamities, is 
described in one of his most famous passages, in which he describes what he refers to as 
the ‗nobility‘ found, in particular, in poetry: 
 
it is a violence from within that protects us from a violence without. It is the 
imagination pressing back against the pressure of reality. It seems, in the last 
analysis, to have something to do with our self-preservation, and that, no doubt, is 
why the expression of it, the sound of its words, helps us to live our lives.
83
  
 
 Much of Stevens‘ work is focused on this delicate relationship: on the one hand, 
the importance of the imagination resisting the actual, and on the other the equal 
importance of the imagination coordinating its operations with reality, for ‗reality is the 
central reference for poetry‘.84 Daniel Tobin speaks of Stevens‘ ‗ideal equilibrium 
between poetry and reality, between transcendence and immanence‘.85 Reality and the 
imagination, Stevens writes, are ‗equal and inseparable‘.86 Without the imagination, we 
cannot properly perceive, or indeed conceive of, reality; and without acknowledging the 
real, the imagination cannot be of any use to us.  
This notion of equality underlies Stevens‘ views on poetry‘s truth-telling function: 
‗poetic truth is an agreement with reality‘, and not subject to it.87 Whatever moral truths 
or ethical precepts the poet‘s work might present, Stevens claims, these are secondary to 
the primary function of poetry and its truths – which may, in literal terms, be lies – 
namely, the enactment of the imagination. Without the latter, our perceptions of the world 
are, in effect, disabled; we cannot clearly see or productively consider the otherwise 
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overwhelming burden of the real.
88
 In his or her disposition to fabricate, to invent, in 
short to imagine, lies the power of the poet: 
 
what makes the poet the potent figure that he is … is that he creates the world to 
which we turn incessantly and without knowing it and that he gives to life the 
supreme fictions without which we are unable to conceive of it.
89
 
 
In Stevens‘ thinking, the fictions secreted by the imagination are necessary, and vitally 
so, because our existence as human beings is, to put it bluntly, inconceivable without 
them. Poetry, the cardinal product of the imagination, is a biological, an evolutionary 
necessity; it gives ‗life whatever savour it possesses‘.90 Without the fictions that the 
imagination produces, with the poet their chief crafter, we would be cognitively destitute. 
We would not be able to apprehend the life we live, the circumstances in which we are 
placed, let alone endure them. We would, in a crucial sense, be blind. The poet, in terms 
of this metaphor, is our eyes, our sight. He or she constructs our reality by giving us those 
tools – myths, for example – without which we would be lost. The Divine Comedy, its 
drama of sin and redemption, is not just a story of Dante‘s Christian providence, but a 
way of arranging our minds and our lives, and bringing a coherence to our passage 
through the world; a world which, thanks to Dante‘s imagination, becomes not just an 
aimless, trackless wandering through a dark wood, but a pilgrimage from the fallen world 
to beatification. In his ‗Adagia‘, Stevens declares that ‗after one has abandoned a belief in 
god, poetry is that essence which takes its place as life‘s redemption‘: thus poetry, and 
the order it provides, becomes our secular salvation.
91
  
Critchley uses the metaphor of illumination to understand Stevens‘ idea of the 
way in which the imagination acts upon reality: 
 
poetry, for Stevens, is the description of a particular … in the radiant atmosphere 
produced by the imagination. Poetic acts are acts of the mind, which describe 
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recognisable things, but which vary the appearance of those things, changing the 
aspect under which they are seen.
92
  
 
More than merely altering our perception of reality, Stevens observes in ‗The Collect of 
Philosophy‘, poetry enlightens us as to the existence of a life, a world, part of and yet 
beyond our own in its import and extent: 
 
[a] sense of the infinity of the world is a sense of something cosmic. It is cosmic 
poetry because it makes us realize … that we are creatures not of a part, which is 
our every day limitation, but of a whole for which, for the most part, we have as 
yet no language. This sudden change of a lesser life for a greater one is like a 
change of winter for spring or any other transmutation of poetry … A realization 
of the infinity of the world is equally a perception of philosophy and a typical 
metamorphosis of poetry.
93
 
 
For Stevens – as later for Heaney – poetry offers the closest experience possible in a post-
Romantic age to the transcendent; but for the American Modernist, that transcendence is 
simply an aspect of the mundane.
94
 His poetry, as Jonathan Levin points out, is about 
uncovering that infinite universe, revealing ‗the extraordinary dimension of the ordinary‘, 
and Stevens‘ view of poetry rests on its power to ‗refine and extend‘ our ability to 
perceive the world in which we live.
95
  
 Wallace Stevens‘ defence of poetry is, ultimately, a defence of the imagination 
and its unavoidable necessity for any life that is to be fully human. As Kaplan describes 
it, Stevens ‗rather soberly … studied the poetic imagination and universalized it as a 
source of value‘, arguing that it was integral to life and thus expressing an essentially 
Romantic viewpoint.
96
 The primary criticism to which Stevens‘ argument is vulnerable 
is, inadvertently, contained in an assertion by Levin that ‗poetry‘s vital integration of 
imagination and reality leads Stevens to embrace fiction, or poetic distortion, as an aspect 
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of true understanding‘.97 From one point of view, one could say that the defining activity 
of the imagination is the creation of lies, the softening of the abrasions which reality 
inflicts upon us. Czeslaw Milosz implies as much when, in one of the notes included in 
his collection of reflections, Roadside Dog, he writes, ‗those fantasies, those pageants 
constructed by the human mind above the horror of life. All arts, all myths, and 
philosophies …‘.98 As such, one might well argue that the readiness of a writer like 
Stevens to accept that lie, to perpetuate it, is, quite literally, delusional. Veiling the real, 
the imagination cannot but weaken, rather than strengthen, our grasp of it.    
The very insistence, though, with which Stevens asserts the co-dependency of the 
imagination and the actual betrays his acute awareness of the above objection and his 
concern to rebut it. Similarly, he is aware of a paradox: namely, that it is through the 
creation of fictions that human beings are brought closest to the real. (This is indeed the 
defining paradox of the imagination itself, as Heaney will also acknowledge.) Julian 
Barnes, the English novelist, gives another, albeit more recent formulation of the same 
thing when he writes in his Nothing To Be Frightened Of that ‗the novel tells the 
beautiful, shapely lies which enclose hard, exact truth‘.99 Poetry itself, of course, is a 
matter of language; and, as Nietzsche pointed out, language is fundamentally a lie, an 
‗endlessly broken echo of an original sound‘.100 Wallace Stevens would almost certainly 
agree – at least in one sense.  
In his understanding, however, it could be said that the imagination is rather like 
the sacrament in Christian practice: in partaking of the wafer and the wine, one literally 
partakes of the body and blood of Christ. From one point of view, of course, this is an 
illusion; the wafer is a wafer, the wine, wine. But, sanctified by the order of service, both 
become another substance. And, become such, they disclose a reality which, for the 
believer, would not otherwise be apprehended. Moreover, both Stevens and Heaney are, 
like all poets, imbued with a certain sense of what it is to be human. Central to our 
humanity is the fact that we are not only sufferers of our condition, but imaginers of it at 
the same time. To engage in the latter is not extraneous or delusionary (though it may be 
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at times); rather it is constitutive. And providing working models of this imagining of our 
condition, often as intricate and yet accurate as a chronometer, poetry might also be 
called a kind of psychic DNA – it contains within it the original blueprint of what it is 
that makes us most humanly what we are. Hence its importance and hence its justification 
– and hence, perhaps, the ultimate strength, despite their vulnerability, of all defences 
based on this premise. 
Stevens‘ essays are an implicit, rather than explicit defence of poetry, and they 
can, in my view, be more justifiably criticised on another account. In his essay 
‗Reflections on Wallace Stevens‘, Randall Jarrell says of poets in general, and Stevens in 
particular, that ‗the poet‘s medium, words, is abstract to begin with, and it is only his 
unique organisation of the words that forces the poem, generalisations and all, over into 
the concreteness and singularity that it exists for‘.101 In the case of Heaney‘s poetry, the 
process described here by Jarrell seems effortless. Heaney‘s vocabulary is so well-
chosen, so earthy and tangible, that the concrete is only a turn of the head away; and even 
in his attempts to express the most ineffable effects of poetry in his prose writing, Heaney 
retains this grip on the actual. Stevens, though undeniably skilled at organising abstract 
words into concrete images in poems, is not nearly so adept in his prose. Where the 
Irishman‘s prose style is richly descriptive and passionately (while rationally) 
convincing, Stevens writes the dry, dense prose of a philosopher and of someone who is 
generally termed a philosophical poet. This is particularly evident in his writing about the 
connection between poetry and philosophy, as Simon Critchley points out in Things 
Merely Are: his attempts to depict in prose the relationship he so eloquently examines in 
his poetry are ‗uneven, at best rather associative, and indeed poor in comparison to the 
power of his verse‘.102 Despite the fact that, stylistic limitations notwithstanding, Stevens‘ 
conception of the relationship between reality and the imagination appears to have been 
invaluable to Heaney in the development of parts of his argument, when Stevens‘ work is 
read in its original form, the brilliance of the conception itself is almost lost in the 
methodical, phlegmatic monotony of his writing. In Heaney, on the contrary, that same 
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conception is grounded in numerous exempla, and the radical paradox in the 
imagination‘s operations is illuminated in ways which are deeply, unfailingly persuasive.  
 
 
 
V 
On the face of it, few defenders of poetry would seem to provide a more exemplary 
model than W.H. Auden. Here was a poet who came of age on the cusp of the 1930s 
(which he would go on to characterise, in ‗September 1, 1939‘, as a ‗low, dishonest 
decade‘) and whose specific overt attempts to attribute to poetry a utility by making it 
socially responsive are among the best-known of his century.
103
 His poetic and critical 
status, not to mention his insistence (at least for the early part of his career) on poetry‘s 
social efficacy, his implicit answer to the political accusation, make him an inevitable 
node in the genealogical branch of defenders at the end of which is Heaney. Unlike 
Heaney, however, Auden goes on to renounce poetry‘s utility as vehemently, as 
persistently, as he initially affirms it. The Irish writer argues consistently for poetry‘s 
social effects, even if he locates those effects on a different ground, and he never 
repudiates poetry‘s ability to change us in some way, thus significantly shifting our way 
of being in the world. 
 Lucy McDiarmid points out in her Auden’s Apologies for Poetry that Auden was 
a writer obsessed with the potential (and later the impotence) of his art form to provide 
social and moral benefit; the strength of his rejection of poetry as useful reflects, she goes 
on to emphasise, the extent to which Auden had credited poetry with significant power in 
his earlier writing.
104
 His essays on the operations of poetry, throughout his career, are 
weighted with religious metaphor. The creative act itself is depicted as an act of 
‗worship‘ directed towards what Auden calls ‗sacred beings or events‘, which are defined 
in terms of their ability to inspire awe, to provoke the imagination.
105
 Beauty, as 
embodied in poetry, is of benefit to us in that, as Auden writes elsewhere, ‗through its 
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analogies, the goodness of created existence, the historical fall into unfreedom and 
disorder, and the possibility of regaining paradise through repentance and forgiveness are 
recognised‘.106 His gospel may be the gospel of poetry, but it is, in its chosen terms, also 
the Gospel of Christ. Through the reconciliation, in the poem, of the conflicted emotions 
within the poet, the achieved poem offers us a kind of absolution. 
As one might expect from this, every aspect of poetry including its phonetic 
properties is bound up, in Auden‘s conception, with the moral. In the introduction to his 
1935 collection The Poet’s Tongue, defining poetry as ‗memorable speech‘, Auden 
speaks of the oral power of poetry, which 
 
must move our emotions or excite our intellect, for only that which is moving or 
exciting is memorable, and the stimulus is the audible spoken word and cadence, 
to which in all its power of suggestion and incantation we must surrender …107 
 
It is evident from his phrasing that Auden attributes to sound more than merely the ability 
to give pleasure, whether aural or otherwise. Its purpose is higher than that, closer to 
something spiritual, or at least something enthralling, spellbinding, in the manner of ritual 
chanting. This persuasive poetic music moves us, as does every other element of the 
poem, towards social or political responsiveness. Poetry does not dictate the way we 
should go, but it is concerned  
 
with extending our knowledge of good and evil, perhaps making the necessity for 
action more urgent and its nature more clear, but only leading us to the point 
where it is possible for us to make a rational and moral choice.
108
 
 
The art form‘s function is thus clear: its end result is ethical, as it presents us with the 
possibility of an action, while not necessarily impelling us in any one particular direction 
(as might propaganda). In short, if poetry is itself a kind of action, making something 
happen, it operates through a principle of indirection.  
 Later in The Poet’s Tongue, in an argument which McDiarmid describes as 
crediting poetry with ‗diffuse spiritual powers‘, Auden describes two different kinds of 
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art, ‗escape-art‘ and ‗parable-art‘, making it clear that poetry‘s moral function is 
contingent on its relationship to the real.
109
 The task of escape-art is, clearly, escapism; 
the task of parable-art is to teach humankind how to exchange the habits of hatred for 
those of love. The latter is unmistakably the more important type, the type that effects 
actual behavioural change in its readers, and Auden‘s use of the word ‗parable‘ signals 
the shifting of his figurative apparatus firmly into a spiritual setting.
110
 The poetic 
parable, the poetic getting-to-grips with our real behaviour in the real world, is effective 
because, like all such poetry, its task is ‗by telling the truth, to disenchant and 
disintoxicate‘.111 While we may, as Auden suggests in his essay on Robert Frost, long for 
beauty in poetry, and for the pleasure of that beauty, we will come to despise our 
intoxication with something that bears no resemblance to ‗the problematic, the painful, 
the disorderly, the ugly‘ – to the world itself.112 Poetry‘s social effects can only be 
accomplished when it represents, and does not provide escape from, the truth of the 
matter.   
 That matter, while it may have been a political one for many of his 
contemporaries in the 1930s, was not thus for the young Auden, as Michael Thurston 
points out in Making Something Happen – or at least it was not in the sense that he ever 
associated poetry, in his critical writing, with a particular brand of political thought. 
Though he himself was politically active both in his daily life and his poetry, he was 
wary of assigning to his art a political task to the exclusion of all others.
113
 His claims for 
poetry‘s moral benefits, however – and specifically the rendering of those benefits in 
terms of an increased power to make the right choice, to determine the right course of 
action and feel pressed to take it – are nonetheless broadly, strongly utilitarian, 
encompassing the political.   
Auden‘s dismissal, out of hand, of this utilitarian argument and those like it in his 
later years – precipitated, not least, by his return to the Anglican faith of his childhood – 
took, predominantly, the form of an attack on the notion of poetry as politically 
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efficacious. It was this, which, in all functional claims for poetry, was most deeply 
offensive to the poet, particularly in the aftermath of World War II. Explaining his about-
face to Anne Fremantle in 1973, he remarked: ‗I know that all the verse I wrote, all the 
positions I took in the thirties, didn‘t save a single Jew. These attitudes, these writings, 
only help oneself. They merely make people who think like one, admire and like one 
…‘.114 
Auden‘s best-known statement, in either poetry or prose, on poetry‘s utility, is, of 
course, in his memorial poem for W.B. Yeats, the second section of which reads 
   
  You were silly like us; your gift survived it all: 
  the parish of rich women, physical decay, 
  yourself. Mad Ireland hurt you into poetry. 
  Now Ireland has her madness and her weather still, 
  for poetry makes nothing happen: it survives 
  in the valley of its making where executives 
 would never want to tamper, flows on south 
  from ranches of isolation and the busy griefs, 
  raw towns that we believe and die in; it survives, 
  a way of happening, a mouth.
115
 
 
That ‗poetry makes nothing happen‘ has come to be, as Thurston suggests (and as my 
own citation of it, more than once, in the above sections reflects), an ‗epitaph‘ for poetry 
in modern times, engraved on the minds of poets and critics alike. We often forget, as a 
result – and as perhaps Auden himself does wilfully in subsequent years – that his full 
statement here of poetry‘s purpose is, as Thurston goes on to point out, more complex, 
and implies for the art form a place in a much greater, more intricate scheme of things.
116
 
The lines in question were written at the very moment, if you like, of the revolution in 
Auden‘s thought, and one of his biographers, Humphrey Carpenter, traces the writing of 
Yeats‘ elegy during 1939 and the parallel development of Auden‘s conviction that poetry 
is, finally, useless. After delivering a series of political lectures in America, shortly after 
moving there, and finding himself disgusted by his own talent as a rhetorician, Auden 
added his declaration of poetry‘s ineffectiveness to ‗In Memory of W.B. Yeats‘. 
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In these lines, all Auden‘s attempts during the previous ten years to involve his 
poetry in politics and society were categorically rejected. He reiterated that 
rejection, in the words of the ‗Counsel for the Defence‘, in his obituary article on 
Yeats, which was probably written at the same time as the new section of the 
poem: ‗Art‘, he wrote, ‗is a product of history, not a cause … so that the question 
of whether art should or should not be propaganda is unreal … If not a poem had 
been written, not a picture painted, not a bar of music composed, the history of 
man would be materially unchanged.‘ Auden was to repeat this, in similar words, 
again and again for the rest of his life.
117
 
 
Thus, in Auden‘s later years, he begins to advance, as McDiarmid calls it, ‗a 
poetics of apology and self-deprecation, a radical undermining of poetry itself‘.118 His 
justifications for poetry lose their emphasis on the moral and spiritual, on anything of use 
at all, with the exception of a dilute utilitarian faith he retains in the ability of poetry to 
purify the language (as Eliot also has it). In a 1974 Paris Review interview, Auden 
describes the poet‘s ‗only … political duty‘ – namely, ‗in his own writing to set an 
example of the correct use of his mother tongue which is always being corrupted‘.119 
Aside from that responsibility, poetry‘s status is no more significant, for the most part, 
than that of a parlour game. His point of reference, in rejecting poetry‘s usefulness, is, 
again and again, the political:  
 
the social and political history of Europe would be just the same if Shakespeare, 
Dante and Goethe had never written. The only people who affect the political 
climate are journalists who try and produce the truth, and writers in countries 
where there is no freedom – so any statement from any writer carries weight.120  
 
No doubt there was any number of complex psycho-biographical factors – 
perhaps a personal sense of defeat – that gave impetus to this radical volte-face as to the 
value of the art form in the later Auden‘s career. Accompanying his sense of the 
uselessness of poetry was the conviction that poetry actually falsifies true feeling. The art 
which once served a predominantly truth-telling, moral purpose was now a source of 
fabrication and dishonesty. ‗As if by a chemical reaction,‘ McDiarmid writes, ‗the 
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moment the feelings hit the page they become false‘.121 This process is unavoidable – the 
nature of poetry, for Auden at this stage, is inevitably bogus. One of its few redeeming 
features is its ability, by no means unique to the art form, to ‗delight, sadden, disturb, 
amuse, instruct‘. It may remind us of certain political, moral and spiritual realities, but it 
has no real power – not, at any rate, half the power of plain journalistic prose – to make a 
difference.
122
  
One can see at work in the foregoing a kind of extreme literalism. Auden 
evidently believes that if a work of art does not have a quantifiable political effect – 
literally, physically, saving a Jew – then it has no political effect whatsoever. The logic 
here is far from cast-iron, and the cut-and-dried nature of Auden‘s renunciation of the 
political efficacy of poetry, while it also might express his exasperation at the sometimes 
grandiloquent claims for precisely the opposite, ignores the evidence of his own poems 
themselves. One suspects that in rejecting poetry‘s political potential, he is registering, 
unwittingly, the marginalisation of the art form itself, in the light of which all such claims 
for its socio-political effects become portentous and pretentious. In the same Paris 
Review interview, Auden remarks on the degenerative effects of television and radio on 
the language of the general populace; perhaps he had in mind, too, the disadvantage of 
those media to the status of poetry itself.
123
 Shelley‘s ‗unacknowledged legislators of the 
world‘ becomes mere hot air in an historical moment when poets not only obviously do 
not legislate but are not even read. 
Heaney has always been a deeply appreciative reader of the early Auden, alert in 
particular to the role of sound in his poems – to a selection of which, in the essay 
‗Sounding Auden‘, Heaney tells us he will ‗listen‘.124 There is an obvious affinity 
between these two at times word-mad poets. Likewise, Heaney‘s infinitely subtle sense of 
the way in which a poem is an action, even though it does not necessarily, directly, effect 
social change, is very close to Auden‘s claim that poetry is a way of happening. 
Nevertheless – and this is the crucial point – poetry, for Heaney, is never a game, and its 
delight is never simply a distraction. While even the early Auden speaks of 
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‗disintoxication‘ as the final effect of an achieved poem, Heaney establishes a certain 
intoxication as being a rightful and necessary constituent of the art form itself. For 
Heaney, in fact, the intoxicating and truth-telling functions of poetry are not finally 
separable; for Auden, the one is necessarily, puritanically, in opposition to the other. 
Moreover, Heaney, unlike Auden, has never succumbed to social despair; poetry 
continues, in his conception, to have a kind of political efficacy, a social utility, even if 
this might not be measurable or immediate in its effects. Not only does Heaney argue that 
poetry has such efficacy, but he goes so far as to advance the idea that poets, by being 
absolutely faithful to their art form, can, even in a country like Stalinist Russia, for 
example, have an effect, not least of defiance, which has far-reaching political 
ramifications. 
There is evidence enough that Auden was aware of the changed status of poetry in 
the mid part of the twentieth century. In 1949, for instance, he declared that ‗We live in a 
new age in which the artist can neither have … a unique heroic importance nor believes 
[sic] in the Art-God enough to desire it‘.125 His sentiments, by this stage, are resolutely 
anti-Romantic. Heaney, on the other hand, has never lost his faith in that god, even 
though he would never use such phraseology. Whether we attribute it to his temperament 
or his time of writing, his faith, as we will see, has not faltered. Nor is this faith a blind 
one; it rests, concretely, demonstrably, in an undying sense of the ways in which that 
most complex of all human linguistic usages, poetry, operates.  
  
VI 
Randall Jarrell is widely recognised to have been the best American poetry critic of his 
time – the middle of the twentieth century – ‗with an unanswerable flair of 
understanding, an intelligent passion for poetry equal to the poets‘ own, a prose that 
could hum beguilingly and, when necessary, sting‘.126 To be acknowledged as such was 
no small feat, given that he made his mark during what he himself christened ‗The Age of 
Criticism‘ – a title he used disparagingly, but one which conveys nonetheless the 
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ascendancy of literary-critical writing at the time. And that predominance, along with the 
professionalisation of reading and writing in the academy that gave rise to it, was to 
become, more and more, the enemy of poetry. It was against this that Jarrell felt urged to 
defend the art form; rather than accuse poetry, the movement of literature from the streets 
into the university classroom posed an insidious threat identified and analysed with great 
foresight by Jarrell. In his satirical novel, first published in 1954, Pictures from an 
Institution, Jarrell describes, with eerie familiarity to the contemporary reader, a 
‗prominent literary critic‘, Mr Daudier: 
 
he had a column of literary criticism, every week except the last two weeks in 
August, in the best-known literary weekly; he was a director of a club that picked 
books for readers who didn‘t know what to read; there are radio-programs which 
have several critics blame, and several critics and the author praise, some recent 
book, and Mr Daudier was generally on one side or the other; during the school 
year he would lecture to colleges, and when the school year was over he would 
make commencement addresses or get honorary degrees from them; he was the 
chief reader of a publishing house … you saw one-act plays by him … he even 
wrote informal essays … But mostly he talked about great books – about a 
hundred of them; I don‘t know why he stopped at a hundred, but he did, and let 
the rest go; he must have made up his mind that it was no good trying to get 
people to read more than a hundred.
127
 
  
In this satire of the literary professional of the time, as much as in his overall portrayal of 
the threat presented to poetry by the critical trend of that era, Jarrell foreshadows the 
complaints of later twentieth- and twenty-first-century essayists on poetry – including 
Joseph Epstein and Dana Gioia. Such critics would see the increasing confinement of the 
art form, its practitioners, and its critics to the academy as having dealt (or very nearly 
dealt) a death blow to poetry. In 1953, Jarrell, in a remarkably prescient essay on the 
subject, laments that criticism has overtaken creativity as the spirit of the age, and that 
critics themselves are now regarded as being far more important than the object of their 
criticism, whether poetry or otherwise.
128
 His defence against this unexpected enemy – 
which, as we will see, takes various shapes, all stemming from the Modernist trend of the 
time – shares with Heaney‘s defence its insistence on poetry as a profoundly natural, 
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indeed genetic function of the human creature; and one which, Jarrell argues as Bunting 
did too, thus needs no justification beyond itself. 
 He states as much in his essay on ‗The Obscurity of the Poet‘, declaring that 
poetry does not require a defence any more than the oxygen we inhale and the food we 
eat; every society of which we are aware includes, in its cultural cohort, poets.
129
 Poetry 
has always and everywhere been in existence, and our conclusion must surely be, Jarrell 
implies, that our culture, we as a people, could not survive without it: 
 
art matters not merely because it is the most magnificent ornament and the most 
nearly unfailing occupation of our lives, but because it is life itself … art is 
indispensable because so much … truth can be learned through works of art and 
through works of art alone.
130
 
 
Jarrell‘s assertion that poetry does not require a defence is, however, disingenuous. Much 
of his criticism is explicitly a defence of the art form, demonstrating how irreplaceable 
poems are, whether they be Frost‘s or Stevens‘ or Bishop‘s. The very intensity of his 
enthusiasm, his cherishing of poetry, is not just high spirits, but an urgent evangelism on 
behalf of an art form which he recognises – as do his contemporaries – to be in need of 
such advocacy. 
The indispensability of poetry, and more generally of literature, figures in Jarrell‘s 
own critical preoccupation, which lies in the act of reading, of uncovering the truths we 
need to know and, in his role as critic, sharing his enthusiasms. As Vivian Gornick 
observes, while Jarrell‘s status as a poet undoubtedly influences the style of his criticism, 
the extraordinary attraction, the persuasion of his essays lies in his being, first and 
foremost, a reader; in this, perhaps above all, he is Heaney‘s kin.131 The problem he 
identifies in mid-twentieth-century literature is that its remaining readers – and he writes 
at length about the drastically decreasing popularity of poetry – have begun to read the 
wrong writing for the wrong reasons. Critics, he writes, with characteristic wit and 
energy, are ‗often useful and wonderful and a joy to have around the house; but they‘re 
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the bane of our age, because our age so fantastically overestimates their importance and 
so willingly forsakes the work they are writing about for them‘.132 
This gradual domination by professional literary criticism is, for Jarrell, the most 
vexing of a number of associated causes contributing to poetry‘s decline – the decline, in 
fact, of literature in general. The root of all of these is the perceived and indeed often 
actual difficulty of much Modernist writing itself. This gave rise, not least, to the so-
called New Critics who heralded the first wave of professional readers in the academy.
133
 
Jarrell, however, is dismissive of those who do not read poetry because they claim it is 
too difficult: ‗if we were in the habit of reading poets, their obscurity wouldn‘t matter; 
and once we are out of the habit, their clarity does not help‘.134 Modernist difficulty, 
whether reputed or real, is not the issue; the reading habits of society are the essence of 
the problem, and, at the moment in which he is writing, society is reading very little, too 
much of which is literary criticism instead of literature itself. In addition, Leonard 
Diepeveen remarks, Jarrell, in his attack on this neglect of the arts, draws attention to 
competing art forms and the instant, easy gratification available from popular 
entertainment.
135
 When one considers that the 1950s were the decade which saw an 
exponential increase in household televisions in the United States, until, by 1960, 
television was the pre-eminent source of popular culture in North America, that fear 
seems more than justified.
136
 
What, in all of this, is the role of the poet, that shadowy, neglected or else 
maligned figure? Poetry, for Jarrell as for Heaney, has transformative powers, and, as 
Stevens also believed, those powers reside in its capacity to reveal a new and different 
world within the realities of our own. As demonstrated in the passage (quoted in IV 
above) from Jarrell‘s ‗Reflections on Wallace Stevens‘, a poet should, in that critic‘s 
view, pay first homage to the concrete. Jarrell goes on to quote Goethe on the importance 
of locating the general in the specific – the closer the poet scrutinises the singular 
instance of an object, the more universally valuable, universally true, his or her 
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observations will be.
137
 In this way, as Jarrell describes it elsewhere, the poet opens the 
way to ‗a foreign country whose laws and language and life are a kind of translation of 
your own‘; a world, in other words, different from and yet like the one in which we 
live.
138
 
This is an echo of the argument that dates back to Sidney and recurs in Heaney: 
poetry, by examining reality in all its richness and detail, grants us access to another, 
better, reality. The terms of this claim change from generation to generation, but in 
holding this view Jarrell positions himself firmly in the line of defenders from Sidney to 
Heaney (the fundamentally, albeit to varying degrees, Romantic line). His place in this 
order of poet-critics and his adherence to their common beliefs notwithstanding, Jarrell is, 
for my purposes, primarily significant because of his warning against, his ominous 
prediction of, an age in which literature‘s own offspring would turn against it, in 
unwitting Oedipal fashion, and become a threat to, in particular, the status of poetry. As 
the first writer to identify this threat, to give significant expression to it, Jarrell becomes a 
prophet of the era in which Heaney will come to defend poetry.  
There is another important respect in which Jarrell is a predecessor to Heaney; 
that is, the particular style he forges or otherwise deploys in his own criticism. It connects 
with the reader directly, intimately, engaging with him or her both emotionally and 
intellectually. This is a critical manner which, while not without precedence, ran very 
much contrary to that age of criticism which Jarrell stigmatised. If he was going to 
protect and defend poetry against its demotion to merely the material of criticism, and by 
definition therefore inferior, he was going to do everything but adopt the elaborate and 
self-serving jargons of the professional critic of his time. His is a style designed to let the 
general reader in, not shut him or her out. It is one of Jarrell‘s articles of faith that the 
value of poetry is such that it should be possible to write about it without becoming 
unduly technical or theoretical.  In fact, to write academically (at least in its more 
Alexandrian tendencies) about it is – such is the suggestion of much of his writing – to 
betray the importance of literature, and poetry specifically. It is to be complicit in that 
demotion of the art form. 
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There is a sense in which, though there is no evidence of direct influence, Heaney 
will become the natural inheritor of Jarrell‘s manner, while enriching that democratic 
style with a vocabulary, a turn of speech, a metaphorical reach, which goes beyond that 
of Jarrell himself. Heaney has been alert to the degree to which there are forms of 
criticism in the contemporary world which, in their approach to literature, both explicitly 
and implicitly assume the inferiority of the art, regarding it as if it were some kind of 
recidivist, constitutionally inclined towards sin and error. In his own criticism, Heaney 
will resist this view; almost the only times in which, in his prose, he betrays even a 
flicker of irritation is when he refers to the more accusatory forms of postmodern or 
postcolonial criticism.
139
 Critics in such schools may not be Heaney‘s primary opponents, 
as it were, in the trial against poetry, but they contribute nonetheless to the evidence, the 
accusation, against the art form. 
 
VII 
Like Randall Jarrell, Joseph Brodsky, the Russian-American poet and critic, was one of 
the great enthusiasts for poetry, and his essays on the subject reflect as much. Exiled from 
the Soviet Union in 1972, he settled in the United States and became, as Cynthia L. 
Haven puts it, ‗an erudite Nobel laureate and international man of letters‘, a kind of 
spokesperson for poetry.
140
 In this, not least, he is like Heaney, and he takes his place as a 
natural point of comparison with the Irish writer because of his equal prominence in late 
twentieth-century poetry criticism. Given his particular origins, it is not surprising that his 
emphases and the very language in which he couches them are rather different from those 
of any American critic, or, for that matter, Heaney himself. Brodsky is aware that poetry 
suffers neglect in the present; but without confronting this plight head-on, he makes 
claims for the art form which are larger, it seems, than those made by any other defender 
in the second half of the twentieth century. His is, one might say, the ultimate utilitarian 
argument for poetry, and as such it deserves particular attention in Heaney‘s literary 
genealogy.  
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 In the preface to her book on Brodsky, Valentina Polukhina summarises his 
understanding of the poet‘s role in society, commenting that ‗as far as the social duties of 
a poet are concerned, his main tasks are: to improve the quality of his language; to inspire 
in his readers a desire for self-improvement; and to make society less vulgar‘.141 While 
this is an undeniably accurate, if somewhat bland, précis of Brodsky‘s poetic credo, it is 
simultaneously a profound understatement of the matter as he sees it. Language, for the 
Russian poet, is paramount; its importance to Brodsky, particularly as it is embodied in 
poetry, its ‗highest form of existence‘, cannot be overemphasised.142 In his view, 
language is the most powerful social and political force at our disposal, and the poet, as 
wielder of that force in its ultimate form, is responsible not merely for the linguistic 
betterment of his or her people, but for their ethical wellbeing; or, rather, the linguistic 
improvement that he or she engenders is, precisely, to the moral betterment of all. 
Language misused is, in turn, the cause of social disintegration. Writing about the 
revolutionary novels of Andrei Platonov, for instance, Brodsky remarks that ‗these books 
never were published in Soviet Russia, for apart from concrete social evil, their real target 
is the sensibility of language that has brought that evil about‘.143 The horrors of Soviet 
Russia, the horrors of the world in general, are in these terms the consequence, 
ultimately, of malevolent speech, of language turned against humanity by corrupt men 
and women. 
 The claim that writers are best suited to defending society against such corruption 
is, Brodsky believes, a natural one to make. In ‗The Sound of the Tide‘, he writes of 
Derek Walcott that 
 
he acts out of the belief that language is greater than its masters or its servants, 
that poetry, being its supreme version, is therefore an instrument of self-
betterment for both; i.e., that it is a way to gain an identity superior to the confines 
of class, race, or ego. This is just plain common sense; this is also the most sound 
program of social change there is.
144
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One is struck, repeatedly, in reading Brodsky‘s essays, by statements like the latter: 
forthright assertions of poetry‘s social efficacy, uttered with complete confidence, in the 
tone of one slightly annoyed to find himself in the presence of less certain, somewhat 
shortsighted people. The implication is that those who do not recognise the intuitive 
truths which he is concerned to point out are lacking in common sense. However else, 
Brodsky seems to ask ingenuously, are we going to liberate ourselves from social 
imprisonment than through language? Literature provides us with both the tools and the 
standards for political and personal change, and a life lived without literature is, as he 
writes elsewhere, ‗inferior and unworthy of effort‘ – such effort, would, in any case, 
come to naught without the poetic dynamo that drives our transformation as human 
beings.
145
 
 That dynamo – language maximally empowered in poetry – produces in us two 
kinds of ‗psychic movement‘, both of which are described in Brodsky‘s long essay on 
Marina Tsvetaeva, ‗Footnote to a Poem‘.146 The first of these is encapsulated in one of 
his key phrases, which Heaney himself would seem to have borrowed: poetry, through its 
language, allows us to shift our ‗plane of regard‘, to contemplate our circumstances from 
a kind of perspective which enables us not only to understand the world in all its 
complexity (its evil not least), but to comprehend it in the deepest sense of that word.
147
 
The art form elongates the prospect of human sensibility, raises the level at which our 
minds operate, and in the process we become immune to the more compromising aspects 
of whatever reality, social or otherwise, we find ourselves in. It becomes possible for us 
to see that reality more clearly and thus resist succumbing to it, particularly its chaotic 
aspects. Poetry thus provides us with a kind of moral, ethical insurance policy; as long as 
we are reading it, we will be less likely to capitulate to tyrants, bullies or liars of other 
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kinds, and neither will we be susceptible to the baser impulses of our own natures. In 
short, the aesthetic as embodied in the language of great poetry is a kind of guarantor of 
our existence as ethical beings, and in this way, directly, materially, it affects our way of 
being in society – and, potentially, society as a whole. 
 The second psychic movement prompted by poetry, in Brodsky‘s view, finds a 
foreshadowing in the work of Robert Frost, one of the Russian‘s acknowledged 
influences; Heaney, too, it is worth noting, through his reading of Frost, will incorporate 
a version of this notion into his defence of poetry.
148
 Brodsky‘s conception is as follows: 
language, specifically as it is used in poetry, thrusts both poet and reader beyond the 
expected limitations of their psyche, and shows the reader who has exhausted all 
possibilities that there exists, through poetry, a range of further options. (In Brodsky‘s 
view, as expressed more than once in Less Than One, reality is essentially wanting – he 
describes it, in its Soviet embodiment, as ‗either nonsense or nuisance‘ – and we must 
turn to literature for a fuller and by definition superior existence.)
 
Such is the inherent 
drive of language, its irresistible momentum, that, in its highest form, poetry, it carries 
our minds, our beings, into ‗infinity‘ itself, as Brodsky states with reference to 
Dostoevsky. To put it more prosaically, we are flung so far beyond the limits of our daily 
understanding that we glimpse the outer reaches of our own humanity, and the machinery 
of the world at large.
149
 Our plane of regard is raised; our lives, our dilemmas, are 
clarified. 
The poet, too, experiences a version of this motion, because the very process of 
creation is one driven by language, which is synonymous, for Brodsky, with the Muse. It 
is language that ‗prompts, or … dictates‘ each new line of poetry, and the experience of 
writing is an experience of immersion in language, being engulfed and propelled along by 
it.
150
 Poetry is, ideally, ‗language negating its own mass and the laws of gravity … 
language‘s own striving upward – or sideways – to that beginning where the Word was‘, 
taking poet and reader with it.
151
 The poet, becoming an instrument of the language, of 
the Muse, becomes secondary to it, rather than vice versa, and, as Brodsky has it, the 
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language uses him or her to sustain itself, to prolong its existence.
152
 For the Russian 
poet, as Stephen Watson points out,  
 
language is worthy of all homage because it is the very medium itself, the 
limitless possibilities bedded in the nature of syntax and vocabulary, that carry the 
writer, and specifically the poet, into dimensions where he or she would otherwise 
not be able to travel.
153
 
 
Furthermore, the moral ramifications of a poem are directly related to the degree to which 
the poet proves a worthy tool of the language. Brodsky claims in his essay on Auden that 
the better a writer‘s ear, the more acute his ethical sensibility (by this token, of course, 
Heaney is the most exceptionally moral of men).
154
 
 In some of Brodsky‘s formulations of this idea of linguistic momentum, he 
prefigures the kind of assertion that Heaney will make a few years later – at one point, for 
example, the Russian writes that poetic language is ‗the liberated verse-mass milling the 
theme and almost literally splashing up when it hits a rhyme or an image‘, displaying a 
strikingly Heaneyesque turn of phrase. Elsewhere, he demonstrates how the process of 
rhyme in poetry serves as a means of resurrecting, in a sense, the dead – it pushes beyond 
the boundaries of the actual and brings something back, accomplishing what we might 
call ‗symbolic repair‘.155 Heaney, likewise, has faith that, as one writer has put it,  
 
in every achieved poem, an absence is evoked in such a way that, even should that 
absence be terminal (i.e. a loss irrecoverable, an injustice irreparable), it becomes, 
in the poem itself, a living presence, an absence transformed.
156
 
 
Moreover, it is, in 1996, Brodsky‘s conviction that poetry can overtake reality which 
Heaney celebrates in his New York Times obituary for the Russian poet, who revered 
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above all ‗the capacity of language to go farther and faster than expected, and thereby 
provide an escape from the limitations and the preoccupations of the self‘.157  
It is telling, however, that Heaney should phrase his tribute thus, focusing on the 
power of language to liberate us from our internal constraints, and not, primarily, from 
the oppressive social forces at work in our lives (and there is a difference between these 
two, not least in Brodsky‘s own work). Brodsky‘s version of the utilitarian argument is, 
as I have suggested, the most literal and extreme form of it propagated in the work of any 
twentieth-century writer. While there are echoes of other utilitarian defenders in his work 
– Eliot‘s requirement that poets preserve and improve the language, for example – the 
degree to which he worships language is unparalleled. He believes, in his own words, in 
‗the complete overlapping of art and ethics‘, and he attributes to poetry, to language, a 
spiritual, moral force that is, in short, the greatest such force in existence. Nothing – no 
other god, no human effort, no natural phenomenon – is more responsible for the 
character of our suffering and for our relief from that suffering. The battle line at 
Armageddon has been drawn, and it is a margin. 
 The weakness of this argument, though, is nowhere clearer than in the form it 
takes in Brodsky‘s 1987 Nobel Lecture, in which, with perhaps self-conscious hedging, 
he states 
 
I‘ll just say that I believe – not empirically, alas, but only theoretically – that for 
someone who has read a lot of Dickens, to shoot his like in the name of some idea 
is somewhat more problematic than for someone who has read no Dickens.
158
 
 
In other words, a society whose members are well-read is less likely to commit atrocities, 
whether at the directive of their government or otherwise. The man or woman who has 
read Oliver Twist, Great Expectations and David Copperfield will more immediately, 
more determinedly reject the thought or suggestion of violence and wrongdoing than the 
man or woman who has not. In short, the well-read are more moral than the illiterate. 
This is a fundamentally offensive notion, particularly viewed from any context in which 
historical social disadvantage – for reasons of race, class or gender – has equated to 
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educational disadvantage. It is not, however, simply an absence of political correctness 
that makes Brodsky‘s suggestion problematic. His parenthetical remark that, alas, there is 
no actual evidence for his claim, is perhaps more to the point. 
High culture – as Heaney himself remarks – has never precluded base activity, 
and there is evidence aplenty, not least from the Nazi period, that a taste for poetry does 
not preclude a taste for cruelty.
159
 Poetry, for Heaney, has a cleansing, corrective effect in 
the socio-political arena; but he insists, unlike Brodsky – indeed, contrary to him – that 
poetry‘s task is not to enact political or social goals.160 ‗Poetry may lead on to action‘, 
Les Murray concurs, ‗but it is equally likely not to, because in a way it is the action‘.161 
John Carey, in What Good Are The Arts?, dismisses views like Brodsky‘s as deeply 
illogical. Disputing the notion that literature either affects us morally or allows us to 
empathise productively with others – both of which would in turn make us aware of the 
unhealthy elements in society from which we need protection – Carey writes that ‗it is 
self-serving and crassly unimaginative‘ to assume that reading about the difficulties or 
errors of others can allow us to modify our own behaviour in accordance with theirs: 
 
to believe that, from reading books, you know what it really feels like to starve, to 
be in continual pain, to watch your children die – in short, to subsist in the Third 
World – is not a refinement of sensibility but a trivialisation of others‘ 
suffering.
162
  
 
According to Carey, the belief that such empathy is possible through literature is a 
consequence of a powerful desire among those who love the art form that it be so; in 
short, such people delude themselves into thinking there is some benefit of increased 
compassion and understanding possible through reading.  
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While I find Brodsky‘s argument in this regard excessive, Carey‘s dismissal of 
such claims is itself a somewhat unimaginative, and indeed crass, way of putting the 
matter. The weight of historical belief that literature affects us morally and in our 
capacity to live as human beings is evidenced by, not least, the censoring of literature, 
time and time again, in both totalitarian and democratic societies.
163
 Brodsky may be 
overreaching in his suggestion that the problems of Soviet Russia are, at root, problems 
of language, but his comment on the matter reminds us that the state felt sufficiently 
threatened by Andrei Platonov‘s novels to ban his work. Literature, in the eyes of such 
governments, is a source of (unwelcome) ideas before it is language or sound or rhythm, 
and Carey – as well as Brodsky – seems to forget this in his argument. Whether in the 
crude form of a manifesto, the conspicuous form of a philosophical text or the less 
obvious form of a novel or anthology of poems, writing is the foremost means by which 
ideas and sentiments – of whatever nature – are disseminated. And indeed, there has long 
been the assumption (even if absolute proof is impossible to obtain) that in depicting the 
sufferings of others, literature is uniquely equipped to enlarge the range of sympathy 
within the reader – ironically, this is what Auden meant when he wrote ‗in the deserts of 
the heart / let the healing fountain start‘ – and thereby at least instil in human beings a 
predisposition towards the needs of strangers, whether we act on that inclination or not.
164
 
In his highly acclaimed essay on those needs, Michael Ignatieff asserts that ‗it is the 
painters and writers, not the politicians or social scientists, who have been able to find a 
language for the joy of [contemporary] life‘; they are also, according to Ignatieff, the 
people to whom we must look for a full and adequate expression of our contemporary 
needs.
165
 Such expression would, surely, be purposeless if it did not enable us to 
understand each other better, to better imagine the plight of others.  
 In the word ‗imagine‘ lies the primary distinction between Brodsky and Heaney. 
Brodsky would not – and indeed does not – happily limit, as he would interpret it, 
poetry‘s political and social efficacy to its operations on our imagination. The latter term 
is pivotal to Heaney‘s defence: it is through the imagination that poetry changes us, and, 
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ultimately, society. A poem‘s first work, as it were, is on the imagination, and that 
imagination is also the pre-linguistic impetus behind a poem. For Brodsky, the process is 
more direct and more comprehensive: language, which is inspiration itself, engenders 
change, and does so – or can do so – to devastating, real effect. The notion of a ‗pre-
linguistic‘ impulse of any kind does not exist in his worldview. What this argument 
amounts to is a kind of linguistic mysticism, a sweeping intellectual gesture with which 
Brodsky wipes the human slate clean of God and every other kind of non-linguistic 
influence on our lives. 
 
At almost every important point in the essays in Less Than One, it is language, 
and nothing but language, that emerges as the true hero or heroine, as well as the 
chief means to whatever form of salvation Brodsky is able to envisage. Language 
is everywhere prior, and to such a degree that there are times in his work when 
linguistics, as Jonathan Schell has remarked, ‗seems to have swallowed up 
theology‘.166 
 
It is refreshing to have broadly stated, as Brodsky is bold to do, that poetry is the 
supreme use of language by the human species, and that, therefore, indifference to poetry 
is an anthropological crime. It casts an interesting light on the creative process, as it is 
embodied in poems, to know that they make use of a dynamics in language, unavailable 
to prose writers, that propels the poet in the direction of ‗truths‘ at which, unaided (that is 
to say without language), he or she would never be able to arrive. These are the kinds of 
revealing insights that Brodsky‘s essays throw up, albeit in his often highly unsystematic 
way. But, to the Western reader, he might seem to place a little too much confidence in 
the culture of belief – and it is a specifically Russian one – that the poet is not only a kind 
of alternative government, but, above all, a moral authority, and his or her work morally 
improving as a result. The twentieth century is replete, as I have pointed out, with 
examples which have made us sceptical of that ethical-aesthetic dyad which is at the heart 
of Brodsky‘s defence, and, finally, we are more taken aback than taken in by his 
passionate conviction in the omnipotence of language.  
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VIII 
In his 2004 eulogy to the Polish poet and essayist Czeslaw Milosz in The Guardian, 
Heaney refers to the Nobel Laureate as ‗a credible witness to [an] immemorial belief in 
the saving power of poetry‘.167 As regards this poet, Heaney insists, it is his faith that is 
of the essence:  
 
there was nothing disingenuous about his professions of faith in poetry, which he 
once called philosophy's ‗ally in the service of the good‘, news that ‗was brought 
to the mountains by a unicorn and an echo‘. Such trust in the delicious joy-
bringing potential of art and intellect was protected by strong bulwarks built from 
the knowledge and experience that he had gained at first hand and at great cost.
168
 
 
That knowledge and experience, gained in Warsaw during and after World War II, make 
Milosz a definitive poet-witness, his poetry born of an all-too-personal encounter with 
calamity.
169
 Heaney is drawn to Milosz for the very reason that the Polish writer is of 
especial interest to us here: placed unwittingly at the very epicentre of European history 
at its twentieth-century nadir, he encountered firsthand some of the forces which have 
been most malignantly opposed to poetry, and indeed civilisation. His identification of 
the antagonists most threatening to poetry and his response to those foes therefore carry 
especial weight. Milosz‘s defence of poetry is not of one piece; there is no single greatest 
challenge to poetry in his conception, but rather a range of enemies, and the culmination 
of his response to those enemies is, as we will see, based on a kind of prophetic 
mysticism which bewilders, rather than reassures the reader. 
 Milosz‘s The Witness of Poetry, a series of lectures delivered at Harvard in 1981 
and 1982, is the book that most decisively delineates the forces with which the writer 
believes poetry has had to do battle in the twentieth century. The recurring question that 
underlies each of these lectures on poetry is why, at this historical moment, the art form is 
characterised by ‗every kind of pessimism, sarcasm, bitterness, doubt‘; why the capacity 
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to respond to the world with joy and hope seems to be lacking in contemporary poets.
170
 
Milosz‘s answer is manifold. Already, by the end of the opening sentence of the book, he 
has identified two of poetry‘s current challengers, namely the age of criticism and the 
predominance of scientific thought and discourse.
171
 His insistence, throughout these 
lectures, will be that poetry is embittered and without hope because it constitutes the most 
authentic ‗witness‘ to society and humanity: it is, in a postmodern age as never before, 
the single most consistently insightful measure of the world‘s wellbeing, and its current 
cynicism apprises us of the degree to which that wellbeing is under threat from a variety 
of sources.
172
  
 The first of these, as identified by Milosz, concerns the alienation of poetry and 
poets from the rest of society, resulting in ‗the schism and the misunderstanding between 
the poet and the great human family‘.173 This process of divorce began in the nineteenth 
century, but, by the twentieth, had become a basic fact of the poet‘s existence. Poetry, 
through its language, has the potential to exert influence socially, politically and 
spiritually. As those concerns are increasingly excluded from poetry, however, and as it 
becomes more and more an art form speaking to an isolated elite, poetry itself 
exacerbates the divide between that elite and the rest of society. When that divide is 
radically, traumatically closed by a shared catastrophe – such as Germany‘s occupation 
of Poland – poetry once more becomes ‗as essential as bread‘, as it was in a bygone era; 
it once more, inevitably, becomes deeply involved in society and its most immediate 
needs. But such cataclysmic events are of course neither desirable nor, thankfully, 
regularly forthcoming. The bleakness of contemporary poetry, Milosz concludes the 
lecture by suggesting, might be in part explained by this distance between the art form 
and its erstwhile audience.
174
 This is a version of the argument presented more recently 
by writers like Epstein and Gioia; and it is foreshadowed in the complaint that Modernist 
poetry is too difficult for, and too estranged from the common reader. 
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 Milosz follows this lecture with one entitled ‗The Lesson of Biology‘, identifying 
another recurrent enemy of poetry, science. His perspective on the nature of this enemy 
takes a slightly different form, however, to those of his predecessors. For Milosz, the 
scientific foe is an insidious one, whose most damaging effects take place within the 
imagination of the poet him or herself: education, with its emphasis on scientific modes 
of thought and evaluation, not only dispose the poet to view the world in the limited, 
preconceived manner espoused by such ways of thinking, but induce shame in the writer 
who would do otherwise, who would present to the reader a wholly original, childlike 
understanding of the earth.
175
 The threat to poetry inherent in this state of affairs is, at 
root, a threat to Blake‘s ‗Divine Imagination‘. Without that imagination, that spiritual 
lens on the world, the poet‘s perspective is ‗cold, indifferent‘ and disaffectedly objective 
– in a word, disenchanted.176 (And without that enchantment – such is Milosz‘s 
contention – the poet and his or her work will be a diminished thing.) 
 Milosz likens the twentieth-century effects of science on the human mind to the 
more visible, quantifiable effects on the earth itself of pollution, and the by-products of 
the development made possible by science. In a world in which the human being is no 
longer regarded as a ‗mystery‘ – that is, his or her irreducible individuality underwritten 
by God – he or she becomes but one of a million species fighting for dominance. The 
imagination, in such a world, is constrained to an unbearable degree by ‗the scientific 
Weltanschauung, according to which only the chain of causes and effects is responsible‘. 
When this worldview is translated into the social domain, its effects are reductionist and 
devastating, to an extent as yet unknown to us; among those effects, however, is the 
Darwinian notion of the ‗the survival of the fittest‘, which, in crude or otherwise debased 
forms, has been the justification for destroying countless lives as a means to cleanse 
society of unwanted elements.
177
  
As a result of this, the poet, whose imagination longs, according to Milosz, to be 
able to rest on the certainty, the subjectivity of God, is a creature in limbo. Poetry, as the 
Polish writer sees it, has always been a matter of clear judgement, of good and evil, of 
beauty and ugliness, of truth and lies. Now, under the reign of science and its obliteration 
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of such absolute opposites, the art form finds itself in a quandary; the despair evident in 
so much twentieth-century poetry is a consequence, whether acknowledged or not, of 
precisely this. Fifteen years later, in the introduction to his A Book of Luminous Things, 
Milosz re-emphasises the dangers of this imaginative poverty in our time. 
 
It has happened that we have been afflicted with a basic deprivation … Theology, 
science, philosophy, though they attempt to provide cures, are not very effective 
‗in that dark world where gods have lost their way‘ … The world deprived of 
clear-cut outlines, of the up and the down, of good and evil, succumbs to a 
peculiar nihilisation, that is, it loses its colours, so that greyness covers not only 
things of this earth and of space, but also the very flow of time …178 
 
 The fatalism induced by this position is acknowledged and very slightly relieved 
by Milosz in the closing paragraphs of ‗The Lesson in Biology‘, where he is at pains to 
reassure the reader that science is, in his view, neither an altogether detrimental force nor 
an insurmountable one for writers. Additional scientific progress is needed to undo the 
environmental damage wrought by its technological application, and poets will continue 
to engage in what Milosz famously calls ‗the passionate pursuit of the Real‘; they will 
continue, in other words, to examine reality as they always have, to gaze upon its 
intricacy and enormity, hoping to find within it an epiphany of its most essential nature, 
‗the Real‘. Poets, Milosz suggests, have at heart an immovable faith in reality (or at least, 
in his terms, ought to). 
 That quest by poets to pursue and capture reality as precisely, as concretely as 
possible, is compromised, however, as Milosz argues in ‗A Quarrel with Classicism‘, by 
the modern poet‘s inheritance of traditional form and convention. This lecture is, of those 
in The Witness of Poetry, the least immediately relevant to a discussion of Milosz‘s 
defence of poetry. It is, however, instructive as to his conception of poetry‘s relationship 
to the ‗Real‘.  The inheritance of classicism, his argument goes, stands as a constant 
invitation for the writer to sacrifice realism, and the ‗logic of incessant movement‘ that 
governs the arts, for the static, but superficially elegant linguistic and formal constructs 
central to the centuries-old habits of European poets. Language, in terms of that 
invitation, is inherently inadequate as a frame for the actual, and thus, paradoxically, the 
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hackneyed conventions available to us are the closest we can come to representing reality 
in a meaningful way; the very familiarity of those codes to the reader renders them most 
appropriate to the task.
179
 The province of poetry outside the borders of those conventions 
is a perilous, uncertain place; but, Milosz argues, it is in fact that uncertainty that ensures, 
in the bravest poets, a continued and determined ‗pursuit of the Real‘.180  
There is a kind of Platonism in Milosz which seems to lead him to believe that 
there is an essence to things which is not immediately available to us and which, with 
sufficient faith and not least sufficient talent, the poet, through the medium of words, can 
approach and even capture. In holding such faith, Milosz follows the ‗principle of 
individuation‘ found in the work of the thirteenth-century Franciscan philosopher Duns 
Scotus, whose influence Michael Parker traces to the poetry of Heaney, too:
181
 
 
all medieval philosophers were concerned with how human beings could come to 
know the universal; Scotus believed that they could do so by apprehending an 
individual object‘s essence, which he named its ‗this-ness‘ (haecceitas); and that 
such apprehensions and intuitions ultimately reveal God …182 
 
Even if the matter of language itself, through its very referential quality, ensures that the 
writer can never perhaps apprehend the object in all its quiddity, it is a necessary goad to 
all his or her activities, Milosz argues, that he or she believe that ‗this wild swan of a 
world‘ – a phrase that he borrows from an American poet he admires, Robinson Jeffers – 
can be hunted down. It is an awareness of this that, however frustrating it might be, quite 
literally keeps the poet to the mark and, in Milosz‘s terms, ensures the health of the art 
form itself. Whatever the time, whatever the place, whatever the social constraints, the 
Real remains, whether realised or not, whether apprehended by the poet or not.   
 Heaney, in an essay on Miroslav Holub, encapsulates Milosz‘s argument with 
classicism thus: 
 
classicism, in this definition, becomes a negative aspect of the Horatian dulce, a 
matter of conventional ornament, a protective paradigm of the way things are, 
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drawn from previous readings of the world which remain impervious to new 
perceptions and which are therefore deleterious to the growth of consciousness.
183
 
 
Twentieth-century poets, Milosz goes on to assert, despite being freer than ever before to 
abandon the strictures of traditional expression and to set off in pursuit of the Real, 
appear to be no more immune to the temptations of form than their predecessors: ‗a glass 
wall of conventions rises between a poet and reality‘, and Milosz wonders whether the 
dejection that so preoccupies him in contemporary writing is perhaps not merely a poetic 
‗tic‘ of the age. The poet has, in any case, found him or herself caught between a 
commitment to reality, and one to poetic custom. The history of poetry itself, its inherited 
forms and conventions, in this way becomes a threat to that which Milosz regards as its 
most central occupation – the perception of the Real.184  
 Far weightier obligations are called into question in the penultimate essay in The 
Witness of Poetry, ‗Ruins and Poetry‘, in which Milosz faces, as he inevitably must given 
his background, the political accusation against poetry. The context which gives shape to 
that accusation as well as his response to it is his own Poland, specifically during World 
War II, where the Nazi occupation, resulting in the obliteration of the social order and the 
very idea of civilisation itself, led to a radical disenchantment which included the notion 
of culture as well: 
 
the main reproach made to culture, a reproach at first too difficult to be 
formulated, then finally formulated, was that it maintained a network of meanings 
and symbols as a façade to hide the genocide under way. By the same token, 
religion, philosophy, and art became suspect as accomplices in deceiving man 
with lofty ideas, in order to veil the truth of existence. Only the biological seemed 
true …185 
 
In this manner, the culture, not least as it is represented in poetry, bears the burden of a 
society‘s helpless rage, becoming but another source of betrayal and treachery, complicit 
in the full horror of what has come to pass. Milosz does not hesitate to acknowledge that, 
in the light of a ghastly reality, the institution of literature itself becomes culpable. There 
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is, he argues, nonetheless an admirable quality to poems that attempt to document, to 
witness, in every painful detail, the facts of those horrors. Such poetry is constructed, as it 
were, from the ruins of a nation and an era, from the ruins of language itself.
186
 That this 
effort is at all possible, Milosz claims, answers Adorno‘s much-quoted challenge as to the 
possibility of writing poetry after the Holocaust, and in doing so it becomes the 
embodiment, however fragmented, however fragile, of hope. Such hope originates, more 
often than not, as he goes on to assert in some of his other writing, in a revelation of the 
Real; and so attention to that profound reality, in the form of poetry, is vitally necessary 
in a world characterised by political upheaval.  
The Polish writer is, crucially, able to make this argument for hope because of his 
belief in that essential, transcendent Real which is beyond the inherently superficial 
reality established by linguistic signs. The Nazis may, as Adorno argued in his writing on 
Auschwitz, have exterminated semantics itself along with millions of lives, destroyed 
irredeemably our ability to conceive of life and death in traditional terms; but Milosz‘s 
Real is not dependent on the authority of language for its existence.
187
 Poetic language 
simply provides the means by which the Real might be shown forth, and thus Milosz 
defends, as Heaney also does (albeit on different grounds), ‗the need for beauty and 
poetry in the face of destruction‘ – the need, in other words, for an alertness to and an 
expression of the Real. For Milosz, as Nathan and Quinn have stated, the ‗transcendence‘ 
of nightmarish reality is possible only through ‗immanence‘, through ever closer attention 
to the natural world, the world fundamentally uncompromised by the corruption of 
language and culture.
188
 This claim is, as Heaney points out again, authenticated by 
Milosz‘s personal experience. ‗The poetry I wrote before the war, and later in Nazi-
occupied Poland,‘ Milosz writes, ‗would have been utterly without hope were it not for 
my awareness of the beauty of the things of this earth‘.189 That beauty, by its survival 
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even as the foundations of civilisation give way, presents an alternative to the despair of 
political and social monstrosities; and writing that captures that alternative, finding its 
source in what is most unquestionably Real, is, it seems, the only worthy heritage the 
poet can hope to leave. Nathan and Quinn put it as follows: 
 
human beings are so much brushwood in the cosmic scheme of things; we come 
to be and pass away in a moment. Yet in the conflagrations that reduce us to 
charred cinders, as we pass into nothingness, we can still struggle to give off some 
light, which is our only way to affirm the value of the very process that consumes 
us. This glowing ember of human suffering is called poetry. As Milosz later put it, 
‗Man perishes entire and leaves no trace except a spark of beauty, provided he can 
trap it‘.190 
 
 And so the enemies of poetry jostle for front row in The Witness of Poetry: 
modern alienation between poet and reader; the threat that science represents to the 
imagination and its ‗innocence‘; the necessity yet futility of the various aesthetic modes 
of capturing the Real; the unavoidable political accusation; and, at least in brief, the 
overabundance of critical writing on poetry that has had a tendency to claim ascendancy 
over the art form whose servant it once was. Milosz does an accomplished job of 
presenting the challenges facing twentieth- (and twenty-first-) century poets, and his 
articulation of the dilemmas of the poet, particularly vis à vis politics, is easily the equal 
of Heaney‘s – as, given his historical experience, one might well expect it to be. In his 
response to those challenges, however, particularly as expressed in the final essay in the 
collection, ‗On Hope‘, Milosz is less than entirely lucid. His final expression of the future 
of poetry is a statement of faith which, if one does not share his Roman Catholicism or 
mystical leanings, it is very difficult to find persuasive, and, indeed, to interpret at all.
191
 
 The final statement of ‗On Hope‘ is a summary expression of that faith. Having 
predicted, in the rest of the essay, a series of great and potentially positive changes taking 
place the world over, Milosz concludes by proclaiming that  
 
every day one can see signs indicating that now, at the present moment, 
something new, and on a scale never witnessed before, is being born: humanity as 
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an elemental force conscious of transcending Nature, for it lives by memory of 
itself, that is, in History.
192
 
 
The Polish writer senses what he calls elsewhere in the essay the impending ‗unification 
of our planet‘.193 The means to that unification, or to a desirable form of it, lie in history, 
and in a growing consciousness, as he has it, of our planet‘s past. History will, Milosz 
predicts, replace science as the lens through which we scrutinise ourselves and our 
society, and we will thus gain a greater understanding of our own humanity; part of that 
process will be the ‗search for reality purified … for beauty‘. The ultimate consequence 
of this global change will be healing – of the divide between poetry and society, of the 
gap between what we wish for and what we suffer. There remains, however, as Milosz 
states elsewhere in the essay, a risk that the world will veer towards disintegration rather 
than unification.
 
It is an awareness of this risk that, in this final essay, is responsible for 
the characteristic bleakness of twentieth-century poetry, a cast of mind that fails to take 
into account the hope of which Milosz himself is so profoundly aware.
194
 
Summarised in this fashion, Milosz‘s arguments seem not far removed from the 
platitudinous. Like Brodsky‘s, Milosz‘s thought here becomes vapid with a kind of hope 
which the reader is very hard-pressed to find real or to see as anything other than a 
peculiarity of his own mind and its eschatological leanings. Something of what he seems 
to be driving at is suggested years earlier when, for instance, he writes in The Captive 
Mind,  
 
today the only poetry worthy of the name is eschatological, that is, poetry which 
rejects the present and human world in the name of a great change. The reader of 
today is in search of hope, and he does not care for poetry which accepts the order 
of things as permanent.
195
  
 
Yes, the reader might say, but we are best persuaded by works, and not statements of 
faith, particularly when it comes to the value and viability of an art form. How Milosz 
reaches his extraordinary and puzzling conclusion to The Witness of Poetry remains 
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unclear; it is also frustrating, after the careful and expertly argued essays preceding this 
one, to come up against a wall of mysticism and unfathomable hope. There is doubtless 
something attractive about the confidence and unwavering belief expressed by Milosz in 
this closing essay, but as much as the emotional force behind these convictions 
communicates itself to us, the motivation for them does not. The reader, ultimately, is left 
in the dark. 
All of the foregoing might seem of no relevance to this thesis. But my exposition 
of the final tendency of Milosz‘s ideas is made principally for reasons of contrast. There 
is a crucial point of departure between Milosz‘s defence and Heaney‘s, even when they 
might seem to be on common ground: where the latter founds his argument on 
demonstration, on the engaging and acutely sensitive reading of exemplary poems, 
Milosz is simply not as good a reader, and neither is he so meticulous in the provision of 
such evidence. He has a tendency to levitate, as it were, precisely where Heaney, perhaps 
faithful to his all too earthy origins, is inclined to dig – which is why one could never, 
pejoratively, call the Irish writer mystical. It is to Heaney‘s defence, therefore, which we 
must turn for a response, whether implicit or explicit, to the kinds of objections to poetry 
raised by Milosz; and an answer, above all, to what I have called the political accusation 
against the art form. 
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Chapter 2 
Heaney’s Defence of Poetry I:  
The Processes of Poetry 
In the case of the pen ‗between my finger and thumb‘, ‗snug as a gun‘, and all the rest of it, I was 
responding to an entirely phonetic prompt, a kind of sonic chain dictated by the inner ear. It‘s the 
connection between the ‗uh‘ sounds in ‗thumb‘ and ‗snug‘ and ‗gun‘ that are the heart of the 
poetic matter rather than any sociological or literary formation. 
  
Seamus Heaney on writing ‗Digging‘, interview with Dennis O‘Driscoll1 
 
I 
The canniness of Seamus Heaney's defence of poetry, the strategic subtlety of it, is that, 
while acutely aware of the enemies ranged against the art form, he does not try to attack 
politics, science, religion, mass society, technology or any of the other perceived enemies 
of poetry head-on. His defence, in its essence, is not concerned with destroying poetry‘s 
foes; he is not anti-science or anti-religion or even anti-politics. He has – and this is 
conspicuous throughout his career – a prior commitment, which is to poetry. And for 
him, poetry, while never without its political implications, is not politics by other means; 
it is not religion by other means (though its relation to religion is never denied); it is not 
sociology by other means. It is its own, autonomous self; it is poetry. He takes it as a kind 
of first commandment, in short, that poetry is poetry and not some other thing (as F.R. 
Leavis claimed, though Heaney is himself no Leavisite); his faith in the art form is not 
underwritten by anything but his own understanding of the nature of that art form itself. 
Indeed, his conception of poetry‘s internal processes forms the substructure of his 
defence, the grounds on which he establishes poetry‘s adequacy, its efficacy, to withstand 
the socio-political pressures of the contemporary world. It is those processes, as depicted 
by Heaney in his essays, which will be my focus in this chapter.  
One of the strengths of those essays – indeed, of Heaney‘s argument as a whole – 
is that he is perhaps rare among writers in that the fundamental elements of his defence 
are consistent throughout his career; notwithstanding his conception, remarked by 
Vendler in the Introduction to this thesis, of increasingly insightful, compelling 
metaphors for those concerns. Heaney‘s stance towards poetry has remained essentially 
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unchanged. His focus has shifted, certainly – his 1995 prose collection, The Redress of 
Poetry: Oxford Lectures, turns from the political charge which dominates his earlier work 
to the burden imposed by reality itself – and his ideas become more sharply defined over 
the decades; but Heaney has worked for thirty years within the same conceptual 
framework. He does not rely on modish theoretical trappings at any stage of his 
argument; as Hazard Adams points out, ‗there is very little reference to recent critical and 
theoretical discourse familiar to American academics in Heaney‘s essays … and almost 
no use of its jargon‘.2 His is not an approach based on current trends, which might well 
have dated it many times over by this stage. The shift in perspective that does take place 
within his work is analogous to one he describes as taking place in the work of every 
poet, from an inward, personal concentration – in Heaney‘s case on his relationship to the 
political and social turmoil of Northern Ireland – to a focus ‗beyond himself‘, which 
‗take[s] on the otherness of the world‘ – or, in Heaney‘s case, a broader exploration of the 
imagination and its reach in a post-religious age.
3
 In researching his defence, I have been 
struck by the frequency, over time, with which he returns to the same writers, the same 
passages, linchpins of an attitude to art and life held with absolute consistency for all of 
his career thus far. Indeed, I have found it unavoidable, at times in my exegesis, to follow 
in his footsteps, exploring the number of ways and different junctures at which, for 
example, he uses a writer like Osip Mandelstam or Robert Frost. Neil Corcoran 
comments on this same aspect of Heaney‘s work, suggesting that such passages, such 
writers, ‗act almost as Arnoldian touchstones of memorable authority‘, which furnish ‗the 
basis for the sometimes intense physicality of Heaney‘s own creatively oriented 
criticism‘.4  
 Undoubtedly, the potency of Heaney‘s defence has much to do with his critical 
style: ‗the Heaney manner‘ is crucial to the success of his argument. In his essays, he is 
the quintessential man of letters, as described by John Gross in The Oxford Book of 
Essays, whose manner of writing is notable, particularly in his prose, for its ‗intimacy and 
informality‘; he is, at the same time, an accomplished rhetorician, albeit in a non-
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pejorative sense.
5
 He adopts the middle register, one which is averse to the dry intricacies 
of literary theory. If Heaney has a reader over his shoulder, then he or she is that (perhaps 
now mythical) figure, the educated and interested general reader; it is with him or her in 
mind that he always writes. In particular, poetry as represented by him is not the private 
domain of an elite or coterie: in his criticism there is no trace of condescension towards 
what Ezra Pound once called ‗the bullet-headed many‘.6 Brad Leithauser has said of 
Randall Jarrell that ‗the reader connects with [his] criticism immediately, emotionally‘, 
and this is true of Heaney too. He is, like Jarrell, able to communicate and inspire great 
strength of feeling in his reader. In the same vein, Anne Stevenson has written that 
Heaney‘s ‗poetry and prose are branches of the same tree‘; we respond to his essays as 
we do his poems, ‗as distinctive perceptions of a humane intelligence and eminently 
generous personality‘.7 As much as his poems clarify life, his prose clarifies poetry as an 
art form – its purposes, its processes, and its undeniable place in the world.  
Heaney is a superb expositor, a practical critic sharing many of the same skills as 
Jarrell. The two writers likewise share an attractive temperament (and the luck of that 
temperament), but, despite the readiness of his enthusiasms, the American finally does 
not quite have Heaney‘s powers of articulation. The persuasive power of the latter‘s 
rhetoric lies firstly in the fact that it never has designs upon us. Heaney almost never 
arouses the suspicion that he has an axe to grind. His writing is at the furthest remove 
from emotional blackmail, and his argument is fundamentally non-ideological, a rare 
achievement in an age in which political-ideological considerations have a way of 
insinuating themselves into all spheres of human activity. Above all, however, his 
persuasive power rests in an uncanny ability to render in language, whether through an 
aptly chosen analogy or the grace of a metaphor, that which we recognise – intuitively, 
pre-linguistically – as true. Heaney is able to ‗listen in‘ to a poet or a poem as if his own 
ear were possessed of super-aural properties, convincing us without special pleading, and 
in the easy elegance of his prose style, that there are depths present in that which he is 
‗sounding‘ which we never expected were there. Poetry, as a result, becomes an art form, 
a vessel, more replete with meaning (in the widest sense), more indispensable, than ever 
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before. Without this superb critical capacity, as well as the matching skills of articulation, 
his defence, while always honourable and worthy of attention, would amount to 
something half as special as it really is. His reputation as ‗the beloved, genial, Irish 
ambassador for the art of poetry‘ is well-earned, certainly.8 But there is, for the above 
reasons, much more to it than geniality. 
 The manner of Heaney‘s style alone establishes those aggressors against whom he 
protects poetry: his constant opponents are the ideologue and a certain kind of academic 
policeman, with their desiccative, politicising theories – and styles to match. The manner 
of his defence is, at its most fundamental, an extension of Larkin‘s ‗pleasure principle‘; 
he writes about poetry as a pleasure-inducing phenomenon in a pleasure-inducing way. 
Heaney resists succumbing in his work to the ‗cunning merger between poet, literary 
critic and academic critic‘ (as Larkin calls it), and speaks always in the same clear, rich 
voice, the voice originating with Heaney the poet. His essays and poems, as Helen 
Vendler remarks, are exempla of both ‗soul‘ and ‗style‘.9 ‗Poetry, like all art, is 
inextricably bound up with giving pleasure‘; and in his essays, again and again, Heaney 
delights in the pleasure of poems, mimicking their ability to give pleasure by delighting 
his reader.
10
 His excitement at the processes of poetry, his amazement at their effect, are 
expressed in images and arguments that in turn excite and amaze, that do full justice – as 
no other apologist for poetry has done – to poetry‘s pleasure-giving properties.  
Furthermore, all the evidence suggests that Heaney is blessed with the kind of 
sensibility that is inclusive rather than exclusionary. He resists the almost mandatory 
secularism of the contemporary academic and critic, both in his insistence on the ability 
of poetry to ‗awaken the spiritual in human experience‘ and in his use of Catholic 
Christian terminology in depicting the processes and functions of poetry.
11
 Though never 
doctrinally religious in his critical vocabulary, he is notably relaxed about borrowing 
terms from religion: these are, he seems to believe, part of our necessary cultural 
inheritance as well as the terms most expressive of the human being‘s inarguable spiritual 
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needs. These characteristics of his prose differentiate him significantly from most other 
defenders of poetry, and the importance of that terminology to his argument must not be 
underestimated.  
  
II 
Preoccupations: Selected Prose 1968-1978 is Heaney‘s first collection of essays, and its 
focus is, to a large extent, the nature of the creative act. In this collection, as both in his 
other critical writings and in his poetry, Heaney has two primary metaphors for the poet: 
the priest and the peasant, one who works with the spirit and one who works with the dirt. 
Implicit in these recurrent metaphors is a view – one which permeates his defence – of 
poetry as a natural, organic process which simultaneously issues a transcendent 
experience. Heaney believes, without embarrassment, in the numinous aspect of poetry, 
but insists as vehemently on its profound connection with the earth – that is, with 
tangible, corporeal reality, and with agricultural-style labour. In his poetry, this is most 
obviously and famously expressed in ‗Digging‘; but this combination of metaphors 
appears in many other poems, too, some of which are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 ‗Belfast‘ is the earliest essay in which poetry is depicted as such, and in this 
instance Heaney‘s central comparison conflates the spiritual and the carnal: ‗I have 
always listened for poems,‘ he writes. ‗They come sometimes like bodies come out of a 
bog, almost complete, seeming to have been laid down a long time ago, surfacing with a 
touch of mystery.‘12 Poems, in these terms, are of the land, but that land itself is a 
creative force: like the bog people, poetry and its origins are both ‗secret and natural‘.13 
In this image, the bodies are a product, by some mysterious process, of the bog itself, like 
the ‗Grauballe Man‘, who is a salmagundi of organic elements: 
 
… The grain of his wrists 
   is like bog oak, 
   the ball of his heel 
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   like a basalt egg. 
   His instep has shrunk 
   cold as a swan‘s foot 
   or a wet swamp root. 
 
   His hips are the ridge 
   and purse of a mussel, 
   his spine an eel arrested 
   under a glisten of mud.
14
 
 
Heaney makes it clear that he does not consider the process of writing to involve only 
waiting and passive reception: poems involve conscious crafting and willed elements. But 
his closing depiction of that craft, in this essay, puts one in mind of the sorcerer: ‗the 
secret of being a poet … lies in the summoning of the energies of words‘.15 The very 
earthliness, the tangible, substantial weight of a poem is borne of something decidedly 
insubstantial, something ethereal. ‗He clearly thinks,‘ according to Harold Bloom, ‗that a 
poem comes up out of the dark, almost unbidden, organically oozing up through capillary 
channels pressured by incomprehensible forces‘.16 In ‗The Makings of a Music‘, Heaney 
once again refers to ‗energies‘, this time in his description of ‗composition as listening … 
a surrender to energies that spring within the centre of the mind‘. Here, the energies are 
perhaps more than merely linguistic, but they speak to the vitality and motion that is 
central, for Heaney, to the act of composition, to inspiration itself; a vitality always 
accompanied by a degree of ‗wise passiveness‘ on the part of the poet.17 
There are echoes of this process in ‗Feeling into Words‘, where Heaney uses a 
cluster of metaphors in an attempt to provide a more complete picture of poetry‘s role. 
Here, the comparison of poems to bog people is more generally rendered in terms of 
archaeological discovery. Heaney asserts once more poetry‘s equal involvement with the 
life of the supernal, the mysterious, and the life of the soil, as he describes 
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poetry as divination, poetry as revelation of the self to the self, as restoration of 
the culture to itself; poems as elements of continuity, with the aura and 
authenticity of archaeological finds … poetry as a dig, a dig for finds …18 
         
Michael Parker points out that Heaney‘s images for poetry here ‗could equally apply to 
the Mass or any other sacred ritual‘, practices which are an obvious source of tradition 
and thus constancy – although that suggestion ignores the progress from spiritual to 
earthly in the act of divination, from sensing the presence of water to scooping up the dry 
earth to reveal mud.
19
 The poet is like the diviner, Heaney explains, specifically ‗in his 
function of making contact with what lies hidden, and in his ability to make palpable 
what was sensed or raised‘.20 It is these activities – of discovery, of seeking and finding – 
that relate divination and archaeology, but divination is both science and art, an 
exploration guided by something unseen (and leading to something unseen). The image 
of the diviner incorporates the sense of the poet as originator, as worker, and it is one of a 
set of similar characterisations of the poet by Heaney, in both his poetry and his prose. 
Blake Morrison has commented on the Irish writer‘s tendency to compare the poet‘s 
work to ‗that of carpenters, water-diviners, blacksmiths, thatchers and a whole range of 
folksy-craftsy ―makers‖‘.21 At the same time, however, there is an underlying religious 
metaphor at work here, related to the Catholic discourse that often informs Heaney‘s 
writing: 
 
a displaced Catholicism … function[s] … when a poem is regarded as a visitation 
to the poet, who acts as its transmitter; this is a version of creative intransitivity 
which no doubt draws on ideas of both Romantic inspiration and Modernist 
impersonality but it may also owe something to the concept of divine grace and its 
acting independently of the recipient‘s state of mind or being, or, indeed, to the 
Catholic concept of priesthood in which, similarly, sacramentality operates 
independently of the state of grace of its agents.
22
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Digging, on the other hand, is undoubtedly manual, and implies the labour and 
nobility involved in writing: it depicts the poet with his or her hands in the dirt, a 
particularly physical engagement.
23
 The poet digs for the historically and culturally rich 
images and words that constitute a poem, and in this sense restores to the culture a kind 
of language and a depth of expression that it has lost; poetry is, as Derek Walcott has it, a 
process ‗of excavation and of self-discovery‘, for the individual and for the community.24 
Jay Parini, in Why Poetry Matters, shamelessly appropriates Heaney‘s notion of this 
process in a manner which nonetheless serves as a useful elaboration of the idea. ‗Poetry 
restores the culture to itself: mirroring what it finds there already but also sensing and 
embodying the higher purposes and buried ideals of that culture, granting access to 
hidden sources of power‘.25 The work of the poet, then, as Parini puts it, is to ‗restore 
language to its meaning‘, its fullest, original, forgotten meaning.26 He speaks elsewhere 
about language – although ‗poetry‘ would be more accurate to Heaney‘s argument – ‗as a 
kind of echo-chamber in which the origins of words … enhance their current denotations 
and connotations. Often unconsciously, the root meanings of words add resonance and 
meaning to the language of the poem‘.27 Nor is he alone in this conception. The Polish 
writer Stanislaw Baranczak likewise describes poetry‘s purpose as being to make ‗the 
reader aware of the word‘s hidden semantic possibilities‘, and this is surely what Heaney 
means, in part, when he speaks of invoking a word‘s peculiar energy.28 
At the same time as poetry reawakens the culture through language – through its 
internal, auditory operations, as conceived of by Heaney – it reflects and reveals the 
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reader to the reader (and the poet to the poet), making familiar experiences new, and 
uncovering places in the self that would otherwise go unconsidered. As one critic has 
noted, Heaney betrays here ‗an interest in what lies hidden, neglected or suppressed‘, and 
proposes ‗an idea of poetry which combines psychic investigation with historical 
enquiry‘.29 The nature of this exploration, I would suggest, is acoustic rather than 
semantic for Heaney. As will become evident in my later discussion of the auditory 
imagination in Heaney‘s work, his abiding interest is in words as historical entities 
providing access to pre-historic, pre-linguistic sensations and inclinations. In ‗The God in 
the Tree‘, he elaborates on the way in which words, as ‗archives‘ of the past and of 
language, interact with each other: 
 
poetry of any power is always deeper than its declared meaning. The secret 
between the words, the binding element, is often a psychic force that is elusive, 
archaic and only half-apprehended by maker and audience.
30
 
         
 
Elsewhere in Preoccupations, Heaney compares the discovery of what is 
concealed to crossing an intellectual and emotional frontier and plundering ‗the 
inarticulate‘.31 Poetry finds it origins prior to words and prior to ideas – it starts, 
according to Frost, as ‗a lump in the throat, a homesickness, a lovesickness‘. This 
inexpressible ache ‗finds the thought and the thought finds the words‘.32 In his reading of 
Frost‘s formulation, Heaney returns to the dual nature of poetry as entailing both spirit 
and sweat: the first sensing of that ache ‗involves the divining, vatic, oracular function‘, 
and the poem‘s quest for language involves ‗the making function‘. Heaney goes on to 
distinguish between these functions using the terms ‗technique‘ and ‗craft‘. Technique, as 
he defines it, is the ability to ‗mediate between the origins of feeling in memory and 
experience and the formal ploys that express these in a work of art‘. Technique, then, as 
Heaney defines it, is the work of the priest, the diviner, the sorcerer, the uncoverer of 
mysteries, who uses his diviner‘s rod, his rosary, his magical equipment, to open the way 
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to a spiritual experience. It involves ‗a gift for being in touch with what is there, hidden 
and real‘, and, most importantly, the ability to make what is there available to those who 
need it. Craft, on the other hand, is ‗the skill of making‘, those tricks and traditions a poet 
learns, Heaney explains, from other writers – in other words, the domain of the peasant-
farmer, the hands-on worker who digs the well once water has been found. This is a task 
involving talent and intuition of a different kind, and one learnt through apprenticeship to 
a master or masters.
33
 The poet, bringing together both aspects of the creative process, 
becomes both priest and peasant, both talented and trained. 
In his characterisation of the poetic act as a combination of apparently disparate 
elements lies much of the genius of Heaney‘s defence. To the Irish writer, poetry 
involves waiting as well as action, it encompasses the spiritual and the corporeal, it 
conjures the familiar while revealing the unknown. These descriptions are the first 
attempt by a defender of poetry to establish the craft as both manual, if you like, and 
spiritual labour. They reveal, not least, Heaney‘s unique ability to turn to his advantage – 
and to the advantage of his prose and poetry – what one might have assumed to be a 
disadvantage, namely his rural background, particularly in a postmodern, predominantly 
urban world. The agricultural imagery which so enriches and characterises his poems (to 
such a degree that Al Alvarez has suggested it is a pretension) here allows him to 
establish as clearly, perhaps, as only a Roman-Catholic farmer could, the spiritual/earthly 
binary that is inherent in poetry.
34
  
Heaney would have us recognise that poetry is not limited by either the rarefied 
moral claims made on its behalf or its close relationship to the dirt and sweat of reality: it 
is equally at home, and useful, in both realms. In fact, it creates a singular amalgam of the 
one and the other, such that, in Heaney‘s conception, they cannot finally be separated. It 
is therefore no surprise that the effect of Heaney‘s description of the poetic process, as 
well as of his own writing of it and about it, is of an unusual wholeness, as if the entire 
gamut of human being itself, from the carnal to the spiritual, were forged into a 
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continuity. In a time in which ‗alienation‘ has long since become a cliché, there is, 
perhaps uniquely, nothing alienated or alienating in Heaney‘s conception of poetry, 
whichever metaphor one might choose to articulate this – and precisely because that 
conception is not fundamentally exclusionary. This is his deep sanity, if you will; also, 
one suspects, the source of much of his popularity, whether acknowledged or not. (In this 
respect, at least, he calls to mind another uniquely non-alienated poet of the twentieth 
century, Pablo Neruda, much of whose work, whatever its exultations, is also profoundly 
of the earth.) Since Plato, ideas about the nature of inspiration have ranged from divine 
vision to secular madness, and emphasis has always been placed on the peculiarity, the 
essential aberrance of the experience. In Heaney‘s work, we find a picture of the process 
as both deeply mysterious and profoundly natural, and, moreover, rooted in that which is, 
after all, the matrix of all life: the earth itself. 
 
III 
That combination of the enigmatic and the organic is nowhere more fully expressed than 
in Heaney‘s conception of the ‗auditory imagination‘, a notion he borrows from Eliot and 
on which his defence, in large part, will come to rest. In an essay from Preoccupations 
entitled ‗Englands of the Mind‘. Heaney quotes Eliot‘s own formulation of this 
imaginative capacity, which early and late will constitute one of his theoretical 
touchstones. Eliot, in his essay on Matthew Arnold, speaks of a kind of aural 
seismograph that poets possess: 
 
the feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of 
thought and feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive and 
forgotten, returning to the origin and bringing something back … [fusing] the 
most ancient and the most civilised mentality.
35
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Seamus Heaney, ‗Learning from Eliot‘, in Finders Keepers: Selected Prose 1971-2001, (London: Faber & 
Faber, 2002), 36.) 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 81 
As with so many of his borrowings from other writers, Heaney is able to attribute a 
significance to the auditory imagination that makes it far more than a routine literary-
critical phrase; it is, as Anne Stevenson rightly calls it, the ‗mainspring of his own 
inspiration‘:36 
 
Eliot was thinking here about the cultural depth-charges latent in certain words 
and rhythms, that binding secret between words in poetry that delights not just the 
ear but the whole backward and abysm of mind and body; thinking of the energies 
beating in and between words that the poet brings into half-deliberate play; 
thinking of the relationship between the word as pure vocable, as articulate noise, 
and the word as etymological occurrence, as symptom of human history, memory 
and attachments.
37
 
        
   
This is one of Heaney‘s most accomplished, most memorable descriptions of the 
linguistic forces involved in the poetic act, forces which seem, albeit in muted expository 
form, to be present in this passage itself.  Poetry is once more the locus of a binary, 
bringing together sound and sense, harmony and history, in a single act of highly charged 
kinesis. In the poetic medium, words become caught up in a kind of Brownian motion, an 
endlessly variable, unpredictable exchange of energy and momentum, both phonetic and 
semantic. Poetry, combining words in such a way as to galvanize their potential as sheer 
sound, as denotation and connotation, recalls for us not only our physical being but our 
being in a specific culture, in history, as well.  
Sound is of course central in this account of the matter; but it also stems from ‗an 
arduous cooperation of mind and feeling and ear‘.38 The idea of this collaboration 
between sound and sense is pivotal to Heaney‘s defence: the auditory imagination 
becomes the very condition, the resource, which enables poetry to mean at all, and it is 
not merely the icing on a poem‘s semantic cake. For Heaney, as for T.S. Eliot, the old 
blanket terms – ‗music‘ or ‗sound‘ in their traditionally limited senses – are not adequate 
to describe this aspect of poetry, which, for these critics, is particularly powerful 
precisely because it is not simply a verbal approximation of musical melody. Heaney 
implies as much in ‗Osip and Nadezhda Mandelstam‘, when he reveals that Nadezhda 
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Mandelstam uses the phrase ‗a dig ―for the nugget of harmony‖‘ to describe her 
husband‘s poetic process. In her use of the metaphor, the value of the ‗nugget‘ lies both 
in its relation to history, tradition and memory, and its euphonic properties. The 
successful creation of a poem is simultaneously the creation of ‗harmony‘, the sounding 
of words in tune, perhaps, with the world.
39
 That which is called forth by the sound of 
words thus has, in Heaney, the same power as those primordial or archetypal images of 
which Jung once wrote: 
 
whoever speaks in primordial images speaks with a thousand voices; he enthrals 
and overpowers, while at the same time he lifts the idea he is seeking to express 
out of the occasional and transitory into the realm of the ever-enduring. He 
transmutes our personal destiny into the destiny of mankind, and evokes in us all 
those beneficial forces that ever and anon have enabled humanity to find a refuge 
from every peril and to outlive every dark night.
40
 
 
Like these images, it is the auditory imagination which is the root and branch of 
the art of poetry; and it is the central justification of that art form because it allows entry 
to what Harry White calls ‗an otherwise inaccessible experience‘, one which is wholly 
beneficial.
41
 The inextricable link between sound and meaning is unique to poetry; it 
situates the art form on the borderline between music and language, and on the borderline 
between our conscious and subconscious. It permits us the enlargement, the enrichment, 
of an experience encompassing both our apperceptions and our subconscious minds, not 
only awakening our most elemental selves but creating communication, cooperation, 
between those selves and our daily, rational beings. The result of that interchange of 
energy, of meaning, is like that of Jung‘s primordial images acting on our psyches – that 
is, the fortification of our human spirits. We become, in short, better people; not ethically, 
morally so, but in our talent, as it were, for humanity itself. The holistic psychological 
and emotional balance afforded us by the auditory imagination (at peak powers) is akin, 
perhaps, to the feeling of complete physical, muscular harmony experienced by a dancer 
or a runner when his or her body is fully, congruously exerted; and it is poetry alone that 
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affords us, so immediately and so profoundly, that opportunity for equilibrium. This, 
then, is the significance of the auditory imagination, and the reason that it becomes, for 
Heaney, the bedrock of his defence: it is unique to poetry, the very source of the art 
form‘s forcibleness and its capacity to be of use to us. Without the auditory imagination, 
‗poetry as an art is in danger of being overshadowed by a quest for poetry as a diagram of 
political attitudes‘.42 Heaney goes on,   
 
I do not in fact see how poetry can survive as a category of human consciousness 
if it does not put poetic considerations first – expressive considerations, that is, 
based upon its own genetic laws which spring into operation at the moment of 
lyric conception.
43
 
         
Poetry fuelled by the auditory imagination is not chaotic or uncontrolled – rather, 
it is generated by a kind of poetic DNA, its own intrinsic system. If that system is 
overridden by an external one, if the poet does not prioritise the demands of the creative 
act rather than the social, moral or political one, then poetry cannot sustain the qualities 
that establish it as a distinct way of experiencing the world. Heaney seems, in this 
instance and in others, to be something of an essentialist. He is not saying anything about 
the ‗content‘ of poetry. Rather he is an essentialist as to the elements, the ingredients, as 
it were, that have to be present if a poem is to remain faithful to the nature of poetry – 
and thus to bring to us the poetic experience. And it is only in fulfilling that original 
mandate that the art form supplies a credible justification for itself. Poetry has to begin 
with the auditory imagination; this is, as it were, its linguistic genetic marker. Leave this 
out – that is, forget the auditory imagination for some ulterior consideration, however 
virtuously motivated – and you are forgetting the element which, in Heaney‘s 
formulation, defines poetry. If we do this, we not only sell short the art form, but we 
make it vulnerable to attack. For then, lacking the foundation provided by its own 
defining processes, the language of poetry becomes just politics or religion or social 
commentary by other means – a kind of inferior, perhaps even childish, form of prose.   
If Ezra Pound is commonly, perhaps all too ritually, regarded as having the finest 
ear of twentieth-century English-language poets – and his sense of the line, particularly 
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outside the template of iambic metre, gives credence to this – then Heaney may justly be 
said to have the finest ear for the sound-properties of individual words: the juxtaposition 
of consonants, embedded alliteration, the resonance of certain vowel sounds. In his 
emphasis on the auditory imagination, therefore, he is not only playing to one of his 
strengths; he is foregrounding that to which his own extraordinary ear naturally inclines 
him. No poet before him has given so much emphasis to the auditory imagination – made 
it so definitive of the process whereby poetry comes into being. Heaney‘s interpretation 
gives the notion far more scale and significance than, for instance, Eliot himself does. In 
‗Matthew Arnold‘, Eliot says nothing more about the concept, which he presents as a way 
of explaining what Arnold‘s poetry, in his view, lacks. Indeed, one critic has contended 
that for all its fame among Eliot‘s prose passages, the notion itself is one of Eliot‘s least 
illuminating, most unhelpfully generalised references to the music of poetry.
44
 For the 
Irish writer, on the other hand, the auditory imagination embodies another one of the 
binaries that are characteristic of poetry as he conceives of it: earth and spirit, seeking and 
awaiting, mind and body, and now sound and sense. In this way, his reading of Eliot‘s 
conception is to make of it a cog – of perfect size and design – in the machine of a 
broader argument, one crucial to the motion and productivity of that machine. The 
importance of those contrasting pairs to Heaney‘s defence is that, he argues, poetry 
unifies them, conjoining them in what Les Murray would call, albeit clumsily, the 
‗wholespeak‘ of poetry; and that balance, that unification, is central to Heaney‘s 
understanding of what makes good poetry, and what, moreover, makes it uniquely 
valuable.
45
 Octavio Paz intimates something similar in ‗The Other Voice‘:  
 
the operative mode of poetic thought is imagining, and imagination consists, 
essentially, of the ability to place contrary or divergent realities in relationship. 
All poetic forms and all linguistic figures have one thing in common: they seek, 
and often find, hidden resemblances. In the most extreme cases, they unite 
opposites. Comparisons, analogies, metaphors, metonymies, and the other devices 
of poetry – all tend to produce images in which this and that, the one and the 
other, the one and the many are joined …46 
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The coexistence of such fundamentally opposed elements in a harmonious, efficacious 
whole – a whole which not only yokes together, but directs the forces of those elements – 
is achieved by no other art form, no other form of language, than poetry; and poetry is, 
therefore, ultimate speech. Such is the implication of Heaney‘s argument. 
The degree to which poetry‘s overall efficacy relies on the auditory imagination is 
demonstrated in one of the earliest essays in The Government of the Tongue: Selected 
Prose 1978-1987, ‗Osip and Nadezhda Mandelstam‘, in which Heaney explores a context 
where the auditory imagination is handicapped, or absent altogether. When this occurs, 
poetry fails not only to move, to live, but also to mean. The Irish writer describes 
Mandelstam‘s stance towards sound and meaning, a stance that is, in essence, Heaney‘s 
own. He refers to Mandelstam‘s ‗devotion to the physical word, the etymological 
memory bank, the word as its own form and content‘ – a reaction, in part, to the 
‗metaphysical dualism‘ of the Russian Symbolists, just as Heaney‘s own allegiance to it 
might be read, at some level, as a response to postmodernism‘s groundlessness. Heaney 
quotes Mandelstam‘s notion that ‗the word is a bundle and meaning sticks out of it in 
various directions‘ (ready to be snagged, in Heaney‘s formulation, on the meanings of 
juxtaposed words), and remarks on ‗his profound contact with the common, miraculous 
resources of the [Russian] language as a phonetic instrument‘. Writing, it seems, of an 
absence of precisely that linguistic energy described by Heaney in Preoccupations,
 
Mandelstam laments the leaching of meaning from language, by Russian Symbolism, in 
his well-known criticism of the Symbolist rose:
 47
  
 
the rose is a likeness of the sun, the sun is a likeness of the rose, a dove – of a girl, 
and a girl – of a dove. Images are gutted like scarecrows and packed with foreign 
content. In place of the Symbolist forest, we are left with a workshop producing 
scarecrows … Nothing is left but a terrifying quadrille of ‗correspondences‘ 
nodding to one another. Eternal winking. Never a clear word, nothing but hints 
and reticent whispers. The rose nods to the girl, the girl to the rose. No one wants 
to be himself.
48
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Instead of harbouring layer upon layer of acoustical meaning, here the words fail to 
signify even their most basic, essential referents. Symbols always of something other than 
themselves, they become empty vessels – nothing in themselves, and unresponsive, by 
extension, to the catalytic potential of sound.  
Robert Frost‘s notion of the ‗sound of sense‘, though somewhat less important to 
Heaney‘s defence than Eliot‘s work, is nevertheless an additional tributary that flows into 
Heaney‘s conception of poetry and its importance. Frost‘s description of this primordial, 
ancient intonation has, in Heaney‘s reading, much in common with the auditory 
imagination: if achieved by a poem, that intonation allows it to ride the momentum of the 
language as an entity, becoming absorbed into the familiar and deeply evocative rhythms 
of that language. In ‗The Indefatigable Hoof-Taps: Sylvia Plath‘, Heaney remarks that in 
both Frost‘s and Eliot‘s writing there is a strong element of self-justification at work: 
 
what is implicit here is an argument for the deep humanity of the achieved poem, 
its access to an evolutionary racial ear. The auditory imagination … unites reader 
and poet and poem in an experience of enlargement, of getting beyond the 
confines of the first person singular, of widening the lens of receptivity until it 
reaches and is reached by the world beyond the self.
49
 
 
Poetry, then, moves readers beyond its own boundaries, and beyond themselves, not only 
allowing access to that which lies immediately outside the self, but also to that which has 
seemed unreachable and indeed is unreachable, it appears, by any other means. By 
aligning itself with the internal rhythms of language, the poem harnesses the energy of 
the language as a whole. In this way, poetry outpaces the self, and ‗sound and meaning 
rise like a tide out of language to carry individual utterance away on a current stronger 
and deeper than the individual could have anticipated.‘50 This is the strengthened, 
widened river on which the poem arrived in the first place, a linguistic phenomenon that 
is universal in its reach. Heaney is talking, here, about the transformation of the personal, 
intimate speech act into a poetic act which, by means of its sound as much as anything 
else, is accessible to readers other than the poet. The beat of the poem, its deepest 
intonation and movement and the meaning they produce, are recognisable to us because 
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we are human beings – with all that implies about our common ancestry, our common 
experiences, and indeed our shared capacity for speech – and they are familiar to us in the 
most unavoidable, undeniable sense, an aural equivalent of the Jungian conception of the 
archetypal.   
It will be clear from the essays discussed above that one branch of Heaney‘s 
defence derives in no small part from Eliot, Frost, and their respective articulations of the 
power of sound; as we will increasingly see, this is the case with many other aspects of 
Heaney‘s argument. What distinguishes him from his predecessors is his style – in this 
instance his rejection of that impersonal, largely theoretical style of criticism so 
characteristic of Eliot – and what Neil Corcoran calls ‗his unerring sense of what, as Ezra 
Pound said in another context, is ―of present use‖, or may be made so‘; in other words, 
his superb sensibility, the way in which he is able to discern and extract those quotations 
from among the work of his forebears and contemporaries that are germane to his 
purposes. Repeatedly, we both witness and overhear him, in his commentary on other 
writers, ‗interiorize … and transform‘ the relevant passages into a constellation, a 
configuration, which then informs his own critical method.
51
 Heaney‘s instinct for potent 
word-combinations in his poetry is just as strongly evident in his ability to combine ideas 
and specific passages in his criticism: the relation between Frost and Eliot (often taken to 
be poetic opposites), between Mandelstam and Milosz, between Weil and Havel and a 
dozen other writers, enlivens his prose and establishes an unexpected, dynamic system of 
give and take that is, in fact, a product of Heaney‘s own acute critical sense. His genius is 
a cumulative genius; in other words, he adds together rather than excludes, and he sees 
things – even ostensible opposites – as being coextensive (or at least in a continuum) 
rather than at war with one another, as is so often held. And the result is always a sense of 
enlarged purpose, whether as regards human being as such or the art of poetry 
specifically.  
 
IV 
The auditory imagination, with its complete unity of sound and sense – perhaps the most 
integrated of all Heaney‘s conceptions – is a characteristic of poetry which critics, and, 
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indeed, some poets, have found it hard to accept, both historically and in the present era. 
Most recently, John Carey, in What Good Are The Arts?, challenges Heaney‘s belief that, 
as Carey understands it, 
 
poetry works through making noises that stir deep unconscious memories, both 
racial memories of man‘s pre-verbal cave-dwelling past and memories of our own 
childhood – possibly, as others have suggested, though Heaney does not, 
memories of the first semi-articulate converse between mother and child. The 
effect of these memories is to make us trust the ‗promptings of our intuitive 
being‘ (as opposed, presumably, to logic, reason and science) …52 
 
Carey, who rejects the notion that art of any kind can improve its recipients in any way 
(one which Heaney embraces, in his own terms) likewise rejects Heaney‘s argument for 
the acoustic influence of poetry on our inner beings, the idea that poetry‘s music ‗prevails 
on [people] to trust the intuitive, sympathetic and vulnerable parts of themselves, giving 
them an inner strength to withstand the ―wrongness all around‖‘.53 His criticism of the 
idea is based on what he interprets as the stumbling-blocks to understanding in this 
argument, and the fact that the similarity ‗between the sound of poetry and the noises 
made by cavemen, infants, or whatever other pre-verbal creature is intended, is 
impossible to establish‘.54  
 Carey‘s rationalistic bent, most obvious in his apparent setting up of an opposition 
between poetry‘s promptings and scientific reason, is similarly betrayed in his 
interpretation of Heaney‘s remarks about that which is ‗ancient‘ and ‗primitive‘ as a 
reference to the memory, in people, of the grunts of cavemen and infants. This is an 
unnecessary assumption to make, I would argue, but the possibility that Heaney may be 
speaking of something more nebulous than an evolutionary memory of actual speech is 
not an idea that Carey will countenance. The critic is, in any case, setting up a straw man, 
an argument based precisely on the kind of diminished, ‗un-whole‘ conception of human 
being that Heaney opposes. Carey‘s human is a biological machine, with neither 
imagination nor spirit, a creature embodying all that is alienating, all that is counter-
intuitive, about extreme materialism. And what Carey requires of that machine, in all its 
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outputs – not least poetry – is a kind of crude productivity reminiscent of Auden‘s 
conviction that in order to be of value, poetry must be shown to have saved Jewish lives 
during the Holocaust.  
It is science itself, however, that punches the biggest hole in Carey‘s argument – 
specifically linguistic science. The pre-verbal noises of infants, their babbling, is, 
contrary to what Carey seems to think, systematic and predictable, and wholly in keeping 
with the most fundamental and unchanging structures of language itself. Its music, 
moreover, is universal: all babies, regardless of their origins, babble the same sounds at 
more or less the same time in their development, and those sounds are ordered by their 
place of articulation, the position of the tongue in their mouths as they speak; the tongue, 
in other words, governs. The similarity between those sounds and the common sound 
structures of poetry is therefore quite possible to establish; and while no such study has, 
as far as I know, been conducted, the very systematic nature of babbling, its ordering of 
sounds by their articulation, would seem to have much in common with the musical 
instincts of the poet, as demonstrated by even the simplest of poetic techniques – 
alliteration and assonance. Furthermore, as the linguist M.M. Lewis points out, an 
established stage in the babbling period is characterised by the discovery that sounds are 
a source of pleasure, not for the response they provoke from caregivers, but for their own 
texture and aural sensation. Babies babble for the sake of babbling, because, like 
Mandelstam, they like the way sounds feel in their mouths. Poetry, as defined by Heaney, 
is, one might argue, an ‗adult‘ means of regaining that pleasure, and perhaps with it the 
sense of profound, original self-discovery that accompanies infancy.
55
 Terry Eagleton, for 
one, would concur: ‗poets, like infants, relish sounds for their own sakes. Poetry is a 
superior form of babbling‘.56 
Philipp Wolf, in an essay on Heaney and Heidegger, also objects to the general 
assertion (in both Heaney‘s prose and poetry) that poetry can help through its sound. 
 
To be sure, prosody and melody are always relevant to sense and meaning in 
literature and in particular, poetry. But if we look at it soberly, is it really possible 
to evoke a kind of individual universal, spatial and supertemporal identity of 
presence through poetic and tonal modulation and the articulation of certain 
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words or names? … And could the tonal substance of words and place-names by 
any means release that kind of mythologically orphic charm … ?57 
 
Wolf‘s criticism is not limited to the auditory imagination per se, but includes the 
general notion that poetry‘s sound can accomplish anything at all of value, of lasting 
worth; and it should be noted that his criticism relates, also, to the way in which Heaney 
seems to use place names in his poetry – ‗Anahorish‘, ‗Broagh‘, for instance – to conjure 
an identity and a history. Language and place are issues of abiding and often interlinked 
concern to Heaney, in both his creative and critical writing. In attempting to cast doubt on 
whether the meeting-point of those two entities, in the naming of places, has any 
particular power, Wolf ignores an entire school of social science that deals with language 
and identity, not least as that identity is asserted or recalled in the naming of geographical 
locations. In a postcolonial society such as Northern Ireland, such naming, and the 
utterance of those names, becomes a symbolic reclamation not only of power, but of 
history: 
 
the naming and renaming of places is a crucial aspect of geographical ‗discovery‘, 
establishing proprietorial claims through linguistic association with the colonising 
power. The same logic applies in every episode of ‗spatial history‘ … Spatial 
history ‗begins and ends in language‘; by the act of naming, space is symbolically 
transformed into place, a space with a history.
58
 
 
In Northern Ireland, that transformation is one enacted throughout its troubled history, 
both by the colonisers and the colonised; Irish-language place names, words from Irish 
dialect, mythological-historical references – all of which are markers of Heaney‘s own 
poetry – are today a means of reconstituting, of redefining, national identity, in a country 
where that identity has long been fragmented and limited along (not least) religious 
lines.
59
 Catherine Nash argues that the articulation of such place names serves a dual 
purpose in contemporary Irish society: it summons up a shared past, and it also suggests a 
unified future, one inclusive of both Protestants and Catholics under the single identifier 
                                                 
57
 Philipp Wolf, ‗Heaney and Heidegger: Poetry, Ontology and Ideology‘, in Literature and Philosophy: 
Yearbook of Research in English and American Literature, ed. H. Grabes, (Stuttgart: Gunter Narr Verlag, 
1997), 328. 
58
 Peter Jackson, Maps of Meaning, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 168. 
59
 Catherine Nash, ‗Irish Placenames: Post-colonial Locations‘, in Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 24.4 (1999): 475. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 91 
‗Irish‘. The ‗mythologically orphic charm‘ to which Wolf so dubiously refers – he is, like 
Carey, suspicious of powers which cannot be rationally reduced – is abundantly present 
as a consequence of Ireland‘s postcolonial status; language in such circumstances bears a 
far heavier weight of meaning than it might otherwise, and for Heaney as for other Irish 
writers, indeed for common Irish citizens, language is the foremost, the most accessible, 
carrier of myth and history. Moreover, the ‗tonal substance‘, as Wolf calls it, of those 
words and names is the very essence of the matter; it is a language‘s phonetic character, 
after all, that differentiates it most immediately, most clearly, from any other language. It 
is difficult, for instance, to mistake the fluid melodies of French for the guttural edges of 
German. Heaney may be speaking, in large part, of English rather than Irish-language 
poetry when he discusses the auditory imagination; but as his own poetry testifies, the 
combination of the vocabulary of rural Ireland with a music that seems to originate in 
Irish-English dialect, rather than in London or Liverpool dialect, is as evocative of 
Heaney‘s homeland as his references to geographical locations.  
Poets themselves, however, have also struggled with the binary of sound and 
sense as it exists in poetry, and in ‗Sounding Auden‘, one of the later essays in The 
Government of the Tongue, Heaney discusses the problem which that dyad presented for 
the Anglo-American poet throughout his career – the impossibility, for Auden, of 
accepting such a force as the auditory imagination, with the seemingly irreconcilable 
elements of history and harmony working together. For Auden, Heaney writes, 
 
on the one hand, poetry could be regarded as magical incantation, fundamentally a 
matter of sound and the power of sound to bind our minds‘ and bodies‘ 
apprehensions within an acoustic complex; on the other hand, poetry is a matter of 
making wise and true meanings, of commanding our emotional assent by the 
intelligent disposition and inquisition of human experience.
 60
 
 
The poet is firstly a magician, poetry the enchantment whose power is, for Auden as for 
Heaney, Eliot, Frost and Mandelstam, phonetic. The emphasis here is on poetry as being 
literally spellbinding, irrespective of semantic content. At the same time, the poet is 
involved in revealing the truth, in disintoxicating (to use Auden‘s word) the minds of 
others through the exercise of a sceptical and moralising intelligence. Heaney explains 
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how a poet‘s ability to command our attention and arouse our assent arises from this 
nonpareil combination of truth and tone: 
 
by poetic authority I mean the rights and weight which accrue to a voice not only 
because of a sustained history of truth-telling but by virtue also of its tonality, the 
sway it gains over the deep ear and, through that, over other parts of our mind and 
nature.
61
 
 
As we absorb a poet‘s words, sound and meaning operating on us simultaneously, we are 
moved, often involuntarily, in the direction of their gesture. The voice of the truly 
authoritative poet is both eminently trustworthy – having proved itself thus in previous 
poems – and deeply, magnetically attractive in its timbre. Les Murray speaks of poetry 
being ‗convincing, true to instinct and intuition, capable of stirring involuntary sympathy‘ 
in the reader, and this is precisely the force that Heaney identifies with sound.
62
  
There is, the Irish writer suggests here for the first time, a potential for confusion 
inherent in this particular ‗duality‘: sound can override sense, or vice versa, and Auden 
himself was particularly, even preternaturally, aware of this potential. His lifelong 
conflict over the role of poetry, his fear, as Heaney has it, of poetry‘s siren-like power, 
were consequences of his time and place; consequences, finally, of the political 
accusation of which Auden grew ever more aware as he matured. For a time, Heaney 
argues, the Anglo-American poet was able to retain a shaky belief in the peaceful, 
healthful coexistence of sound and sense, and produce poetry that, reliant on its own 
processes, conveyed truth; ‗but this unified sensibility fissured when Auden was 
inevitably driven to extend himself beyond the transmission of intuited knowledge, 
beyond poetic indirection and implication, and began spelling out those intuitions in a 
more explicit, analytic and morally ratified rhetoric‘.63 
For Auden, then, sound and sense, magic and the reality principle, become finally 
irreconcilable; he cannot believe in a poetry that answers satisfactorily to both, despite his 
early, strained attempts, in his essays, to conceive of such a poetry. For Heaney, on the 
other hand, the matter is far clearer. Ideally, any possible confusion or imbalance between 
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poetic music and poetic meaning is temporarily resolved by poems themselves: ‗in fact, 
most poems – including Auden‘s – constitute temporary stays against the confusion 
threatened by the mind‘s inclination to accept both accounts of poetic function in spite of 
their potential mutual exclusiveness‘.64 Heaney is of course paraphrasing Robert Frost‘s 
description of poetry as a ‗momentary stay against confusion‘. (For Frost, the poem 
elucidated our own existence; the confusion it resisted was the confusion of being alive, 
of daily living.)
65
 But Heaney, characteristically adept in turning the metaphors of others 
to his own purposes, is speaking of a confusion of a different order. The apparently 
unbridgeable gap between the ways in which a poem makes meaning – through sheer 
sound on the one hand and through the intelligence enacted in words on the other – is, 
Heaney is concerned to point out, disposed of by Auden‘s own poetry. Not only are 
poetry‘s intoxicating and disintoxicating aspects reconcilable, but, in Heaney‘s argument, 
they are inseparable: a poem‘s truth-telling function can only be performed if it is also 
fulfilling the phonetic demands of the craft. This is a notion that recalls, of course, 
Sidney‘s assertion that poetry teaches through delight.66       
 What, then, is the essential difference between Auden and Heaney, which allows 
the Irish writer to reach this conclusion while his predecessor grows more and more 
doubtful – not simply about the possibility of sound and sense as a unified force, but 
about the efficacy of poetry at all, at any level? It might be suggested that Heaney, 
through his remarkably equable temperament and inclination towards the reconciliation 
of opposites, is skating over or hurrying to push together two plainly contrary facets of 
the art form; that Auden‘s agony and final defeat at the hands of that contradiction is the 
more honest response. The difficulty with this position is that neither in his essay on 
Auden, nor in any of his other essays on the sound and sense of poetry can Heaney‘s 
approach, his method of argument, be faulted for insubstantiality; the evidence is in the 
poetry itself, which Heaney reads and delights in for the benefit of his audience.  
This practical aspect of his criticism, and the support it provides for his theory, is 
noted by commentators as early as the first reviews of Preoccupations. Robert Pinsky, in 
his New York Times review of the book, remarks that Heaney‘s conception of poetry is 
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persuasive because it is ‗supported by the unfakable absorption in technique of the 
adept‘.67 Heaney himself ventures a half-apology for his preoccupation with poetic 
exegesis in the foreword to that first collection of essays, reminding the reader that his 
defining educational experiences took place at a time when practical criticism dominated 
literary academic practice.
68
 Fifteen years later, reviewing The Redress of Poetry, J.D. 
McClatchy asserts that Heaney‘s defence of poetry is far more concerned with the 
evidence of poetry itself than the propagation of ideas: it is in the finer details of texts, 
rather than in grand theoretical notions, that his argument finds its most convincing 
form.
69
 Heaney does not ask us – he never asks us – simply to nod our heads in 
agreement; not before we have listened with his ears to the truth and the music of the 
poetry itself, heard them work together at peak powers. As Corcoran observes,  
 
what distinguishes Heaney as a critic is the physicality of his ear … the way, 
precisely, in which the contour of a meaning is traced within the pattern of a 
rhythm, or, sometimes, a rhyme or even, indeed, an etymology. Poetic authority is 
sought within poetic music; an ethics of interpretation is grounded in the 
description of a technique.
70
 
 
In ‗Sounding Auden‘ that technique is described – as it typically is in Heaney‘s essays –  
with reference to more than ten of Auden‘s poems, as well as an assortment of works by 
other writers; each one comes under the super-sensitive scrutiny of Heaney‘s ear and eye. 
This consistent practical criticism (what Pinsky, responding to Heaney‘s fears of being 
overly didactic, calls ‗the best kind of teaching‘) buttresses, as Heaney‘s reviewers have 
noted, an argument that otherwise might well have collapsed under its own weight. Again 
and again, in his reading, Heaney shows us how sound and sense cooperate, at least in the 
best poems, to provide a richness, even an excess of meaning – a demonstration which 
overrides any scepticism one might have about possible conflict between the two. In fact, 
as Heaney discloses them, they are the systole and diastole of poetic meaning, the very 
reason we go to poetry in the first place.  
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 It should not be overlooked, either, in contemplating the differences between 
Auden and Heaney, that despite Heaney‘s far more immediate and prolonged contact 
with political violence and unrest, at least during his developmental years – which, one 
would assume, might make him understandably less likely than Auden to reach this point 
of equanimity concerning poetry – he retains one distinct advantage over the Anglo-
American. This is his discipleship to the Eastern European writers, like Mandelstam, 
whose witness to poetry, whose faith in the importance of its utter autonomy, have 
provided Heaney with the outlines of his own artistic creed. His affinity with those 
writers is everywhere evident in his essays, and Heaney himself explains their importance 
to his writing in The Government of the Tongue: 
 
I keep returning to them because there is something in their situation that makes 
them attractive to a reader whose formative experience has been largely Irish. 
There is an unsettled aspect to the different worlds they inhabit, and one of the 
challenges they face is to survive amphibiously, in the realm of the ‗the times‘ 
and the realm of their moral and artistic self-respect, a challenge immediately 
recognizable to anyone who has lived with the awful and demeaning facts of 
Northern Ireland‘s history over the last couple of decades.71 
 
In the strength of their belief in the necessity of poetry – a belief tested repeatedly by 
pressures unimaginable to most – such poets provide Heaney with a list of undeniably 
credible, reliable witnesses to the liberation, at times even personal salvation, available 
through the art form. Indeed, their unflinching faith in the power of poetry to overcome 
present horrors has fortified Heaney‘s own beliefs in this regard, as the discovery of such 
kinship always must. The Irish writer acknowledges as much in a recent interview, 
remarking that without their influence, he would not have been ‗as convinced about the 
worthwhileness of writing itself‘.72 Faced with an almost inconceivable degree of 
politicisation, these writers were able to see more clearly, perhaps, than others in 
countries less cursed, the extent to which poetry was not politics; and in this way they 
have been of use to Heaney. Mandelstam, for instance, provided him with models of 
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resistance, fuelling his own instinct for independence and the irreducible nature of the art 
form of poetry itself.  
Auden, on the other hand, had no such church, as it were, in which to have his 
faith affirmed. Writing in the 1930s, just as the century was about to take arguably its 
most incomprehensible, unbearable political turn, he had to find his way alone, in a sense, 
through a morass of artistic and social responsibilities. It is no wonder, then, that he 
should have found it difficult to reach the level ground of Heaney‘s reconciliation of 
those same responsibilities – his belief that, as Octavio Paz has also stated, poetry‘s most 
defining characteristic is the intimate and inseparable fusion of sound and sense.
73
     
 Heaney‘s conception of the necessarily autonomous processes, embodied in the 
auditory imagination, by which poetry comes into being, dominates his defence of the art 
form; it is the engine room, so to speak, of his argument. The nature of that argument 
itself, however, is inevitably determined by the charges against which it must defend 
poetry. For Heaney, those accusations are political in form – which, as I have already 
said, is to be expected given his background, his coming of age in Northern Ireland 
during the Troubles. It is to Heaney‘s defence of poetry against the political accusation, a 
defence founded in his notion of song, therefore, to which I will turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Heaney’s Defence of Poetry II: 
The Political Accusation 
[Lyric poets] know that the integrity of the polis is guarded as much by the solitariness of their 
enterprise as by other people‘s solidarity, although it‘s hard to proclaim that truth when closed 
ranks and consensus are the things most in demand. 
 
     Seamus Heaney, interview with Dennis O‘Driscoll1 
 
I 
In one of his earliest essays, Heaney describes the moment, in 1969, in which he first felt 
the pressure of a political-poetic responsibility bearing down on him. The rioting in 
Belfast, which heralded the onset of an era of nationwide violence and bloodshed, 
heralded also the beginning, in Heaney‘s work, of an argument with those who would 
dismiss poetry as impotent, indeed offensive, in the face of political upheaval, as he 
himself strove to write poetry that was neither of those things. 
 
From that moment the problems of poetry moved from being simply a matter of 
achieving the satisfactory verbal icon to being a search for images and symbols 
adequate to our predicament. I do not mean liberal lamentation that citizens 
should feel compelled to murder one another or deploy their different military 
arms over the matter of nomenclatures such as British and Irish. I do not mean 
public celebrations or execrations of resistance or atrocity … I mean that I felt it 
imperative to discover a field of force in which, without abandoning fidelity to the 
processes and experience of poetry as I have outlined them, it would be possible 
to encompass the perspectives of a humane reason and at the same time to grant 
the religious intensity of the violence its deplorable authenticity and complexity.
2
 
 
That field of force is established and maintained most powerfully, of course, in Heaney‘s 
poetry, and much has been written about the ways in which that poetry confronts the 
political questions unavoidable to an Irish writer of his generation; this is something 
which Heaney never does by simplifying or merely bemoaning the conflicts and 
catastrophes of his homeland. A different kind of response, one by the necessity of its 
medium more extensive and more general, is to be found in Heaney‘s essays. The 
abiding, underlying concern of Preoccupations and The Government of the Tongue is the 
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ability of poetry to make a sufficient, a fully adequate response to the demands, above all, 
of the politician and the activist. 
The earliest published essay in Preoccupations, ‗Canticles to the Earth: Theodore 
Roethke‘, mentions briefly society‘s attempts to constrict the movement, the freedom of 
poetry by imposing political or other demands on the art form; Heaney broadly 
characterises this pressure as applied by ‗the spirit of the age‘.3 Though some imprint of a 
particular time and place, its biases not least, will be evident in a poet‘s work – and this is 
a theme throughout Heaney‘s essays – he or she should not make historical or political 
circumstances the driving force, the life source, of his or her poetry. Rather, the poet must 
maintain, as a primary obligation, ‗an awareness of his own poetic process, and a trust in 
the possibility of his poetry‘.4 That trust, as it implicitly stands in opposition to political 
fidelity, is characterised, in much of Preoccupations, as a kind of religious faith – not a 
substitute for a religion, but a metaphorical deity to whom the poet owes his or her 
allegiance.  
Six years after his essay on Roethke, Heaney again tackles the relationship 
between poetry and society in an essay entitled ‗Faith, Hope and Poetry‘, the first in 
which he mentions, if only in passing, the fallen status of poetry among the arts.
 
 He does 
so in the context of an impassioned ‗call to arms‘ addressed to poets: 
 
poetry may indeed be a lost cause … but each poet must raise his voice like a 
pretender‘s flag. Whether the world falls into the hands of the security forces or 
the fat-necked speculators, he must get in under his phalanx of words and start 
resisting.
5
 
           
Poetry‘s enemies in this depiction are clear: the politically-driven, ideological bullies and 
the materially obsessed, whose ambitions are the very opposite of poetry‘s. Despite the 
apparent hopelessness of poetry‘s position, the poet must do his or her utmost to preserve 
the integrity of the art form, because his or her motivation is not gain or power, but faith; 
as Ezra Pound declared in his Cantos, ‗the temple is holy / because it is not for sale‘.6  
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 Without works, this faith, like any other, is dead; and thus Heaney calls on poets 
to defend their belief in the art, to resist surrender to the sceptical enemy, by writing 
poetry that is true to the processes by which it is constituted rather than those of society.
7
 
Heaney‘s own works in this regard are, of course, found in both his poetry and prose, 
including the essays in The Government of the Tongue; and in the latter he begins to 
argue specifically for the legitimacy of that poetic faith with reference to questions of 
political, moral and ethical responsibility. In doing so, he returns again and again to a 
description of poetry‘s defining characteristic, that aspect of its nature which makes it 
worthy of fidelity. Paradoxically, it is the very aspect of poetry so offensive to the 
politician, what Terence Brown calls its ‗liberating music‘ – those untrammelled 
processes which I have discussed in Chapter 2. In Heaney‘s second collection of essays, 
we begin to see the full significance of those operations in relation to poetry‘s 
justification as an art form.
8
 He will argue, using one of his most memorable phrases, for 
‗the efficacy of song itself‘: that unfettered, unhampered music, he will claim, is more 
useful to society (counter-intuitive as this might seem) than any politically-charged 
sentiment or rallying cry.  
 His intention is clear from the outset of The Government of the Tongue, as the 
essay that serves as an introduction, ‗The Interesting Case of Nero, Chekhov‘s Cognac 
and a Knocker‘, gives shape to the tension between art and socio-political reality. In 
1972, Heaney writes, he and a singer friend had a recording session that ‗was to promote 
that happiness and expansiveness which song, meaning both poetry and music, exists to 
promote in the first place‘.9 The session, however, was cancelled, because, as they 
travelled to the studio, a series of bombs went off in the city. Heaney and his companion 
completed their trip to the studio, but found that – in a description reminiscent of 
Milosz‘s in his Nobel lecture10 – ‗the very notion of beginning to sing at that moment 
when others were beginning to suffer seemed like an offence against their suffering‘, the 
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proverbial instance of Nero‘s fiddling while Rome burned serving as a striking, albeit 
apocryphal, image of that offence.
11
    
‗Art‘ is, and has always been, Heaney argues, in apparent conflict with ‗Life‘, or 
more specifically, ‗Song‘ exists in opposition to ‗Suffering‘; this struggle is experienced 
by no one so sharply, so constantly, as the poet, whose obvious allegiance to lived 
experience, cannot, it sometimes seems, be reconciled with an equally pressing allegiance 
to art.
12
 Poetry‘s original sin, so to speak, is the transgression of the limitations imposed 
by reality and by society; the art form recognises no boundaries, no barbed wire or Berlin 
Wall: 
 
there is a certain jubilation and truancy at the heart of an inspiration. There is a 
sensation of liberation and abundance which is the antithesis of every hampered 
and deprived condition. And it is for this reason that, psychologically, the lyric 
poet feels the need for justification in a world that is notably hampered and 
deprived.
13
 
 
So important is this conflict to Heaney that it will find further reformulation in ‗The 
Government of the Tongue‘, as he describes how 
 
that vitality and insouciance of lyric poetry, its relish of its own inventiveness, its 
pleasuring strain, always comes under threat when poetry remembers that its self-
gratification must be perceived as a kind of affront to a world preoccupied with its 
own imperfections, pains and catastrophes.
14
   
 
The guilt of poetry, and indeed sometimes the source of its author‘s shame, is its 
inevitable, unstoppable autonomy – and not least the unrestrained impulse that generates 
it in the first place – in a world characterised by inhibition and responsibility. There are 
those poets, like Wilfred Owen, Heaney points out, the congruence of whose life and 
work are beyond the reproach of this accusation. Owen ‗represents poetry‘s solidarity 
with the doomed, the deprived, the victimized, the under-privileged. The witness is a 
figure in whom the truth-telling urge and the compulsion to identify with the oppressed 
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becomes necessarily integral with the act of writing itself‘.15 The ‗poet-witness‘ thus 
embodies the most direct response to the political accusation: lyric action becomes 
synonymous with lived action, and poetry, in a sense, becomes politics.  
Such instances are, however, rare. Heaney is concerned to defend a far broader 
conception of poetry – namely, the art form as it incarnates linguistic, phonetic freedom. 
While the poet-witness is an interesting anomaly who speaks to the full range of poetry‘s 
interactions with Life, Heaney finds once again in Osip Mandelstam, another writer born 
of abnormal circumstances, a more instructive, more widely applicable response to the 
political accusation; and one which springs from the very commitment to poetry that 
Heaney himself has been advocating.  
Writing his poetry ‗in the Stalinist night‘, as Heaney calls it, Mandelstam was 
nevertheless able to declare emphatically that ‗beauty is truth, truth beauty‘.16 While 
Wilfred Owen had a message to impart, Mandelstam created art for (quite simply) its 
own sake: for the sake of the words themselves, for the very taste and sound and 
unhindered movement of them. Mandelstam‘s faith was in poetry itself, his allegiance to 
‗all words in their pristine being‘ – untarnished by euphemism or doctrine or utilitarian 
ends of any other kind, and representing a response to the charge of politics far more in 
keeping with Heaney‘s than Owen‘s was. In this connection, Heaney coins a phrase that 
lies at the very heart of his argument.
17 
Mandelstam, he writes, 
 
stands for the efficacy of song itself, an emblem of the poet as potent sound-wave; 
and when one thinks of the note of the soprano which cracks glass, one has yet 
another image of the way purely artistic utterance can put a crack into the 
officially moulded shape of truth in a totalitarian society.
18
 
 
Thus the poet, rather than a witness, is a wave of unadulterated, unchecked sound; or 
rather, one might argue, he or she becomes a witness not to the authority, the weight, of 
reality, but to the authority, the forcibleness, of poetry itself. The music that has been so 
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central to Heaney‘s conception of poetry is now, in a shift characteristic of his stylistic 
adroitness, not merely music, but ‗potent sound-wave‘; the emphasis is no longer on the 
intoxication, the necessary allure of its melodies, but on its acoustic force, its ability to 
push back against the pressure of the state. Poetry‘s undeniable social and political effects 
are a result of its being true to itself – it survives in the extensive and socio-politically 
efficacious force-field of its own self-sufficiency. By being ‗purely artistic utterance‘ – 
that is, without even actively seeking a role for itself in this respect (other than the 
fulfilment of its own nature) – it stands in judgement of the half-truths and lies of 
totalitarian and much other political discourse as comprehensively as suffering seems to 
condemn song.
19
 
 
For [Mandelstam], obedience to poetic impulse was obedience to conscience; 
lyric action constituted radical witness … Mandelstam [bore] witness to the 
necessity of what he called ‗breathing freely‘, even at the price of his death; to the 
art of poetry as an unharnessed, non-didactic, non-party-dictated, inspired act.
20
 
      
The irony is manifest: fidelity to the aesthetic, to art for art‘s sake, becomes 
synonymous with ethics.
21
 Furthermore, its ethics are not limited to, and indeed are not 
concerned with, whatever moral viewpoint there is room to express in the poem at hand 
(as is the case, for example, in the field of ‗ethicism‘, the ethical criticism of art, which 
holds that the morality embodied in and the aesthetics of a work of art are critically 
intertwined).
22
 The ethical reach of poetry, as conceived of by Heaney, is far wider: it is 
supremely ethical, he argues, to give a poem over to its aesthetic inclinations. It is like 
honouring the essential independence of the individual; indeed, the analogy is a real one. 
The art of poetry, in preserving its own autonomy, is in fact safeguarding the autonomy 
of the individual subjects in society. Mandelstam, of course, is the extreme exemplar of 
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this attitude; he was so convinced of the value of the aesthetic, and so deeply ethical in 
his poetic considerations, that he was prepared to die as a consequence.  
The very qualities of verse, therefore, that would convict it in its trial by Life are, 
ironically, the qualities that constitute its most powerful defence, and its most powerful 
influence on our lived experience: its freedom, its buoyancy, its unfettered movement. A 
further amplification of this idea, beautifully expressed in ‗The Government of the 
Tongue‘, demands quotation:  
 
here is the great paradox of poetry and of the imaginative arts in general. Faced 
with the brutality of the historical onslaught, they are useless. Yet they verify our 
singularity, they strike and stake out the ore of self which lies at the base of every 
individuated life. In one sense the efficacy of poetry is nil – no lyric has ever 
stopped a tank. In another sense, it is unlimited. It is like the writing in the sand in 
the face of which accusers and accused are left speechless and renewed … The 
drawing of those characters is like poetry, a break from the usual life but not an 
absconding from it.
23
 
 
Hazard Adams, in The Offense of Poetry, includes Heaney‘s argument among 
those which claim for poetry what Adams calls ‗an ―antithetical‖ politics‘, although this 
critic does not clearly locate that antithesis, as does Heaney, in poetry‘s auditory 
qualities: 
 
poetry‘s potentially ethical nature is part and parcel of its offensiveness, but this 
ethic cannot be expressed as a message of a set of moral principles or even 
ultimately in interpretation … Poetry has a very important social and political 
dimension, but when it is most clearly perceived, it is often antithetical by its … 
nature to social and political fashions … its offense [in this regard] is the best 
ground for its defense …24  
 
The more fully a poem embodies poetry in its auditory essence, the greater its value and 
truth-telling potential; it was so for Mandelstam, and it is equally so for poets writing in 
non-totalitarian, democratic societies. Democracy, it is abundantly clear at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, does not preclude mendacity, the kind of political doublespeak (and 
consequent social ‗herdspeak‘, as Heaney calls it) of which poetry is the polar opposite; 
and neither does it preclude political atrocities. Heaney acknowledges as much in a 2008 
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interview, stating that ‗the world is reduced by the reduced power of speech in somebody 
like George W. Bush‘.25 Richard Jackson, in his Writing the War on Terror, argues that 
an entirely new, fundamentally delusive discourse has been developed to justify, and to 
create a public attitude supportive of, the ‗counter-terrorist‘ attacks sanctioned by the 
Bush administration. That discourse is dangerous because it constitutes, Jackson claims, 
an exercise of power that is inherently abusive, and one which in fact obstructs rather 
than aids the finding of solutions for political violence. There is thus ‗an urgent need to 
cross-examine and scrutinise the language of political leaders … rather than just 
passively and uncritically absorb it‘.26 Poetry, Heaney has argued recently, is one means 
by which the competence for such critical discernment is nurtured – it constitutes ‗a boost 
to the capacity for discrimination and resistance‘.27 The task of the ‗free‘ poet, in a 
democratic society, is thus precisely what Mandelstam‘s was in Stalinist Russia, even if 
the cost of performing that task is obviously far less for the former than it was for the 
latter.  
In a further paradox, the very need for justification that arises, for the poet, from 
the jubilation and liberty of his or her art form, is effectively done away with by 
obedience to the demands of the poem, by a faithful embodiment of that selfsame delight 
and freedom. This idea finds its most memorable formulation in a passage from an essay 
first published two years before ‗Nero, Chekhov‘s Cognac and a Knocker‘: 
 
the only reliable release for the poet [is] the appeasement of the achieved poem. 
In that liberated moment, when the lyric discovers its buoyant completion, when 
the timeless formal pleasure comes to its fullness and exhaustion, in those 
moments of self-justification and self-obliteration the poet makes contact with the 
place of consciousness where he is at once intensified in his being and detached 
from his predicaments.
28
 
 
Heaney is writing here of the kind of consummation that can await the poet as he or she 
completes his or her particular poem, a sort of epiphany at the end of the creative process; 
the terms of that epiphany are, it should be noted, wholly aesthetic. Its effects, however, 
                                                 
25
 Heaney, Stepping Stones, 382, 196. 
26
 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), 1-4. 
27
 Heaney, Stepping Stones, 381. 
28
 Heaney, Finders Keepers, 118. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 105 
are psychological and deeply beneficial, as it reconnects the poet with his or her most 
fundamental self, and opens a space between that self and the dilemmas of daily living. 
Poetry, in this formulation, is both fulfilment and relief, the satisfaction of something 
achieved and liberation from something otherwise unresolved. 
The art form‘s first allegiance, then, is to its own processes, but, as Heaney goes 
on to say, that allegiance does not effectively relieve it or the poet from their duties to 
society: 
 
the idea of poetry as a symbolic resolution of opposing truths, the idea of the 
poem as having its existence in a realm separate from the discourse of politics, 
does not absolve it or the poet from political responsibility … Yet ‗pure‘ poetry is 
perfectly justifiable in earshot of the car bomb and it can imply a politics, 
depending on the nature of the poetry.
29
 
 
Poets are responsible, both in their life, and in their work, to their political situation; 
Seamus Heaney‘s own biography as citizen and writer exemplifies this dual truth. Indeed, 
in his argument for a poetry that is, as he puts it in ‗Place and Displacement: Recent 
Poetry from Northern Ireland‘, ‗neither deliberately provocative nor culpably detached‘, 
there is, one critic has noted, ‗something of self-justification … of answering critics who 
find him evasive or uncertain in the matter of politics or who criticise the well-made 
poem approach to craft in the face of social upheaval‘.30 Heaney‘s preoccupation with 
this particular issue is no doubt a reflection of the degree to which he has had to grapple 
with questions of political duty or ‗commitment‘ in his own life and work.31 He, like 
other poets, ‗is stretched between politics and transcendence‘, between suffering and 
song, between art and life.
32
 It is, however, a crude solution to this problem, and a crude 
idea of political responsibility, to conclude that the poet must therefore write poetry 
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whose primary purpose is to propagate an ideology or otherwise take sides. Heaney is 
careful, in the quotation above, to establish that poetry‘s political nature is a slant one, 
and one that is neither universally nor necessarily present in the art form. He is in 
agreement with Eliot on this point, who insists that poetry‘s worth has nothing to do with 
any perceived or intended message – the true test of the best poetry is, in fact, that it 
‗survives … the complete extinction of interest‘ in whatever matters, political or social, 
most concern the writer.
33
 Les Murray, too, recognises the potentially powerful, deep-
seated effect on us of even ‗a poetry woven around ideas we thoroughly disagree with‘.34 
For Heaney, 
 
a précis of the content, for example, takes no account of the literary echoes and 
allusions which can be fundamental to its poetic energy. In a poem, words, 
phrases, cadences and images are linked in to systems of affect and signification 
which elude the précis-maker. These under-ear activities, as they might be termed, 
may well constitute the most important business which the poem is up to and are 
more a matter of the erotics of language than the politics and polemics of the 
moment.
35
 
           
The expression ‗the erotics of language‘ is of the essence, and it summarises precisely 
that force in poetry for which Heaney has been arguing: the inner workings, the 
independent reproductive power of words and sounds irrespective of socio-political 
import. As Molino interprets it, Heaney concedes that ‗the times demand a poetry 
commensurate with their social and political upheaval, but the overtly political or 
propagandistic poem is not the answer‘.36 And as Derek Walcott states in What the 
Twilight Says, the consequences of giving poetry over to politics are beneficial to neither 
party. Writers who allow this are 
 
fascinated with the efficacy of poetry as an aspect of power not through its 
language but through its subject. Their poetry becomes a kind of musical 
accompaniment to certain theses, and as history it is forced to exclude certain 
contradictions, for history cannot be ambiguously recorded.
37
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 Heaney‘s early responses to the political accusation – which are, 
characteristically, in keeping with the essence of his later arguments – are, we can now 
see, an attempt to establish a balance between poetry‘s crucial independence from the 
workings of political and social machinery, and its paradoxical ability as a self-gratifying 
art form to influence those very workings. The poet can never be detached from his or her 
socio-political environment – ‗you cannot distinguish between your condition as a 
creature of the times and your action as a scribbler‘, as Heaney puts it.38 But artistic 
engagement with that environment must take place on poetry‘s terms, or else the resulting 
artefact will be both poetically and politically inefficacious.  
 
II 
The argument for poetry as an autonomous, self-justifying force, even – indeed especially 
– in the face of political demands, finds its most refined form in ‗The Government of the 
Tongue‘, the title essay of Heaney‘s 1988 collection. The political metaphor which 
Heaney chooses as a vehicle for that argument is a typically apt one: his artistic loyalty is 
to the tongue, to poetry, as sovereign, even over the actual affairs of state and nation. As 
one critic has noted, the Irish writer uses deliberately and persistently legislative terms 
with reference to poetry throughout the essay, bringing to mind Shelley‘s 
‗unacknowledged legislators of the world‘, that best-known attribution of political and 
social efficacy to the art form.
39
 There is also an instructive ambiguity in the title of the 
essay, however, one which captures the conflict faced, at some point, by most poets: is 
the tongue governing or being governed? Should the poet relinquish the reins of his or 
her creative process to poetry itself, to inspiration, or should the political, ethical intellect 
be used to muzzle the more extravagant – in the original sense of that word – gestures of 
the art form? 
 The answer, for Heaney, in ‗The Government of the Tongue‘ – as it has been 
from the very start of his career – is something of a foregone conclusion; while never 
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failing to acknowledge the real anguish of that conflict in his own life and the lives of all 
poets, the Irish writer holds to his conviction in poetry‘s potential as an art form: 
 
when I thought of ‗the government of the tongue‘ as a general title for these 
lectures, what I had in mind was this aspect of poetry as its own vindicating force. 
In this dispensation, the tongue (representing both the poet‘s personal gift of 
utterance and the common resources of language itself) has been granted the right 
to govern. The poetic art is credited with an authority of its own. As readers, we 
submit to the jurisdiction of the achieved form, even though that form is achieved 
not by dint of the moral and ethical exercise of mind, but by the self-validating 
operations of what we call inspiration … 40  
 
These are by now familiar themes, and the first few pages of the essay are used to restate 
Heaney‘s position as it has been collectively represented by the other essays in The 
Government of the Tongue: poetry‘s autonomy is of the essence, and there is also, in this 
passage, a nod to the responsibility of the poet to grant poetry that autonomy. Only then 
will poetry act upon the reader, who, whether consciously or not, recognises and defers to 
the persuasive force of the imagination at work; in fact, the implication is that the reader 
will succumb more completely to the poem‘s laws and judgements if their source is 
internal rather than external to it, in the form of moral or ethical considerations. This is 
affirmed later in the essay, as Heaney extends the metaphor above, referring to 
‗interference by the knowing intellect in the purely disinterested cognitions of the form-
seeking imagination‘. Such interference is ‗poetic sabotage, an affront to the legislative 
and executive powers of expression itself‘.41 Michael Keneally makes an important point 
about the connotations of the word ‗jurisdiction‘ as Heaney uses it in this essay: ‗a poet‘s 
achievement is not merely exemplary but in some sense directive‘. Poetry, as Heaney 
himself will later argue, does not simply provide a picture of how things could or should 
be; it makes things happen, through the processes of inspiration and imagination.
42
 
Demonstrating again his unerring ability to select quotations and concepts from 
the work of others that not only complement, but amplify his own argument, Heaney 
proceeds to define inspiration in the terms of the Polish poet Anna Swir. Swir describes it 
as ‗a psychosomatic phenomenon‘, and she goes on: 
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this seems to me the only biologically natural way for a poem to be born and 
gives the poem something like a biological right to exist. A poet becomes then an 
antenna capturing the voices of the world, a medium expressing his own 
subconscious and the collective subconscious. For one moment he possesses 
wealth usually inaccessible to him, and he loses it when that moment is over.
43
 
 
Swir, like Heaney, believes in a poetry which is genetic to the human being, which has a 
constitutive right to continued existence. Inspiration as described here is both a mental 
and a physical event, an interaction between mind and body involving ear, eye and 
heartbeat as well as imagination. Swir‘s definition is in line with Heaney‘s conception of 
poetry as encompassing at once mind and body, as both earthly and transcendent, both 
carnal and spiritual. In fact, given the similarities between what Heaney refers to as 
‗inspiration‘ here and his description of the auditory imagination in previous essays, I 
would suggest that the two concepts are more or less equivalent; or, rather, that the 
workings of the auditory imagination are essential to the occurrence of inspiration. Both 
have to do with the operations of the subconscious and the interplay between the physical 
and emotional in the course of writing. Heaney‘s insistence on the fundamentally natural 
origins of poetry is also echoed in Swir‘s references to its emergence or birth. The Waste 
Land, the example with which Heaney opens this particular essay, is an exemplary 
product of inspiration in that parts of it (Part V, ‗What The Thunder Said‘, in particular) 
seem to have sprung fully-formed from Eliot‘s subconscious, their genesis governed 
only, and unpredictably, by the tongue.  
 Having taken up his usual weapons – albeit newly reinforced by various 
quotations – and having rearticulated his position on the matter of poetry and politics, 
Heaney enters into the conflict anew. The importance of ‗The Government of the 
Tongue‘ is not only the judicious and richly connotative metaphor it provides for an 
argument by now well established; even more than that, the essay is significant for its 
statement of the relationship that Heaney believes must exist between social reality and 
poetry. While the voices to which Heaney responds are still those of the politician and the 
ideologue, he here adumbrates the greater, more encompassing accusatory presence 
which takes shape in The Redress of Poetry: reality itself. 
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 In its socio-political form, that reality poses a threat to the imagination, as Heaney 
conceives of it, the hazard of a foreign, contaminating set of political or social 
imperatives finding their way into the fragile, balanced ecosystem of the poetic process 
(and, to extend the metaphor, infecting that ecosystem until all that is most innately 
poetic about it has been consumed). Poetry, however, if its independence holds, if it 
remains unpolluted by political ends, is of ultimate, real benefit to society. Its more 
essential purpose, in fact, is to elucidate, as Robert Frost famously points out, the 
dilemmas and difficulties, the confusions and pressures of life. The means to that 
elucidation, as described by Frost, are clearly those of pure, uninhibited poetic process: ‗it 
begins in delight, it inclines to the impulse, it assumes direction with the first line laid 
down, it runs a course of lucky events and ends in a clarification of life‘.44 This 
description evinces, not least, the delightfully serendipitous manner in which song 
becomes efficacious: in obeying the urge of its own pleasure, in seeking the gratification 
of its own processes, it results in something of tremendous and extensive value, going far 
beyond a pretty melody. The imagination becomes helpful in the manner (although with 
none of the quiet gravity – on the contrary) of a white-coated psychologist, possessing a 
measure of autonomy, a ‗disinterested gaze‘ as Heaney often calls it, that the patient, in 
the grip of neuroses or other mental obsessions, lacks.
45
 That autonomy, that engagement 
with difficulty which nonetheless remains reliant on independent energies and processes, 
provides the imagination-psychologist with an Archimedean lever – and results in poetry 
that is ‗a process of self-healing‘, or, as he puts it elsewhere, a poetry akin to ‗the 
intervention of a healer or a doctor or a prayer‘.46 For this very reason, Heaney argues, 
the poet should view the imagination as ‗a shaping spirit which it is wrong to disobey‘.47 
The paradoxical importance of poetry‘s absolute independence to its relevance in 
our lives – an aspect of Heaney‘s argument well-stated in many of his earlier essays – 
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takes on, at this point in ‗The Government of the Tongue‘, a broader significance: ‗just as 
the poem, in the process of its own genesis, exemplifies a congruence between impulse 
and right action, so in its repose the poem gives us a premonition of harmonies desired 
and not inexpensively achieved.‘48 The emphasis here is not overtly political; on the 
contrary, it is very deliberately a-political, not in the sense of excluding the political but 
rather in the sense of surpassing it in scope. Poetry‘s far more comprehensive reach is 
confirmed as Heaney goes on: 
 
in this way, the order of art becomes an achievement intimating a possible order 
beyond itself, although its relation to that further order remains promissory rather 
than obligatory. Art is not an inferior reflection of some ordained heavenly system 
but a rehearsal of it in earthly terms; art does not trace the given map of a better 
reality but improvises an inspired sketch of it.
49
 
 
This is a turning-point in the development of Heaney‘s defence, and, both in its 
expressive style and its claims for the art, constitutes one of his most significant 
statements; as we might expect, the image he settles on for art‘s relationship to reality, 
that of a rough drawing, is wholly appropriate to and evocative of the very specific 
association he wants to describe. Poetry does not imitate life, therefore necessarily being 
a poorer version of that life; instead, with the chalk and crayon of reality as we know it, 
poetry drafts a different way of life, suggests a possible reality which is recognisably 
composed of actual materials, but which is nonetheless an improvement on our daily 
experience. Crucially, such art is neither the guarantee of a better reality, nor a fantastic, 
anchorless ship of wish-fulfilment; the ropes between the real and the artistic are fine, 
and woven in a very particular way from a mixture of poetic and experiential substance, 
but they are, or should be, unbreakably strong.  
Over a decade later, in an essay about Robert Burns, we find Heaney – ever-
consistent in his beliefs – describing that phenomenon once more: 
 
I think … that we can prefigure a future by reimagining our pasts. In poetry, 
however, this prefiguring is venturesome and suggestive, more like a melodic 
promise than a social programme. It is not like the blueprint for a better world 
which might spring from the mind of a social engineer. Rather, it arises from the 
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cravings of the spirit as expressed in language, in all those patiences and 
impatiences which language embodies.
50
 
 
The consolation offered by poetry is not that of a formula for the future, whether that of 
the reformer or social worker.  Rather, it offers us a promise of possible satisfaction, of 
potential completeness. Foster paraphrases Heaney as suggesting that poetry will ‗find its 
own route, its own logic, by which it will discover its own solutions‘ – solutions which 
will be markedly different from those proposed by the politician or activist.
51
 Paz, in ‗The 
Other Voice‘, describes poetry as ‗a model of what human society might be‘; and while 
this description contains elements of Heaney‘s above – most especially the expression, 
through poetry, of a potential, a better society – it also reveals, by contrast, the acutely 
discerning sensibility with which the Irish writer selects his images.
52
 Paz‘s ‗model‘ 
implies a degree of detail, of specificity, which is more obviously present in the 
‗blueprint‘ of the social engineer, in Heaney‘s description, than in the rough drawing or 
musical token of the poet. 
This, then, is the zenith of Heaney‘s argument in The Government of the Tongue, 
and it is also the peak from which he will launch himself into an argument for the redress 
of poetry in the collection of that name. But what, Heaney asks at this point in the essay, 
of the other possible implication of his ambiguous title? 
 
As I warm to this theme, a voice from another part of me speaks in rebuke. 
‗Govern your tongue,‘ it says, compelling me to remember that my title can also 
imply a denial of the tongue‘s autonomy and permission. In this reading, ‗the 
government of the tongue‘ is full of monastic and ascetic strictness.53 
 
Heaney is well acquainted with one version of this curtailment of the tongue‘s freedom, a 
limit introduced, as we have seen, by political or social pressures. In such circumstances 
(and his exemplars here do not include himself), poetry finds itself relegated to minor 
status, if any. The urgent and diagrammatic requirements of the crisis at hand, which 
inevitably do not include any artistic endeavour, become all-consuming to society and its 
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individuals. In such cases, the truth and authority of poetry become ‗secondary to 
religious truth or state security or public order‘: 
 
it discloses a condition of public and private repressions where the undirected 
hedonistic play of imagination is regarded at best as luxury or licentiousness, at 
worst as heresy or treason … In such contexts, no further elaboration or 
exploration of the language or forms currently in place is permissible.
54
  
 
Poets living in these conditions – ‗ideal republics, Soviet republics, in the Vatican and 
Bible-belt‘ – are expected to allow their tongues to be governed by dogma; when they do 
not, their liberated, freely inspired poetry becomes a different kind of government, 
another possible allegiance.
55
 Heaney implies, as he has before, that the ungoverned 
tongue is as potentially dangerous, to the dictator or state that would govern it, as a rebel 
force might be. His interests here, however, lie with less forcefully stifling situations, in 
which a writer might choose to shackle his or her own tongue, to view some topics as 
appropriate and others as not. It is not always the case, Heaney argues, that the art 
produced in such situations is necessarily the poorer for it. He goes on to cite the example 
of George Herbert, who, although he submitted his tongue to his Christian beliefs, 
managed by virtue of his musical sensibility – rather than the unchanged efficacy of 
poetry subjected to external demands – to produce a poetry that was nonetheless sincere 
and persuasive. Another example is found in T.S. Eliot, one of the Irish writer‘s masters, 
who, while writing Four Quartets, subjected the previously self-governing tongue to the 
control of philosophical and religious truth. Heaney does not dismiss the product of that 
decision as lesser art, and neither does he attribute the poem‘s integrity to Eliot‘s 
temperament, as he does with Herbert. But in his description of the central governor of 
the Quartets as functioning ‗like a sorrowful grand seigneur, meditatively, 
authoritatively, yet just a little wistfully aware of its lost vitality and insouciance‘, he 
implies that those poems are, indeed, lacking in some necessary and gratifying life-
force.
56
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Such poetry is not always impoverished; but those cases in which it is not are, it 
would seem, few and far between. While Heaney would concede that the governed 
tongue can produce genuine, stirring poetry, he delimits the contexts in which this is 
possible to those determined by a kind of luck, by disposition, by factors removed from 
the creative act itself. The example of George Herbert in ‗The Government of the 
Tongue‘ is like that of Wilfred Owen as poet-witness in ‗The Interesting Case of Nero, 
Chekhov‘s Cognac and a Knocker‘: they constitute a fair acknowledgement, by Heaney, 
that there are exceptions to the rules he is at such pains to establish; but those exceptions 
have little useful bearing on the situation at large. It hardly needs to be added that he is 
not denying poets the possibility of (fervent) political and religious affiliation – his own 
clear political alignment and erstwhile Catholic belief in no way dilute the power of his 
poetry. Rather, he cautions poets not to allow those loyalties to dominate their writing, to 
govern their tongues in such a way as to interfere with the autonomous operations of the 
imagination.  
And so with this caveat, Heaney‘s argument is restated: the best poetry, the truest 
poetry, is possible only when it issues from a tongue ungoverned by state, religion or the 
meddling intellect. By way of demonstration, Heaney quotes a poem by Zbigniew 
Herbert entitled ‗A Knocker‘, which it is appropriate to reproduce here: 
 
There are those who grow  
gardens in their heads  
paths lead from their hair  
to sunny and white cities  
 
it‘s easy for them to write  
they close their eyes  
immediately schools of images  
stream down from their foreheads  
 
my imagination  
is a piece of board  
my sole instrument  
is a wooden stick  
 
I strike the board  
it answers me  
yes – yes  
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no – no  
 
for others the green bell of a tree  
the blue bell of water  
I have a knocker  
from unprotected gardens  
 
I thump on the board  
and it prompts me  
with the moralist‘s dry poem  
yes – yes  
no – no 
 
Ostensibly, Heaney argues, this poem is a statement against the freedom of the lyric, its 
self-delighting absorption in seeking its own fulfilment. The Polish poet seems to want to 
replace such poetry‘s intoxicating imagery and sound with a language as literal, as direct, 
as ‗yes‘ and ‗no‘ – moral discourse, in short. The tongue, this poem insists, should be 
governed, should be constrained as severely as possible. It achieves its effect, however, 
through distinctly lyrical means, through what Heaney calls ‗the fluent evocation of bells 
and gardens and trees‘, without which the knocker would forfeit its symbolic force. 
 
The poem makes us feel that we should prefer moral utterance to palliative 
imagery, but it does exactly that, makes us feel, and by means of feeling carries 
truth alive into the heart – exactly as the Romantics said it should. We end up 
persuaded we are against lyric poetry‘s culpable absorption in its own process by 
an entirely successful instance of that very process in action: here is a lyric about 
a knocker which claims that lyric is inadmissible.
57
 
 
 Even in asserting the government of the tongue, Herbert undermines his own 
stated intention. In light of this victory, this supremacy of the tongue that ungoverns itself 
even as it seeks to submit to government, Heaney goes on to offer a further articulation of 
his poetic credo. The essential nature of poetry and its possible effects, as he sees them, 
remain unchanged, no matter how individual poets choose to resolve the conflict between 
art and life – whether by defeating that conflict through their lived experience, like 
Wilfred Owen, or by outdistancing it altogether, like Zbigniew Herbert: 
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the fact is that poetry is its own reality and no matter how much a poet may 
concede to the corrective pressures of social, moral, political and historical reality, 
the ultimate fidelity must be to the demand and promise of the artistic event.
58
 
          
The tension between art and life, between poetry and socio-political reality, is clearly not 
to be denied. But that tension lies in the fact that, as Heaney affirms, ‗poetry is its own 
reality‘. And this, too, cannot be gainsaid. If the art form owes a primary allegiance to 
anything, it is to that which lies at its very roots and indeed the source of its very being at 
all. It is inextricably linked with the reality of our world, but it has all the rights and 
responsibilities of being its own independent reality – of being sui generis – and if it fails 
to establish itself as such then it fails as poetry. Perhaps every poet feels obligated at one 
time or another, if only through a guilty conscience, to dance to the tune of the state or 
church or social majority. At all times, however, he or she must remain faithful to a 
different reality, that of poetry (which, as Heaney has implied all along, is not politics, 
not religion, not sociology, but itself), and bow instead to the liberating pressure exerted 
by the imagination and the ungoverned tongue. 
 The general point bears further emphasis. Socio-political reality, defined by the 
demand for a particular kind of action, and the reality of poetry, characterised by another 
sort of action altogether, could be said to constitute an example of what Isaiah Berlin 
calls, in ‗The Originality of Machiavelli‘, ‗two conflicting systems of value‘.59 According 
to Berlin‘s reading, Machiavelli‘s writing about the impossibility of uniting Christian 
goals with political ones establishes ‗a differentiation between two incompatible ideals of 
life‘. The politician wishing to embrace Christianity is doomed to political failure, for the 
virtues of Christianity are simply irreconcilable with those of government:
60
 
 
Machiavelli‘s crucial achievement is … his uncovering of an insoluble dilemma 
… It stems from his de facto recognition that ends equally ultimate, equally 
sacred, may contradict each other, that entire systems of value may come into 
collision without possibility of rational arbitration, and that not merely in 
exceptional circumstances, as a result of abnormality or accident or error … but 
… as part of the normal human situation.61 
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Heaney might well have argued (via Machiavelli) that of course poetry is going to need a 
defence, because in its own activity it implicitly and sometimes explicitly embodies a set 
of values, a set of goals, above all a set of operations, which are wholly opposed to the 
values demanded by the aims of political and social betterment. It is, as Adams asserts, 
the very antithesis of those values.
62
 In a recent interview, Heaney offers a contemporary 
example of how this is so: 
 
if you are an Israeli or Palestinian poet at this moment, what poetry ideally 
requires of you is a disinterested gaze at how you are situated, whereas your 
people will require passionate solidarity, and opposition to the Other. The same 
situation prevailed in Northern Ireland in a diminished way: Protestants, 
Catholics, nationalists, Unionists, are you with us or against us?
63
 
 
In short, the domains of poetry and politics represent primary concerns that are 
incommensurable with each other, and thus conflict between them is inescapable, only 
rarely reconcilable – as in those exceptional circumstances exemplified by Wilfred Owen 
writing during World War I. In all other cases, the political poet can, like Machiavelli‘s 
Christian officeholder, either be an effective poet, or an effective propagandist, but not 
both. A still further articulation of the same idea can be found in J.P. Ward‘s Poetry and 
the Sociological Idea: 
 
I want to suggest that poetry not only is not, but could not possibly have been, 
compatible with the sociological idea. That is to say, the very nature of the poetry 
in each case, what constitutes it as poetry and makes us want to call it that, is 
precisely that in it which strains away from the sociological idea and the sociality 
of language …64 
 
The governed tongue is a problem precisely because it is an attempt to reconcile one set 
of values with another, to unite poetry with the idea of a mutually responsible social 
machine – whose responsibility is defined in very particular ways. As such, it is a 
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betrayal of what Heaney states has to be, first and last, the writer‘s final object of faith, 
‗the artistic event‘.65 None of this is to say, of course, that the imagination rejects or is 
necessarily hostile to social reality itself; Heaney has gone to memorable lengths to 
illustrate that those two entities are intertwined, to the greater effect of poetry. The 
hierarchy of that relationship, however, must be maintained by the poet during the act of 
writing: poetic obligation must precede political obligation. 
 This, then, becomes the binary which poetry cannot but struggle to unite in a 
balanced whole: its own liberated operation and the very clearly circumscribed 
transactions of the political. Poetry can be political in all kinds of ways, Heaney argues – 
by uncovering paradigms, by offering through its own means a promise of change, by 
providing an example of truth-telling – but those ways are, by and large, not the 
categorical, unequivocal mechanisms of the apparat.
66
    
  As artists, then, Heaney requires that we should have faith – he uses the term 
once more – in poetry‘s ‗absolutely absolved necessity‘, a necessity ‗absolved‘ in the 
sense of its not requiring justification. Value systems external to those of the lyric should 
not be permitted to affect its fundamental efficacy by imposing themselves upon the 
creative act.
67
 In an interview with Seamus Deane, Heaney describes poetry and politics 
as distinct ways of speaking, of giving coherence: ‗poetry and politics are, in different 
ways, an articulation, an ordering, a giving of form to inchoate pieties, prejudices, world-
views‘.68 The difference between these approaches is always in danger of being conflated 
or otherwise collapsed – and always in one direction. This state of affairs is complicated 
in contemporary society because, in the twentieth
 
 and now twenty-first centuries more 
than ever, the predominance of politics, indeed the pre-eminence of it, is often taken as 
given and vehemently asserted as such. Ihab Hassan deplores ‗the prevalence of politics, 
the obsession with power, the unrelieved pressure of both in the university‘, which ‗skew 
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our language, thought, values‘ by diminishing ‗all existence to … political facts‘.69 
Heaney, like so many other twentieth-century poets, has felt convicted by his resistance 
to this notion – not only by his conscience but also by the strictures of his critics and 
countrymen. He has lived, in short, all the contradictions that can exist between poetry 
and politics (or being and action, as Milosz would term them) and his words here and 
elsewhere come weighted with the conflicted loyalties of his own life and experience.  
   It is perhaps that lived experience that prompts Heaney, as he concludes ‗The 
Government of the Tongue‘, to assert once more that poetry is neither merely a reflection 
of life nor a kind of escapism: 
 
in the rift between what is going to happen and whatever we would wish to 
happen, poetry holds attention for a space, functions not as distraction but as pure 
concentration, a focus where our power to concentrate is concentrated back on 
ourselves.
70
 
 
Poetry opens up a space, otherwise non-existent, between the future and our own desires 
for that future, a future which it neither predicts nor confirms nor imitates. Its purpose, as 
described by Heaney here, is to provide a moment allowing meditation of something 
outside of our lived reality and our ideal reality, but attuned to both. Functioning in this 
way, poetry is not a means of escape. Rather, it is an instance of intense, unwavering, 
unprejudiced focus. The poem is not just a mirror but more like a magnifying glass; and 
the light it concentrates is turned back on us, not to burn, but to illuminate. Thus 
concentrated, our minds and hearts are liberated. Such is Heaney‘s faith. 
 I have discussed, in this chapter, Heaney‘s conception of the ways in which 
poetry, by virtue of its own unhindered operations, resists, specifically, the pressures 
imposed by politics. But poetry faces, as his argument in ‗The Government of the 
Tongue‘ has implied and as we shall further see, a perhaps more obdurate foe than the 
demands of the political – a foe to which Heaney turns in the most comprehensive 
statement of his defence of poetry. This shift in focus, as his career proceeds, is not 
surprising; the claims of politics on poetry are not omnipresent, nor are war and civil 
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conflict (as in Northern Ireland) never-ending. The claims and demands of reality itself – 
what he calls the ‗actual‘ – are, however; and it is against the burden of those claims that 
Heaney seeks to balance the poetic act in The Redress of Poetry. 
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Chapter 4 
Heaney’s Defence of Poetry III: 
The Redress of Poetry 
So when the phrase ‗the redress of poetry‘ swam up, I myself was aswim with intimations of 
possibility. I suddenly realised that I could talk about poetry as something hung out on the 
imaginative arm of the scales to balance or redress the burden of the actual and the endured. I 
don‘t mean as a compensation or consolation, more as a comprehension, a comprehension which 
has to be its own reward. 
 
     Seamus Heaney, interview by Dennis O‘Driscoll1 
 
I 
The centripetal force exerted by the title essay in The Redress of Poetry is such that it is 
difficult to discuss any one of the lectures reproduced in the collection without reference 
to that pivotal text. The title essay brings together ideas explored in its accompanying 
essays, and is in fact a kind of summation, albeit pre-dating the rest in actual 
composition. Because this is so, I will in a sense be working backwards, starting with the 
partial articulation in later essays of some of the ideas brought into so potent a 
culmination in the title essay itself. In this way, we can trace a path through the other 
essays in the collection to the one that not only begins, but crowns them all.  
Heaney‘s writing about poetry, and about the processes involved in making and 
reading it, is characterised by an insistence on the vitality of the art form, the various 
forms of energy which it both harnesses and creates. The craft is contrasted to all that is 
impotent, all that is inactive, and becomes, in Heaney‘s framework, not merely an 
exemplum of vitality, but a source of renewal. In The Redress of Poetry and occasional 
essays of the same period, Heaney comes to consider that power both as it exceeds our 
expectations and limitations, and, crucially, as it balances out against the real. The excess 
of poetry, as we will see, is the very means by which it is able to accumulate the critical 
mass necessary to achieve that balance; or, to put it another way, its abundant, limitless 
energy provides poetry with sufficient uplift to transcend, and thus counterbalance 
reality.  
Heaney‘s opponent in these essays is no longer predominantly political in nature, 
although his concerns in that regard are a lasting feature of his prose; rather, he considers 
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poetry‘s adequacy, its equivalent weight, to the burden of reality in all its forms. 
Evidence of this new tendency in his argument can be found in his 1991 essay ‗Extending 
the Alphabet: On Christopher Marlowe‘s ―Hero and Leander‖‘, in which he speaks not of 
poetry‘s answer to politics, but rather ‗poetry‘s answer to the world‘. That answer is 
composed, as ever, not of politically-based and popular sentiment, but of the auditory 
elements that, for Heaney, are the very substance of poetry‘s power, the elements that 
trigger a kind of internal poetic fission, an endless chain reaction of associations and 
sounds producing a seemingly inexhaustible supply of energy.
2
 
Poetry of this sort – that irradiates both reader and poet with its potent spillover –
is not only pleasurable, but healthful, we are led to believe, and in the deepest sense. It 
provides ‗a kind of homeopathic benefit‘ for the reader, a benefit inseparable, Heaney 
emphasises yet again, from the poem‘s harmonious properties. Experiencing ‗an 
exuberant rhythm, a display of metrical virtuosity, some rising intellectual ground 
successfully surmounted‘ appeases and ‗furthers the range of the mind‘s and the body‘s 
pleasures, and helps the reader to obey the old command … Know thyself‘.3 As has been 
the case with Heaney‘s other examples, the movement here is from sound to spirit, from 
pleasure to perception. As we read poetry and as we respond to its phonetic form, above 
all, we find, as Heaney states in an essay on Yeats and Larkin from the same period, that 
our minds are able, in the Brodskian sense, to reach ‗a new plane of regard‘, a broader, 
more comprehensively perceptive range for their activities. One of the consequences of 
that widened scope is the uncovering of that within us which is both deeply familiar and 
yet deeply strange, or, as Heaney puts it, poetry grants us the ‗foreknowledge of certain 
things which we already seem to be remembering‘.4 
There is more to Heaney‘s use of that key phrase from Brodsky at this stage in his 
defence, however, than simply a reiteration of past lines of argument, and in the same 
essay on Yeats and Larkin, he considers a further implication inherent in the notion of a 
‗new plane‘: poetry‘s ability not only to extend the boundaries of our (self-)perception, 
but its suggestion of another way of being altogether. Through poetry, we are not simply 
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better able to see and comprehend ourselves and our lives, but, Heaney suggests, we are 
assured of the worth of life itself, and simultaneously privileged with the premonition of 
an alternative to our daily experience. Yeats‘ ‗The Cold Heaven‘, he states,  
 
suggests that there is an overall purpose to life; and it does so by the intrinsically 
poetic action of its rhymes, its rhythms, and its exultant intonation. These create 
an energy and an order which promote the idea that there exists a much greater, 
circumambient energy and order within which we have our being.
5
 
 
A great poem, by possessing inherently the characteristics – order, energy, structure and 
yet freedom – of a transcendent system, becomes a promise, an adumbration in itself of 
that system. One is reminded of the New Testament assertion, in the ‗Letter to the 
Romans‘, that in the operations of nature lies proof of the operations of God; and, indeed, 
Heaney‘s last sentence here could be used appropriately to describe what all religions 
themselves do. In Stepping Stones, he summarises this memorably by stating that ‗poetry 
is a ratification of the impulse towards transcendence‘.6  
Heaney‘s terminology, the very thrust of his argument here and elsewhere, is in 
fact distinctive in its religious implication, its insistence on faith of some kind in what 
Heaney has described as ‗an agnostic time‘ – a phrase with both metaphorical and literal 
resonance.
7
 In terms of his recurring image of poetry as a religious force, our age is 
agnostic in its uncertainty about or downright hostility to the art form as a legitimate 
means of expression, as valuable and memorable speech. The literal meaning of 
‗agnostic‘, however, is also applicable: the demise of poetry has much to do with the 
gradual disappearance of God from popular thought. Ours is, according to Les Murray, 
‗an age which distrusts ―mystical‖ talk and prefers to dissemble its spiritual needs‘.8 With 
the unpopularity of the spiritual within critical and intellectual discourse has come a 
reluctance to credit poetry, or any art, with the ability to transcend the actual. The craft 
that Wordsworth described as ‗the first and last of all knowledge‘, a source of revelation 
and prophecy, is no longer viewed as a vehicle for any truth at all, let alone ultimate 
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truth.
9
 Elaine Scarry, in her argument for the usefulness of beauty in On Beauty and 
Being Just, laments the ‗banishing of [conversation about] beauty from the humanities‘ in 
the last three decades, and George Steiner, ten years before Scarry, describes our 
awkwardness in discussing the transcendent in art. To acknowledge what is otherworldly 
about ‗art, music and literature is to risk the whole gamut of muddle and embarrassment‘, 
he writes.
10
 Our age is agnostic with reference to the metaphysical in any shape, and the 
rejection of the spiritual in its most profound form cannot but affect our attitude to its 
other possible manifestations. Heaney, as both poet and critic, is singular in his 
unembarrassed emphasis on what is holy (a word he is not loath to use), and his ready 
recourse to terms like ‗the soul‘.11 One reviewer‘s comment on Seeing Things is perhaps 
even more remarkably true of his prose: ‗what Heaney has done … is to reinvigorate 
poetry with a religious element that has diminished in Western Art since the 
Enlightenment. He has rekindled the numinous.‘12 Peter McDonald in fact suggests that 
Heaney eschews critical-theoretical discourses for this very reason: they cannot provide 
him with a language adequate to the kinds of claims he makes for poetry.
13
 Certainly, the 
terms ‗transcendent‘ and ‗soul‘ do not, to my knowledge, feature in any theoretical 
vocabulary.  
The kind of poetry that intimates the existence of some greater system, that 
implies an ultimate reason for being, and thus in a sense defends that being, is, to use 
Milosz‘s words, inherently ‗on the side of life‘. The Polish poet believed, equally, that 
there was a poetry that failed in this regard, exemplified for him by Philip Larkin‘s 
‗Aubade‘. 
 
Perhaps we forget too easily the centuries-old mutual hostility between reason, 
science and science-inspired philosophy on the one hand and poetry on the other? 
Perhaps the author of the poem went over to the side of the adversary and his 
ratiocination strikes me as a betrayal? For, after all, death in the poem is endowed 
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with the supreme authority of Law and universal necessity, while man is reduced 
to nothing, to a bundle of perceptions, or even less, to an interchangeable 
statistical unit. But poetry by its very essence has always been on the side of life. 
Faith in life everlasting has accompanied man in his wanderings through time, 
and it has always been larger and deeper than religious or philosophical creeds 
which expressed only one of its forms.
14
 
 
Undeniably, these words of Milosz are imbued with the writer‘s Roman Catholicism. 
There is no objective reason why, for secular men and women, Larkin‘s ‗Aubade‘ might 
not be regarded as a great poem – indeed the great poem of recent times on the especial 
unmitigated dread that death holds for secular humankind. But poetry, Milosz implies 
here, achieves in some almost primordial sense what religion and philosophy try to 
achieve in more systematic ways: the ultimate, unlimited expression of a belief in 
eternity, in eternal meaning. Heaney, on the other hand, while arguing for poetry‘s 
transcendent implications, interprets its disposition always to advocate life as established 
by something far more fundamental than its attitude to death. ‗When a poem rhymes‘, he 
states, ‗when a new form generates, when a metre provokes consciousness into new 
postures, it is already on the side of life‘. When we are startled by a rhyme, in other 
words, by the way in which it augments meaning, a challenge to the necessity represented 
by death is already taking place; poetic language thus becomes the very embodiment of 
life itself, choosing, in fact, ‗the condition of overlife‘, and exceeding the usual limits of 
our being.
15
  
Baranczak suggests a similar idea in his essay ‗―The Revenge of a Mortal Hand‖‘ 
when he says of the act of writing that 
 
it results mainly from the deliberate breaking of a taboo, from defiant resistance 
against a powerful rule or law, from rebellion against the commonly accepted 
foundations of existence. It‘s enough to put a verse line down on paper to scoff, in 
effect, at all the basic laws on which the world rests. For the very act of writing 
creates another world in which all those laws can be suspended – more, held in 
suspension interminably by the enduring power of conceit, rhyme, pun, metaphor, 
meter.
16
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The Polish writer‘s remarks neatly echo Heaney‘s emphasis in his essay on Yeats and 
Larkin – on the way in which poetry, through its intrinsic processes, suggests a different 
kind of, a more abundant, existence. We see, too, that his focus at this point in his 
defence is no longer only on the inward reach of poetry, its power to rouse our 
subconscious, but on its movement beyond that subconscious, its capacity to surpass not 
merely our personal limitations but those of the world itself. 
This potential of the art form is thoroughly explored in an essay entitled ‗Above 
the Brim: On Robert Frost‘, in which Heaney describes how a poem produced by the 
governing tongue is able to ‗launch itself beyond skill and ego into a run of energy that 
brim[s] up outside the poet‘s conscious intention and control‘.17 That burst of energy is 
unpredictable to both poet and reader in its intensity: 
 
there is nothing determined about the reach of poetry, either for the writer or the 
reader of it: it is, as Keats said, a matter of surprise by fine excess, what Robert 
Frost calls in ‗Birches‘ a going above the brim, a getting away from the earth 
awhile in order to come back and begin over.
18
 
 
This apparent release from gravity is not, Heaney is concerned to point out, either sheer 
escapism or the consequence only of a poetry motivated by joy or profound pleasure. 
Using Robert Frost as an example, he makes it clear that one of the primary sources of 
such energy is, in fact, the confrontation of misery or suffering. The elevation attained by 
Frost‘s poetry, on the contrary, is often enough occasioned by the ‗sheer unhappiness of 
the uncomposed world‘. Pain is the force which enables Frost to take off: 
 
when Frost comes down hard upon the facts of hurt, he still manages to end up 
gaining poetic altitude. As his intelligence thrusts down, it creates a reactive force 
capable of raising and carrying the whole burden of our knowledge and 
experience.
 19
         
 
Heaney is able to divine, in the American writer, something like a poetic version of 
Newton‘s Third Law: for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. With 
reference to Frost‘s ‗Home Burial‘, he writes that the extent of the poem‘s ascent is 
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directly proportionate to the pressure it exerts against the actual – the harder that Frost 
presses down upon the events of the poem, and the more painful they become, the greater 
the power of that poem to surmount its own occasion. In the case of a great poet, the 
more unyielding the facts of reality, the greater is the ability of his or her imagination to 
propel itself beyond them, like the swimmer who is able to use the very resistance offered 
by the water to propel him or herself to greater speed.
20
 
 Just as this upward movement itself is not necessarily the buoyancy of joy (no 
matter how delightful the energy, the music of the poem may be), so its result is not one 
of fleeting pleasure or amusement, either. Rather, that upward surge, achieved by the 
recoil of the poem as it comes into contact with our lived experience, is capable of lifting 
that experience ‗to a new, refreshing plane‘. And thus we come to the central component 
of Heaney‘s defence as it finds its most sophisticated expression in ‗The Redress of 
Poetry‘. Heaney‘s preoccupation, in this collection, is with poetry‘s abundant energy – a 
consequence not least of its sound – which carries us, along with our doubts and 
dilemmas, to a place which transcends the actual, permitting not only a clearer view of 
our actualities but the glimpse of an alternative experience. And, paradoxically, the 
primary purpose of poetry‘s excess, its potential to outstrip actual conditions, is the 
creation of balance. It is the nature of that balance which becomes Heaney‘s focus in 
‗The Redress of Poetry‘.   
 
II 
At their finest, Heaney‘s essays in redress and in the virtues of a certain kind of 
excess are simply, self-justifyingly persuasive; they are themselves rapt exercises 
in the articulation of the pleasure given to a fine reader by what Wordsworth is 
quoted as naming ―the grand elementary principle of pleasure‖, that principle 
which meets, opposes and transcends the principle of unpleasure, the 
unavoidability of suffering, in history.
21
 
 
Given the importance of Heaney‘s style to the success of his defence, it is unsurprising 
that as his argument for poetry reaches its culmination, so too do his powers of 
articulation. ‗The Redress of Poetry‘ is an exercise in conceptual and expressive 
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brilliance, the pinnacle of decades of thought and writing on the subject. In it, Heaney 
argues that poetry achieves three different kinds of ‗redress‘, each of which has been 
foreshadowed in his previous prose writing. In bringing them together under the ‗rubric 
of ―redress‖‘, however, he gives his argument new impetus and weight, and demonstrates 
again one of the most persuasive aspects of his writing; namely, his ability to give 
concrete expression, through the use of aptly-chosen metaphors, to concepts that would 
otherwise remain nebulous and, for most of us, beyond our own powers of articulation.
22
 
 Heaney‘s argument begins prosaically enough: 
 
professors of poetry, apologists for it, practitioners of it, from Sir Philip Sidney to 
Wallace Stevens, all sooner or later are tempted to show how poetry‘s existence 
as a form of art relates to our existence as citizens of society – how it is ‗of 
present use‘. Behind such defences and justifications, at any number of removes, 
stands Plato, calling into question whatever special prerogatives or useful 
influences poetry would claim for itself within the polis. Yet Plato‘s world of 
ideal forms also provides the court of appeal through which poetic imagination 
seeks to redress whatever is wrong or exacerbating in the prevailing conditions.
23
 
 
While the desire to justify poetry is ‗an unwavering principle throughout 
Heaney‘s career‘, he indicates in this opening passage to ‗The Redress of Poetry‘ that he 
is not going to join the ranks of poetry‘s usual defenders; neither is he going to adopt 
their popular lines of argument, whether for poetry as a source of all knowledge or as a 
linguistic laundromat.
24
 Demonstrating that the political accusation is never far from his 
thinking about poetry, he reminds us of the differences – and similarities – between the 
poet and the revolutionary: 
 
moreover, ‗useful‘ or ‗practical‘ responses to those same conditions are derived 
from imagined standards too: poetic fictions, the dream of alternative worlds, 
enable governments and revolutionaries as well. It‘s just that governments and 
revolutionaries would compel society to take on the shape of their imagining, 
whereas poets are typically more concerned to conjure with their own and their 
readers‘ sense of what is possible or desirable or, indeed, imaginable.25  
 
                                                 
22
 Corcoran, 214. 
23
 Heaney, Redress, 1. 
24
 O‘Donoghue, The Language of Poetry, viii. 
25
 Heaney, Redress, 1. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 129 
Heaney speaks here, as always, from his own experience, aptly described by Vendler as 
characterised by a pressure ‗to be more socially specific in [his] poetry than poets can‘.26 
Wallace Stevens, in his Letters, makes a similar point to Heaney: 
 
the role of the poet may be fixed by contrasting it to that of the politician. The 
poet absorbs the general life: the public life. The politician is absorbed by it. The 
poet is individual. The politician is general. It is the personal in the poet that is the 
origin of his poetry … As the individual he (the poet) must remain free. The 
politician expects everyone to be absorbed as he himself is absorbed. This 
expectation is part of the sabotage of the individual.
27
 
 
It is one of Stevens‘ terms that Heaney uses to mark this distinction between poet and 
politician: ‗the nobility of poetry‘ arises from its conflicting goals to those of politics. 
The revolutionary would dictate, narrow all possible scenarios to the one he or she 
desires, while the poet‘s wish, as we have seen, is to extend those possible worlds, 
potential consequences, in the imagination of his or her readers. The government official 
would have the poet plant particular seeds in cultivated rows, within a demarcated area; 
the poet‘s ambition, however, is to bring forth a forest. Stevens, as we have seen, defines 
the concept of ‗nobility‘ as poetry‘s capacity to withstand the weight of the actual, an 
interior shield of imagination raised against an exterior foe. Heaney‘s interpretation of the 
American‘s work is broader than that of many other contemporary critics, who reduce 
Stevens‘ assertion here (perhaps overly mindful of his historical moment) to the claim 
that poetry ‗assists readers subjected to violent realities by opening their minds to fresh 
ways of thinking‘.28 For Heaney, the act of presenting the mind with new possibilities is 
not only necessary for or useful to those experiencing particular suffering; it is necessary 
for us all. To put it another way, poetry does not only answer to the accusation of politics, 
of rioting and genocide, no matter how central that accusation is to Heaney‘s own life and 
work; it answers as fully to the question posed by reality itself, in all its forms. 
 Heaney wastes no time coming to the crux of his argument. Firstly, he 
acknowledges the kind of protest that might be levelled against the claim that poetry is 
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useful in some potent, meaningful sense. It is the time-honoured one, referred to in more 
than one of his previous essays. Those who protest against the art form 
 
will want poetry to be more than an imagined response to conditions in the world; 
… will urgently want to know why it should not be an applied art, harnessed to 
movements which attempt to alleviate those conditions by direct action.
29
  
 
Such people fail to appreciate the actual operations or nature of poetry, its universal 
social efficacy, enacted when the poet – according to Wallace Stevens – presents us with 
the imaginative inventions, the visions, the new worlds, which make our lives bearable. 
This idea is also expressed elsewhere in Heaney‘s essays, in various forms, most notably 
in his reference to the different plane of experience accessible through poetry. Here, he 
uses his most instructive metaphor yet to represent poetry‘s particular force – that of a 
labyrinth: ‗if our given experience is a labyrinth, its impassability can still be countered 
by the poet‘s imagining some equivalent of the labyrinth and presenting himself and us 
with a vivid experience of it‘.30 In other words, the imagination operates as a kind of 
meta-discourse, at one remove from and thus able to master that which might otherwise 
be (and often is) in reality overwhelming. All that poetry achieves – through its sounds, 
its rhythms, the unbridled energy of its beginnings – it achieves in order that it might 
make our lives endurable, while enabling us also to see beyond our immediate 
experience.
31
 The imagined version of reality ‗does not intervene in the actual‘, and 
hence does not do the work of the revolutionary. The poem, however, is still a strongly 
beneficial experience for both writer and reader, ‗offering consciousness a chance to 
recognise its predicaments, foreknow its capacities and rehearse its comebacks in all 
kinds of venturesome ways‘.32 This line of thinking is crucial to Heaney‘s concept of 
redress, which, as I have said, incorporates poetry‘s ability reveal to us the complexities 
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and contradictions both of external reality, and of our own minds. Through poetry, our 
minds, via the imagination, are extended beyond their usual limits. 
 Heaney goes on to say, in a further stage of his argument, that poetry constitutes 
‗a response to reality which has a liberating and verifying effect upon the individual‘.33 
The nature of that response is useful, he argues, because it is unexpected; it is the very 
opposite of the answer required by the majority, by the politician or activist who would 
yoke poetry to their cause. He has recourse, at this point in ‗The Redress of Poetry‘, to a 
thinker one of whose central metaphors is absorbed into his defence as though it were 
originally conceived for that very purpose. Simone Weil, the French philosopher and 
theologian, describes in Gravity and Grace the ‗law‘ that should govern the actions of the 
individual in society and history: 
 
if we know in what way society is unbalanced, we must do what we can to add 
weight to the lighter scale … we must have formed a conception of equilibrium 
and be ever ready to change sides like justice, ‗that fugitive from the camp of 
conquerors‘.34 
 
Justice itself, Weil asserts, is never static – it moves (or should move) constantly between 
sides, shifting always to the position of the minority or the defeated. Similarly, we must 
be prepared to add ballast to the less popular, less officially sponsored side of society. To 
Weil, ‗gravity‘ is a metaphor used to encompass all those deterministic forces at work on 
the individual and the world, which for her are as irrefutable as the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics (that is, heat-loss) and which can only be escaped, if ever, through the 
rare visitations of what she terms ‗grace‘. Society, in her conception, always operates like 
gravity, tending towards imbalance. ‗Obedience to the force of gravity‘ is, according to 
Weil, ‗the greatest sin‘ – the worst thing we can do as human beings is to throw in our 
weight with the majority, accepting the constructs, social and otherwise, governing our 
lives and spirits.
35
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For Heaney, ‗poetry is an extension and refinement of the mind‘s extreme 
recognitions and of language‘s most unexpected apprehensions‘, and as such it also 
demonstrates Weil‘s law in operation: 
 
in the activity of poetry too, there is a tendency to place a counter-reality in the 
scales – a reality which may only be imagined but which nevertheless has weight 
because it is imagined within the gravitational pull of the actual and can therefore 
hold its own and balance out against the historical situation.
36
 
 
This is one of Heaney‘s key formulations, indeed one of the (self-created) touchstones of 
his defence. In it, he gives voice to the argument upon which that defence finally rests, 
and in doing so proposes another binary in the workings of the poem, by conceiving of a 
kind of poetic flight mechanics: the poem must allow itself to be drawn into the force 
field of the actual, and yet simultaneously resist that pull. The alternative reality that 
poetry suggests is an alternative – not a matter of mere fancy or wish-fulfilment – 
precisely because it is shaped by the constant presence of the actual, the heat of which 
tempers the operations of the authentically imagining imagination in the same way that 
the presence of heat tempers and makes true steel. If a poem fails to acknowledge the 
actual, it will fail to make plausible whatever other reality it invokes, or those it invokes 
will be without weight and substance, drifting in the ether of fantasy; which is to say, 
they will not be able to redress at all.
37
  
This potential danger notwithstanding, there is an equally important, implicit 
requirement expressed in Heaney‘s metaphor, the other half of the binary: namely, that 
poetry resist the gravitational pull of the actual. Even though it must, as it were, engage 
with the actual (or at least one conception of it), it cannot allow itself to be absorbed or 
otherwise subsumed by it. So the action of a poem, as ideally conceived by Heaney, is 
twofold, even paradoxical. It is like an army that both engages with and retreats from its 
foe at one and the same time. Through such means, poetry achieves that counterbalancing 
which is experienced by its readers as a liberation, a confrontation with the conditions of 
life by which they might be oppressed, but also a vehicle which carries them beyond the 
trap, biological or otherwise, that these conditions so often appear to be.     
                                                 
36
 Heaney, Redress, 3-4. 
37
 Heaney, Redress, 4. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
n
 133 
 Elsewhere in Weil‘s writing, she expresses the case against the imagination, 
which, she claims, works always against grace, taking the place which it might fill in our 
lives. Human mortality is a case in point. ‗The thought of death calls for a counterweight, 
and this counterweight – apart from grace – cannot be anything but a lie … The 
imagination, filler up of the void, is essentially a liar‘.38 The ‗void‘ to which Weil refers 
is that space which opens up in an individual life when it refuses to obey the laws of 
gravity, the necessity that governs the world. For her, it is a precondition for the entry of 
grace into a life. So painful is the experience of this void that, almost by the force of 
gravity itself, it sucks into itself all those ameliorative fantasies – the imagination, in her 
terms – which provide a kind of relief, albeit (in her conception) spurious consolation.  
Weil, it should be noted, is a theological radical who specifically wants to deprive 
human beings of all the usual forms of solace, imaginary or otherwise, in order to create 
that void through which, in her conception, true grace might find its way into a human 
life. The imagination, for her, is essentially a kind of day-dreaming or wish-fulfilment 
that keeps its practitioners in the dark, as it were, of the Platonic cave, hindering spiritual 
enlightenment. Heaney, on the contrary, is no absolutist theologically or otherwise – in 
fact nothing is more alien to his sensibility. While fully aware of the degree to which the 
operations of the imagination can be facile, he has a more nuanced idea of what it makes 
possible. As realised in the finest poetry, it can enter a life in a way analogous to the 
grace which Weil would have enter and redeem the void of which she writes, 
countermanding the actual.  
In another essay in The Redress of Poetry, Heaney cites Hugh MacDiarmid as a 
specific instance of a poet whose work, at times, performed that task: 
  
A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle did achieve the redress of poetry. MacDiarmid 
created a fully realised, imaginatively coherent work, one that contained such life-
enhancing satire, such emotional weight and such specific imaginative gravity 
that it could be placed in the mind‘s scales as something both equal to and 
corrective of the prevailing conditions. It was a magnificent intervention by 
creative power into an historical situation. Its force was the force of the glimpsed 
alternative and it still gives credence to MacDiarmid‘s wonderfully stirring 
affirmation in another context that poetry is human existence come to life.
39
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The key phrase here, of course, is ‗something both equal to and corrective of the 
prevailing conditions‘: to some extent, our creations must, if they are to be of any help, 
recreate the conditions of our suffering. The imagined labyrinth must be as convoluted as 
the real one if we are to find our way through it; the poem must ‗make an order true to the 
impact of external reality‘.40 (Les Murray speaks, in a similar vein, of poetry‘s usefulness 
depending on its ability to model the ‗wholeness of thinking and of life‘.41) Heaney‘s idea 
here is a version of Jung‘s suggestion that ‗insoluble conflict‘ can be overcome through 
the development of ‗a new level of consciousness‘ with which to tackle predicament, a 
notion that Heaney uses to introduce one of his earlier essays.
42
 
Elsewhere in ‗The Redress of Poetry‘, Heaney re-emphasises this notion with a 
new and memorable metaphor:  
 
as long as the coordinates of the imagined thing correspond to those of the world 
that we live in and endure, poetry is fulfilling its counterweighting function. It 
becomes another truth to which we can have recourse, before which we can know 
ourselves in a more fully empowered way.
43
 
  
Here, Heaney rephrases his earlier insistence that the draw of the actual should be evident 
in poetry, and he does so to effect a subtle shift in focus.
44
 The opposing forces at work 
on the poem in that original metaphor – both towards and away from the actual – are here 
represented in harmonious action, in cooperation and balance with each other. The binary 
of gravity and grace, of attraction and repulsion, has been translated into an image uniting 
those opposites, as the poem both matches reality in a profound and complete sense and 
yet is not that reality, but something more; there is no longer any drag and resistance at 
work in the image, but instead precisely the kind of equilibrium for which Heaney is 
making his argument. The imagination presents us, he claims, with an experience which 
has all the geographical landmarks, the topography, of our actual lived experience; but 
which exists at an altitude that is above reality, transcending it even as it correlates with 
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it. We find this kind of relationship in the finest poetry, this being, precisely, a mark of its 
distinction. These seemingly irreconcilable opposites – fidelity to the actual, fidelity to 
the actuality of the imagination and its needs – are united in harmony rather than 
opposition in the fully achieved poem. This is, undeniably, a further articulation of 
Heaney‘s earlier idea, but the deliberate change in emphasis is testament to his 
perspicacity both as a critic and as a poet; for it is a poet‘s discernment at work in the 
selection of these critically insightful metaphors. It is Heaney‘s great gift, as a poet-critic, 
to be able to articulate the dual operation at work in poetry and to reveal it to us with a 
persuasive, indeed incontestable force.  
These central passages in ‗The Redress of Poetry‘ have an intuitively right, self-
evident impact. They are further evidence of Heaney‘s critical-poetic powers, because, in 
them, he is turning to his own purpose an idea central to the work of Wallace Stevens – 
one which the American writer himself circles awkwardly, and to far less potent effect, 
for an entire essay. Heaney‘s genius, with Stevens as with his other sources, is to extend 
their ideas to their full potential, soldering those ideas together in such unexpected ways 
that the machinery of his defence is unparalleled in coherence and dimension. In the case 
of Stevens‘ criticism, the contrast with, and the advantage of Heaney is one of both style 
and substance. The American‘s central essay on the imagination, the one to which 
Heaney refers in ‗The Redress of Poetry‘, is ‗The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words‘. 
In its thirty-six pages, Stevens quotes only one part of a poem, five lines from 
Wordsworth‘s ‗Composed upon Westminster Bridge, September 3, 1802‘. Moreover, he 
does not use that extract to any real effect; he quotes it without any illuminating or 
explicatory remarks, as though the very act of quotation should suffice as demonstration. 
The Wordsworth passage, with its preceding and following text, also reveals Stevens‘ 
characteristic prose style, and I will therefore quote a section of some length. 
 
If we go back to the collection of solid, static objects extended in space, which Dr 
Joad posited, and if we say that the space is blank space, nowhere, without colour, 
and that the objects, though solid, have no shadows and, though static, exert a 
mournful power, and, without elaborating this complete poverty, if we suddenly 
hear a different and familiar description of the place: 
 
 This City now doth, like a garment, wear 
 The beauty of the morning, silent bare, 
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 Ships, towers, domes, theatres, and temples lie 
 Open unto the fields, and to the sky; 
 All bright and glittering in the smokeless air; 
 
if we have this experience, we know how poets help people to live their lives. 
This illustration must serve for the all the rest. There is, in fact, a world of poetry 
indistinguishable from the world in which we live, or, I ought to say, no doubt, 
from the world in which we shall come to live, since what makes the poet the 
potent figure that he is, or was, or ought to be, is that he creates the world to 
which we turn incessantly and without knowing and that he gives life to the 
supreme fictions without which we are unable to conceive of it.
45
 
 
‗This illustration‘, brief as it is, ‗must serve for all the rest‘; and therein lies the difference 
between the two critics. Heaney is never without an exemplary poem at hand in his 
defence of the art form, and in fact that defence is, one might argue, most convincingly 
enacted in his exegesis of other poets‘ work. Stevens, by contrast, argues by a process of 
painful, meticulous logic (albeit with moments of philosophical brilliance), a process 
which is, it seems, intended to be self-sustaining; and his failure to engage, as Heaney 
does, with actual instances of the imagination in action weakens his claims, or at least 
leaves them undefended. The final part of the quotation above is, of course, one of 
Stevens‘ most famous, and one of the most useful to Heaney. It is buried, however, 
beneath a wearying mass of language, in prose whose rhythm lurches this way and that, 
inducing vertigo. Heaney‘s prose likewise has a very physical effect, but of a completely 
different kind: it awakens the mind and body of the reader, quickening his or her powers 
of response, and always rewards that awakening with the further revelation of the literal 
treasures buried in the poem under discussion. Here, in an extract from ‗Counting to a 
Hundred: On Elizabeth Bishop‘, that difference is evident as Heaney speaks of her well-
known villanelle, ‗One Art‘, which he has just quoted in full. 
 
In this poem, Bishop‘s ability to write plainly and at the same time reticently 
manifests itself in extremis. This is wonderful lyric writing; it is impossible to 
separate the poem‘s reality as a made thing from its effect as a personal cry. It is 
in one way, of course, entirely formal, preoccupied with its technical procedures, 
taking delight in solving the challenges of rhyme, in obeying (and disobeying) the 
rules of the highly constraining villanelle form. At the same time, it is obviously 
the whimper of a creature who has been hard done by; or, to be more exact, it is a 
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choked-off whimper, the learnt behaviour of somebody who, without the 
impersonal demands of an art and an ethic of doughty conduct, might have 
submitted to self-pity. In fact, the conquest of a temptation to self-pity is what the 
poem manages to effect: wit confronts hurt and holds a balance that deserves to be 
called wisdom.
46
 
  
 Not all of Heaney‘s fellow defenders of poetry are as arid in style and critical 
practice as Stevens, however, and this brings me to another of his significant differences 
from the majority. Heaney does something which is always extremely difficult. There is 
an almost unavoidable tendency among human beings, particularly in relation to anything 
that causes them desperation and despair, whether it be social conditions or the plight of 
an art form, to go into a kind of rhetorical or spiritual overdrive; it is almost the law of the 
psyche in relation to such things to seek transcendence. Heaney, remarkably, never does 
this, or at least never without justification. His poetry, in moments of stress or distress, 
always moves closer, quite literally, to the earth – in other words, does not seek to escape 
gravity (‗Exposure‘ is a case in point). Similarly, however much he might be aware of the 
difficulties poetry faces in his time, and however much he might be inclined to see the art 
form as a kind of salvation, in his writing about poetry he never resorts to rhetorical 
uplift, a set of grandiloquent but empty affirmations of faith – as, one might argue, for 
example, Joseph Brodsky and Czeslaw Milosz do, at least at crucial points. Rather, he 
listens in to the poem (in other words, bends to the earth again) and demonstrates, again 
in the most practical and non-vapid forms, the very real riches that are to be found in the 
word-hoard that is poetry. He is, in this respect, rather like the modern dancer, who in 
contradistinction to the classical ballerina – always seeking to fight against gravity and 
indeed transcend it – has, as the most basic motion of his spirit, the tendency to work 
with, rather than against, all that would pull him downwards. 
Foremost among the riches available to us through poetry, as we have seen, is the 
imaginative creation of an alternative reality, which is the first kind of ‗redress‘, of 
correction, provided by poetry. Now, in the framework of this overarching metaphor for 
poetry‘s efficacy, Heaney reiterates two of the points he has made in The Government of 
the Tongue: the existence of poet-witnesses, like Wilfred Owen, who come to live 
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according to the measure of an improved, imagined version of reality rather than the 
lesser standards of their lived reality; and the necessary ascendancy, for all writers, of the 
creative dynamic itself over their sense of social or other responsibility: 
 
the movement is from delight to wisdom and not vice versa. The felicity of a 
cadence, the chain reaction of a rhyme, the pleasuring of an etymology, such 
things can proceed happily and as it were autistically, in an area of mental 
operations cordoned off by and from the critical sense.
47
 
 
This is another picture of the tongue ungoverned, and the repetition of a theme in 
Heaney‘s descriptions of the poetic act – namely, his preoccupation with a pre-rational, 
instinctive creativity, a mental/physical function as natural as breathing. To allow the 
imagination its independence is especially difficult, Heaney goes on to point out, in a 
‗late-twentieth-century context of politically approved themes, post-colonial backlash and 
―silence-breaking‖ writing of all kinds‘: 
  
in these circumstances, poetry is understandably pressed to give voice to much 
that has hitherto been denied expression in the ethnic, social, sexual and political 
life. Which is to say that its power as a mode of redress in the first sense – as 
agent for proclaiming and correcting injustices – is being appealed to constantly.48 
 
No less than in previous decades, poets feel the pressure of reality and its 
demands bearing down upon them and their art form. Malloy and Carey, in their 
introduction to Seamus Heaney: The Shaping Spirit, quote from an essay on redress by 
Heaney published in The Times Literary Supplement in 1989, in which he vividly 
describes the contemporary poet‘s dilemma: 
 
in the postmodern age, [our] very vocabulary has become untrustworthy, 
undermined by our awareness of its collusion with all kinds of secluded 
ideologies, based (depending upon your suspicion) upon gender or imperium, or, 
indeed, subversions, and from this acknowledgement of language‘s 
duplicitousness arises a doubt about the very possibility of ever pronouncing the 
authentic, persuasive word … Thus, under the pressure of conflicting 
recognitions, in love with the literature of the past but sceptical of the language of 
                                                 
47
 Heaney, Redress, 5. Heaney aligns himself with Yeats‘s formulation of this idea, that, as Heaney puts it 
here, ‗the will must not usurp the work of the imagination‘.  
48
 Heaney, Redress, 5. 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 139 
the present, self-divided and self-rebuking, the poet stands like an embodiment of 
both the loaded scales and the trembling pointer needle.
49
 
 
It is the risk of both poet and poetry losing their balance that brings Heaney to the 
second kind of redress poets should provide: their duty ‗to redress poetry as poetry, to set 
it up as its own category, an eminence established and a pressure exercised by distinctly 
linguistic means‘.50 Do not forget, Heaney admonishes us, the efficacy of song itself. The 
force of poetry‘s content should be matched (if not, in a sense, exceeded) by that of its 
form, its fulfilment of its own aesthetic laws. The medium should not suffer in the 
expression of the message, and we should rejoice in poetry‘s intrinsic, unhampered power 
as an art form. The critical corollary of this, as Heaney is concerned to point out, is that 
we should not deny our genuine responsiveness to a poetry which belongs to a tradition 
that is part of a ‗discredited cultural or political system‘. James Joyce, for example, was 
vulnerable to the allure of the Elizabethan poets, despite his antagonism towards the 
British Empire itself; and he did not deny ‗his susceptibility to the totally persuasive word 
in order to prove the purity of his resistance to an imperial hegemony‘.51 What Joyce, and 
others, teach us, then, is that a poem‘s musical power, its function as redresser of itself, 
should not be discounted simply because the work itself reflects the views of a fallen or 
unpopular political or cultural system.  
 When the second kind of redress takes place, and poetry is most fully, forcefully 
itself, it answers to a need in the reader that otherwise goes unfulfilled, a need that is met 
by poetry in the ‗fluid, exhilarating moment which lies at the heart of any memorable 
reading, the undisappointed joy of finding that everything holds up and answers the 
desire that it awakens‘. The suggestion of a consummation that is almost erotic is not 
adventitious. For when this fulfilment takes place, Heaney writes, we literally transcend, 
in every aspect of our being, ‗all that is contingent and … ―inconsequential‖‘, and in 
doing so, as at no other time, we believe wholly and empirically that poetry is ‗strong 
enough to help‘ – the latter a phrase from the notebooks of George Seferis.52  
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Our conviction of poetry‘s usefulness is, in short, felt most strongly when a poem 
successfully ‗redresses poetry as poetry‘ as well as providing a counterweight to reality.  
As Heaney summarises this elsewhere, the art form 
 
justifies its readers‘ trust and vindicates itself by setting its ‗fine excess‘ in the 
balance against all of life‘s inadequacies, desolations and atrocities … [it] makes 
an indelible first impression on the ear and then survives in the mind as a 
pleasure, a potency and even, occasionally, a principle.
53
 
 
That ‗fine excess‘ is also the source of the third kind of redress conceived of by 
Heaney as intrinsic to poetry. He has, until this point in the essay, cited two possible 
meanings of the word, which it is instructive to rehearse. One the one hand, redress can 
mean ‗reparation of, satisfaction or compensation for, a wrong sustained or the loss 
resulting from this‘, in relation to poetry‘s balancing out against reality. On the other, it 
can mean ‗to set (a person or thing) upright again; to raise again to an erect position. Also 
fig. to set up again, restore, re-establish‘, with reference to poetry reasserting itself as an 
art form.
54
  
Now, Heaney writes, he wants ‗to profess the surprise of poetry as well as its 
reliability … its given, unforeseeable thereness‘, and to describe how it enters into our 
line of sight and invigorates our minds and bodies. The poet likens his art, in this 
instance, to the bird-shaped transfers that one can apply to windows or glass doors, which 
 
must suddenly enter the vision and change the direction of the real birds‘ flight. In 
a flash the shapes register and transmit their unmistakable presence, so the birds 
veer off instinctively. An image of the living creatures has induced a totally 
salubrious swerve in the creatures themselves. And this natural, heady diversion is 
also something induced by poetry …55 
 
The metaphor itself is worth dwelling on. It reveals once more Heaney‘s preternatural 
gifts for giving concrete embodiment to what might ordinarily be considered the most 
elusive and even abstract of notions. If Heaney persuades – and by the same token if his 
defence is ultimately persuasive – it is because of his unparalleled ability, as witnessed 
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here, to come up with metaphors that enable the reader to trace the reality of an inner 
movement as if it had the solidity, the real existence, of the most tangible of objects, even 
while at the same time being evanescent. The art form, here as before, is an image of the 
real thing, sufficiently alike to the actual to have a markedly beneficial effect, and to do 
so suddenly and unpredictably. The response of the real birds to the two-dimensional 
creatures is ‗instinctive‘, ‗natural‘, ‗heady‘ – all of which are also descriptions, in 
Heaney‘s opinion, of the effects of poetry on the reader. The aptness, the unmistakable 
necessity of poetry in our lives, even as its operations catch us by surprise, render it ‗at 
one moment unforeseeable and at the next indispensable‘.56 This, then, is the third 
definition of ‗redress‘ which is called into play: ‗Hunting. To bring back (the hounds or 
deer) to the proper course‘, a definition in which the word ‗proper‘ carries no moral or 
ethical connotation, as Heaney is careful to point out. Rather, this kind of redress is about 
the channelling, the steering, of the sudden imaginative overflow resulting from poetry in 
a salutary direction. It is this capacity of poetry to which Les Murray also draws attention 
in his suggestion that the art form models 
 
the whole simultaneous gamut of reasoning, envisioning, feeling and vibrating we 
go through when we are really taken up with some matter, and out of which we 
may act on it. We are not just thinking about whatever it may be, but savouring it 
and experiencing it and wrestling with it in the ghostly sympathy of our muscles. 
We are alive at full stretch towards it. Poetry models the fullness of life …57 
 
And when it achieves this, Heaney writes in the final lines of the essay, when the 
art form embodies all three kinds of redress in simultaneous operation, the result is 
liberation of a singular sort: ‗the spirit is called extravagantly beyond the course that the 
usual life plots for it … [and] outcry or rhapsody is wrung from it as it flies in upon some 
unexpected image of its own solitude and distinctness‘.58 
           
III 
As is evident from the very terms he privileges, Heaney‘s defence of poetry takes its 
place in a long line of Romantic defences of the art form; as I have already indicated, and 
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as certain critics have pointed out, his poetry, too, is essentially neo-Romantic. The art 
form – for Heaney as for his predecessors, be they Shelley or Wallace Stevens – 
essentially comes to take the place of religion in ensuring the psychic health of 
humankind, although in Heaney‘s defence it does not do so by supplanting religious faith, 
but by filling the gap that has been left by the absence of belief in a post-religious age. 
The spirit at work in this creed, as we have seen, is the imagination; and because of this, 
not least, Heaney‘s defence stands implicitly opposed to what he perceives as another, 
although substantially lesser, threat to poetry‘s wellbeing – broadly, the postmodern 
literary movement. 
 Within postmodern discourse, the imagination is generally regarded as a deeply 
suspect concept, considered by many theorists ‗a mystified and mystifying bourgeois 
notion, a romantic way of concealing the real roots of creativity which reach down not 
into some dark inner world‘ – which is, of course, precisely how Heaney views it – ‗but 
into that ideology which it is the radical critic‘s task to demystify‘.59 Central to this 
dismissal of the imagination is the dismissal of its relation to the ‗―original‖ creation of 
meaning‘; for the postmodern critic, the imagination is no more than a series of images 
endlessly multiplied, reflecting no ultimate, true, original reality, but instead the very 
absence of that reality. The metaphor commonly used to illustrate this is that of a series 
of mirrors, reflecting nothing but each other in an infinite reproduction of superficial 
appearance.
60
 Rather than an external, tangible world, it is language itself that becomes 
the beginning and end of meaning and experience; there is nothing pre-linguistic, and 
there is nothing post-linguistic, and, as the quotation above indicates, the critic‘s focus is 
on uncovering the ideologies that inform, indeed construct, the institution that is 
literature.  
Such notions, as applied to poetry, are anathema to Heaney, and he has said as 
much, opposing implicitly and at times explicitly, in both his poetry and prose, the 
fundamental tenets of postmodernism. In Stepping Stones, he recalls the effect that 
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literary movement‘s challenge had on the poetry in his 1987 collection, The Haw 
Lantern: 
 
I didn‘t see this as clearly at the time, but now I can see also that there‘s a 
countervailing impulse at work [in the book], a refusal to discredit ‗the real thing‘ 
… There‘s a contest going on between Derry and Derrida. Not that I had read 
Derrida, but in the eighties, back in the milieu of the Harvard English Department, 
it was impossible not to be aware of the challenge he was offering. The words in 
the word-hoard were in danger of being dematerialised and everything in me was 
protesting silently …61 
 
In his later lectures, that protest is given voice. In Finder Keepers, Heaney laments the 
effects that postmodern critical technique is having on undergraduates, who are, 
nowadays, ‗being taught prematurely to regard the poetic heritage as an oppressive 
imposition‘, and to distrust it for its artfully concealed gender, class and power 
prejudices. Such suspicions have a place, he reasons, but that place is not in the minds of 
students who have not as yet learned to read literature qua literature, as something other 
than a reflection of ideology.
62
 Stephen Watt, in Postmodern/drama, recalls attending an 
unpublished lecture Heaney gave at a conference in 1995, in which he spoke of the 
contrast between the empathetic, practical criticism of the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
‗desperate‘ desire of postcolonial, postmodern theorists to uncover whatever cultural or 
political ideology is at work in a text. Those critics, Heaney declares, demonstrate a 
‗postmodern incapacity‘ to see in poetry ‗any link between the ludic and the veritable‘, a 
link which is at the very heart of his own defence of the art form.
63
 And in a telling 
comparison, Heaney says of John Clare in The Redress of Poetry that his writing ‗inspires 
one to trust that poetry can break through the glissando of postmodernism and get stuck 
in the mud of real imaginative haulage work‘. The slippery, ungraspable, purposely 
purposeless discourse of postmodernism stands in direct contrast to the sweaty, physical, 
productive operations of poetry as conceived of by Heaney; that scale of notes goes 
nowhere, ending essentially where it began, while the poetry that the Irish writer defends 
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makes things happen. The no doubt considered juxtaposition of ‗real‘ and ‗imaginative‘ 
in this description is both a deliberate oxymoron – one affirming that reality and the 
imagination are two distinctive entities, that there is indeed an actual world – and not an 
oxymoron at all, but a cooperative binary; like the spirit and the earth, the real and the 
imaginary collaborate within poetry to make it efficacious.  
 But perhaps the most immediately persuasive of Heaney‘s responses to the 
postmodern and its concomitant critical modes is found in ‗On His Work in the English 
Tongue‘, a poem in memory of Ted Hughes, the first section of which reaffirms Heaney‘s 
– and Hughes‘ – belief in the forcibleness of poetic language: 
 
  Post-this, post-that, post-the-other, yet in the end 
  not past a thing. Not understanding or telling 
  or forgiveness. 
    But often past oneself, 
  pounded like a shore by the roller griefs 
  in language that can still knock language sideways.
64
 
 
 For Heaney, then, postmodernism presents a recognisable challenge to the 
autonomy, and what he would go so far as to call the essence, of poetry; but that 
challenge is not one to which he finds it necessary to respond on any significant scale. 
His stance is, in theoretical terms, vulnerable to attack. But, as always, Heaney defends 
himself not primarily through counter-attack. He does so by attending (with all the 
implications of that verb) to the object of his devotion, poetry and poems, and by 
showing, once again, through practical demonstration that there is far more there in 
poetry – that there is indeed a there there (to alter Gertrude Stein‘s remark) – than theory 
and its often relative terms might lead us to believe. In this respect, he puts one in mind 
of Dr Johnson and his famous rebuttal, ‗I refute thee thus!‘; except that his self-appointed 
task is not refutation, but exposition and exemplification. 
 There is a sense, it must be admitted, in which Heaney simply does not square up 
to the postmodern challenge that would be concerned to demystify the notion of the 
imagination as simply one more surrogate (and thus suspect) religion. All the evidence 
suggests that Heaney believes that such religions are a necessity, and, moreover, that our 
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recourse to them is a central element in our definition of what it is to be fully human. The 
postmodernist might well subject such a conviction to irony. Heaney, again cannily, does 
not subject postmodernism to his own irony. Rather, the very way in which he proceeds 
reveals that there is an abyss between much contemporary theory and the convictions that 
have come to him as a practising poet – that each comprises, in fact, a kind of discourse 
which means that it is literally incommensurable, finding no common measure, with the 
other. This, of course, might well be considered a further contributory cause of the 
dilemma which faces the art form in the twenty-first century – but Heaney does not seem 
to deem it worthwhile to pursue the matter. 
It may well be asked, given Heaney‘s critical inheritance, what his articulation of 
poetry‘s necessity adds to those of his predecessors. The advantage of his particular 
argument, its difference, lies both in the illuminative style which Heaney brings to bear 
on the aspects of those earlier defences which he uses in his own – his very selection of 
sources, as I have tried to indicate, is testament to his critical acumen – and in his 
irresistibly persuasive, remarkably consistent demonstration of the defence as it is 
enacted in a wide variety of poems. So striking are the disclosures that this practical 
criticism offers the reader that one reads each of Heaney‘s essays with a sense of 
anticipation and, indeed, excitement; a sense that individual poems, and indeed poetry as 
an art form, are about to be not dissected, but developed in the way that a negative forms 
in a fixing solution: its details become clearer and clearer until its full reality, its being, 
soaks through the paper. A defence of Heaney‘s defence, such as this thesis is, at heart, 
would thus be incomplete without the inclusion – in practice if not in degree of 
percipience – of the kind of close reading at which Heaney excels. In my final chapter, 
therefore, I turn, with the lineaments of his argument in mind, to a selection of Heaney‘s 
own poems as exempla of his defence in practice.  
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Chapter 5 
The Defence in Practice 
 
The artist‘s idea of the artistic act, conscious or unconscious, affect[s] certain intrinsic qualities of 
the artefact. 
 
Seamus Heaney, ‗The Fire i‘ the Flint‘1 
 
I 
In none of Heaney‘s essays on the nature and purpose of poetry does he fail to 
demonstrate the ways in which the work of one or two poets exemplifies his claims on 
behalf of the art; and, as I have argued, these applications of his theory are of central 
importance to the efficacy of his defence as a whole. In this chapter, I will examine five 
of Heaney‘s own poems, dating from the start of his career to one of his more recent 
collections, and I will explore the ways in which his own writing embodies, in at times 
unexpected ways, the poetic principles he espouses in his prose. I have chosen these five 
poems because they each, in their own very specific way, reflect a particular aspect of 
Heaney‘s defence in operation. My choice has been limited in number by the length 
constraints of this thesis. I might have chosen ten, or fifteen, or twenty poems: the five 
here are, in the body of Heaney‘s work, by no means out of the ordinary in their 
enactment of his theory, and that enactment is not limited to the time span covered by my 
selection. In 2006, Heaney published his most recent collection of poems, District and 
Circle, wherein reviewers noted the presence of familiar themes and the reemphasis of 
past preoccupations, but also an awareness, on the part of the poet, of ‗new and distinctly 
contemporary dangers‘, including acts of terror and threats to the health of the planet.2 
While I have not discussed any of the poems from that collection here, it contains, as do 
his previous works, numerous instances of poetry‘s self-justifying capacity, and a sense 
of balance attained and held throughout. 
 Part of what makes Heaney‘s theory of poetry convincing is that it is, like Eliot‘s, 
‗a by-product of [his] private poetry-workshop; or a prolongation of the thinking that 
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went into the formation of [his] own verse‘.3 It should perhaps not surprise us to find, 
therefore, that in many cases his poetry demonstrates, both consciously and 
unconsciously, the attributes outlined by his theory. That said, no theory of writing, and 
certainly not Heaney‘s, is ever translated without mediation into poetry – in that case, it 
would simply be a poetic version of ‗paint-by-numbers‘ – and the task of elucidating the 
relationship between the two is not an applied science. Roger Sharrock‘s comment on 
Eliot‘s writing can be equally applied to Heaney‘s: ‗his criticism is by no means simply a 
programme for the poems he was writing ... The relation between the critic and the poet 
in [him] is a more intimate and subtle one than that between theorem and 
demonstration‘.4 As Heaney himself notes, poetry comes from the writer‘s unconscious, 
and no poet is concentrating on a theory of writing while engaged in the activity itself; his 
theory, then, is not a scaffold for his poetry, and this must be borne in mind when reading 
the ensuing chapter – which, in the interests of analysis, will be much more schematic 
than is the reality. My approach to these poems may, in some cases, seem overly 
systematic; but underlying my exegesis is also a desire to demonstrate how poems seen 
through the lens of Heaney‘s defence offer up a particularly rich testimony both of their 
own individual purposes, and the purposes of the art form itself.
5
 
There is a sense, it should be noted, in which all art accomplishes redress, and any 
successful poem is, in its way, a justification of the art form. On this very general level, 
no writer can help but be involved in a defence of poetry; as we have seen, however, 
there are subtleties in the embodiment of Heaney‘s thinking about his craft which go 
beyond the obvious. It is these that I will explore in the poems that follow. 
 
II  
Death of a Naturalist, Heaney‘s first collection of poems, contains a number of what 
remain his best-loved, most-anthologised pieces: ‗Digging‘, in which Heaney grapples 
with his place as a writer in a family of men who work the land; ‗Mid-Term Break‘, his 
account of the death of his younger brother; and the eponymous poem, one of the earliest 
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examples of Heaney‘s auditory imagination exploring ‗the warm thick slobber / of 
frogspawn‘.6 The book sets the tone, as it were, for Heaney‘s poetic career, defining him 
as a poet of agricultural and natural landscape, of home and history, and of family; and 
there is evident, throughout, an effort on the part of the poet to reconcile his writing life 
with the rural occupations of the generations of Heaney men preceding him. ‗Follower‘ is 
one such poem, an account of the boy Heaney accompanying his father as he ploughs the 
fields, and in the tautness and balance of its structure, it attains redress in a manner 
demonstrating, more than anything, the poet‘s longing to find a terrain common to his 
work as a writer and his father‘s work as a farmer. 
 
My father worked with a horse-plough, 
his shoulders globed like a full sail strung 
between the shafts and the furrow. 
The horses strained at his clicking tongue. 
 
An expert. He would set the wing 
and fit the bright steel-pointed sock. 
The sod rolled over without breaking. 
At the headrig, with a single pluck 
 
of reins, the sweating team turned round  
and back into the land. His eye 
narrowed and angled at the ground, 
mapping the furrow exactly. 
 
I stumbled in his hob-nailed wake, 
fell sometimes on the polished sod; 
sometimes he rode me on his back 
dipping and rising to his plod. 
 
I wanted to grow up and plough, 
to close one eye, stiffen my arm. 
All I ever did was follow 
in his broad shadow round the farm. 
 
I was a nuisance, tripping, falling, 
yapping always. But today 
it is my father who keeps stumbling 
behind me, and will not go away. 
7
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The opening statement of ‗Follower‘, which is immediately developed into an 
image, establishes the central themes of the poem: Heaney‘s father, and his particular 
kind of labour. There is in that first line an implicit comparison (which becomes more 
apparent as the poem progresses) between the poet, the son who clearly does not work 
with a plough, and the father who is defined, here, by that occupation. As he is wont to 
do, Heaney uses a technical vocabulary, not only to give a concrete reality to his father‘s 
ploughing, but also, it seems, because he takes pleasure in such language. Vendler has 
commented on Heaney‘s persistent desire to establish a memorial to the long-forgotten 
farmers of Ireland, something which he does in part by recording technical details such as 
these: 
 
it is immensely important to Heaney to note down those expert movements – like 
an anthropologist inventing a notation for an unrecorded dance – lest they vanish 
unregistered. So in ‗Follower‘ his father at the plough is described moment by 
moment, with a piety not only filial but generational.
8
 
     
The poem is thus constructed using the language of his father‘s agricultural domain, neat, 
precise names like ‗shaft‘, ‗sock‘ and ‗headrig‘; names which are, as Vendler suggests, 
increasingly archaic. In the second line of the poem, the act of ploughing takes on 
elements of discovery and exploration; through Heaney‘s use of ‗globed‘ and ‗full sail‘, 
his father has become an adventurer, a larger-than-life figure setting sail to cross the 
world. Later on, that nautical metaphor is extended as he measures and records in his 
mind the precise dimensions of the furrow he is ploughing. Michael Parker suggests a 
reference to the figure of Atlas in Heaney‘s use of ‗globed‘, which is fitting given the 
mythically heroic depiction of his father that dominates the surface of the poem.
9
 Inherent 
in all these images, with their epic undertone, is an element of celebration, the 
acclamation of Heaney‘s father‘s skill, which renders the poem‘s ultimate significance, as 
we will see, all the more affecting.
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 For the first three stanzas, the only human figure in the poem is Heaney‘s father; 
our focus is entirely on him, and on the way in which Heaney recreates in words the 
exertion and expertise of his ploughing. This combination of concentration and physical 
effort is crucial to Heaney‘s understanding of his father‘s labour, not least because it is a 
version of one of the binaries which, for the poet, defines his own activities: the inspired 
operations of the mind, the spirit, the subconscious, collaborate with the conscious 
exercise of craft to produce a fully empowered poem. His father‘s work, here, like the 
poet‘s, is characterised by both perspiration and precision; although at this stage in the 
poem Heaney has not yet made that link between father and son clear. The focus shifts, 
however, in the final three stanzas – from exactly halfway through the poem – to the 
young Heaney. Where the first stanza‘s opening words are ‗my father‘, the last three all 
begin with ‗I‘, and the pronouns (‗he‘, ‗his‘) and phrase (‗my father‘) referring to his 
father occur again only in the last two lines of each of these stanzas, a foreshadowing – as 
these references ‗follow‘ those to Heaney himself – of the poem‘s final revelation.  
 The fourth stanza introduces the reader to what appears to be the ‗follower‘ of the 
title – the boy Heaney, whose stumbling progress contrasts with his father‘s assured, 
booted step and, indeed, with the adult‘s confidence in all aspects of their environment. 
He trips, occasionally, on the furrowed land, the product of his father‘s meticulous 
measuring and skilful working of the plough, and the man carries the boy sometimes on 
his back. As he rides on his father‘s shoulders, Heaney is absorbed into the rhythm of his 
work, feels, and does not merely observe, the tempo and efficacy of the process. Despite 
the boy being a pest, which Heaney reemphasises in the last stanza, his father seems, in 
his willingness to support his son and keep him from tripping, not to mind the constant 
irritation of his presence. Indeed, as we come to the poem‘s final three lines, we rely on 
this image of father carrying son to balance some of the possible readings of the poem to 
which these lines give rise. There is, in Heaney‘s descriptions of himself in contrast to his 
father, a sense of ‗love and admiration‘, as King observes, but also distance, not only in 
our impression of Heaney‘s father as larger-than-life, towering above his son, but also in 
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the figurative gap between their adult occupations; the full extent of that distance 
becomes clear as the poem concludes.
10
  
 The last sentence of ‗Follower‘ gives it a depth that transforms it from descriptive 
nostalgia into an account of a far more complex relationship with the past. ‗But today‘, 
Heaney writes, ‗it is my father who keeps stumbling / behind me, and will not go away‘. 
The ‗but‘, in its traditional role here, signals a turning-point; but it is a turning-point that 
comes very late in the poem and is surprising – despite its adumbration in the shift in 
focus of the preceding few stanzas – both to the reader and, I feel, to Heaney himself. The 
description of his father, now, as his ‗follower‘ remakes the whole poem, inverting the 
picture which Heaney has spent five and a half stanzas establishing. At the most 
superficial level, we now see the title as a reference both to the boy Heaney and his 
father, followers of one another at different times in their lives, one literally, the other 
metaphorically. More profoundly, however, we reorganise the imagery of the poem in 
keeping with this new knowledge: specifically, we see the first three stanzas as an image 
of the adult Seamus Heaney working at his craft (poetry rather than ploughing) and the 
image of the boy Heaney in the last three stanzas becomes an image of his ‗stumbling‘ 
father. Heaney, as a child, followed his father as he worked the land; now, as an adult, he 
works the land of literature while followed by his father, who is as much a stranger, it 
seems, in Heaney‘s world as Heaney was in his. More specifically, the poem‘s dominant 
imagery is no longer a literal picture of the activities involved in ploughing. Instead, 
ploughing has become an image of writing. The poem is no longer simply about the 
relationship between Heaney and his father‘s craft; it is now about the relationship 
between his father and Heaney‘s craft, a craft requiring as much precision and skill as 
working with a horse-plough.  
Central to this metaphor is a notion that is, as we have seen, fundamental to 
Heaney‘s defence: that poetry is of the earth, as much a muddy, active getting-to-grips 
with the world as is farming.
11
 Both ‗self-respect and mutual respect‘ depend on this 
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notion, Christopher Ricks argues, for the poet son of a farmer.
12
 Equally embedded in 
Heaney‘s choice of metaphor is an element of what the critic Martin Seymour-Smith has 
christened Künstlerschuld, or ‗artist-guilt‘. In this case, that guilt is embodied in the 
complex, in a sense conflicted, feelings of the pen-pusher for the farmer; and it is played 
out more obviously in ‗Digging‘ when Heaney‘s father digs hard and deep below the 
young poet‘s window as he writes.13 The coexistence of these two convictions – that 
writing is as much a work, a ‗mucking in‘ to the world, as farming, and that 
simultaneously it is insufficient in comparison to working the plough – is a more intimate 
version of the conflict that Heaney identifies as existing between art and life. Here, 
however, the poet is haunted not by the world‘s suffering so much as the failure of his art 
to match the usefulness of his father‘s ‗mapping the furrow‘.14  
 ‗Follower‘, not least as a result of its symmetrical structure and neat last-minute 
inversion, accomplishes redress of various kinds in a clear and elegant manner. Until the 
final line, a first reading of the poem presents the reader with a series of realities from the 
poet‘s memories of his childhood: of his father, who farmed with great skill; of himself, 
as a boy, following his father around the fields and being a bother; of his youthful 
longing to follow figuratively in his father‘s footsteps as he matured, a longing that went, 
as the existence of the poem suggests, unfulfilled. In a subsequent reading, in light of the 
poem‘s last sentence, we find that each of these realities is ‗repaired‘, balanced, as it 
were, by their taking on a figurative layer of meaning. The heroic, adventuring image of 
Heaney‘s father at the plough is balanced against the image of him staggering, tripping 
behind his son; the agricultural skill depicted literally in that image is in turn balanced 
against its metaphorical representation of Heaney‘s skill with the pen – the unequal 
relationship implied by the title of the poem and portrayed in its descriptions is thus 
righted. Similarly, Heaney‘s clumsy, constant pursuit of his father across the fields is 
balanced against the image of his rigour and natural ability as a poet, expressed through 
the metaphor of his father at the plough; it is also repaired by the parallel image of his 
father dogging his progress. The apparent disparity between their actions at the literal 
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 Christopher Ricks, ‗Review of Death of a Naturalist‘, in Seamus Heaney, ed. M. Allen (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 1997), 22. 
13
 Martin Seymour-Smith, Guide to Modern World Literature, (London: MacMillan, 1985), xxiii. 
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 At the time of writing, Heaney‘s father was still alive, so in its original context the poem is not yet an 
elegy for him; rather, it represents a lingering struggle for the poet.  
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level is balanced by an equal disparity between their exactly reversed positions at the 
figurative level. Heaney‘s desire to inherit his father‘s lifestyle and occupation, and his 
failure to do so, are balanced against his figurative achievement of that very wish – as a 
poet, he ploughs in his own way, closing one eye and stiffening his arm as he plots each 
poem exactly.  
 The final image in the poem, of Heaney‘s father staggering behind him, is a 
troubled and troubling one. The reduction of the hero-father of the first stanzas, at home 
in his world and worthy of emulation, to a seemingly pitiful figure in the final stanza, a 
man who ‗will not go away‘ and who is as clumsy as a child in his pursuit of the poet, is 
both discomfiting and touching – and is meant to be thus. Critics tend to focus on the 
haunting, inescapable aspect of that stumbling figure: Parker compares the trailing father 
to Hamlet‘s, ‗a ghost … who can never be wholly exorcised‘, and Parini, too, asserts that 
the poet ‗cannot exorcise the father, nor will he ever‘ – though ridding himself of his 
father‘s memory is, as demonstrated by the existence of the poem itself, precisely what 
Heaney does not want to do.
15
 Even one of Heaney‘s most astute critics, Neil Corcoran, 
speaks of the poem‘s conclusion overshadowing its earlier stanzas with a feeling of 
‗distress‘ as its tone is transformed retroactively into one of ‗cruel irritation with … the 
weakness of age‘.16 Andrews describes the poem as emphasising the dual nature of this 
kind of relationship: it is both burdensome and supportive, just as Heaney and his father 
are in turn depicted as both burden of and support for the other.
17
  
In the final phrase of the poem as it stands, there is, certainly, room for a reading 
of the lines which makes them an expression of horror on the writer‘s part: his father 
lurching along behind him, refusing to be gone, is indeed a distressing image, and critics 
such as Buttel have read ‗pain and resentment‘ into the poem‘s concluding lines.18 My 
inclination not to do likewise stems from Heaney‘s description of the moment in which 
father and son are united in purpose, the moment in which the parent lifts the child and 
incorporates him into the cadence of his labour, overcoming whatever irritation he feels. 
In a figurative reading of the poem, in which Heaney is the metaphorical ‗man of action‘, 
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 Parker, 64; Jay Parini, ‗The Ground Possessed‘, 100.  
16
 Corcoran, 10-11. 
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this gesture then becomes evidence that the poet Heaney is not wholly dismayed by the 
lingering presence of his father at his back; it becomes a gesture of respect, of affection, 
towards the spirit of his father. That spirit is also representative of the poet‘s origins, his 
rural beginnings, a background which is inescapable to the mature Heaney – he is being 
followed, in the figure of his father, by a whole way of life that is, as it were, asking him 
to memorialise it.
19
 The presence of his father trailing behind him as he writes, therefore, 
works as an image of Heaney‘s complex relationship with the past and his inability to 
shake off that past, whether he would desire to or not; his figurative embracing of his 
history, his integration of it into the very meters of his poetry, their dip and rise, suggests 
what Robert Fitzgerald as well as Vendler have termed his ‗piety‘ toward his childhood 
way of life.
20
 The poem itself becomes an instance of Heaney lifting his father, lifting his 
pastoral origins, onto his back, and carrying them for the duration of six stanzas. 
 Those origins have, doubtless, influenced one of the ways in which Heaney 
conceives of the work of poetry in his essays: as an earthly, dirty, hands-on process, the 
work of a manual labourer, a farmer, a peasant. It is not surprising, therefore, that we 
should find a similar conception reflected in his poetry; in ‗Follower‘, working with a 
horse-plough becomes an image of the creative act, and the precision of that work 
becomes, likewise, a reflection of the painstaking operations of the poet at his desk. 
Those operations are evident not only in Heaney‘s description of them, but also in the 
grace and exactitude of the poem‘s own structure and form, its effortless demonstration 
of the potential for poetry to operate on two planes at once. ‗Follower‘ is, therefore, a 
restoration not only of an outdated way of life, but also of poetry as an art form, an 
exercise of phonetic and semantic harmony. As King remarks, there is a direct link 
between the agricultural skill of his father and the traditional, regular rhyme and meter of 
Heaney‘s poem; the connection that remains between Heaney and his father, and which is 
evident to the reader, is ‗a sense of craft‘.21 
 The poem is written in tetrameter, and Heaney varies the syllable count here and 
there with an extra syllable. The execution of his abab rhyme scheme is indicative of his 
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preference for slant rhymes – ‗sock / pluck‘, ‗eye / exactly‘, ‗plough / follow‘ – but every 
stanza has one exact rhyme and one slant rhyme. Thus the rhyme itself mimics the 
poem‘s content, the picture of a strong, precise figure interacting with a weaker, clumsier 
one. The sounds of the poem are equally connected with its sense: we see the hard glint 
of the light and feel the sharp-tipped implement in the high, tense vowels and spiked 
stops of ‗bright steel-pointed sock‘; we feel the ‗sod‘ loosen and turn as it ‗roll[s] over‘, 
as its monophthong moves into two rolling diphthongs. Similarly, our mouths and ears 
dip and rise with Heaney and his father as the diphthong in ‗rising‘ swoops upwards. 
Roland Mathias has described well the way in which the poem‘s development of meaning 
is intertwined with its sounds and rhythms: 
 
while the picture of the poet‘s father is put together in the sharp, metallic-
sounding manner that the chink and click of the process suggest to the ear, the 
control implicit in this weakens as the poet depicts his own failure ever to achieve 
the rhythm intrinsic to this ‗mistery‘. At the end of the poem, it is the father-son 
relationship, reversed, that holds the composition together, and the echoes are no 
longer the echoes of a set and understood rhythm, but of ‗stumbling‘ …22 
 
The implications of coherence, of structure and control, in the opening stanzas, are 
heightened by the fact that we hear those high, mechanical sounds above a basso 
continuo of low vowels that draw them unavoidably to the ground, to the soil that is dug 
and turned. The guttural vowel of ‗strung‘, which dips the word earthwards, is heard with 
each rhythmic turn of the stanza, of the plough, in ‗tongue‘, ‗pluck‘, and twice as 
‗furrow‘ is repeated, and it takes a rounder but no less evocative shape in ‗sock‘ and 
‗sod‘. Thus the machinery of the plough makes contact with the ground in a pattern of 
alternating high and low vowel articulations, and the mastery which Heaney sees in his 
father – a mastery embodied in the smooth motions of the plough and their consistent 
results – is mimicked by the predictable rise and fall of the tongue in the mouth. 
The poem‘s other major achievement in relation to the craft as a whole is in its 
flawless demonstration of what Heaney terms, in The Government of the Tongue, ‗an 
experience of release‘, that moment, as the poem reaches its culmination, in which a new 
plane of regard is established, one which frees poet and reader alike from their 
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dilemmas.
23
 I have already described the effects of the moment when we read the final 
three lines, the way in which the entire poem is reshaped, in which roles are inverted by 
the transformation of the literal into the figurative. In reality, that opening of a new set of 
meanings for the poem occurs in a fleeting instant as our reading of the poem ends, and 
the roles of father and son are transposed. In that moment, Heaney lifts us to that new 
plane, a plane quite distinct from the reality he has described – a reversal of it, in fact – 
and one in which the predicaments of the poet, shared at this stage by the reader, release 
him into a place where, as Heaney puts it elsewhere, there is redemption.
24
 In this case, 
there is redemption of father and son, of a particularly rural way of life, and of the poem 
as a whole, redemption accomplished not least through the action of redress in its first, 
world-balancing sense. 
 I also suggested above that Heaney himself is surprised, as poet, by the final three 
lines of the poem – meaning not that he did not craft them as carefully as the rest of the 
poem, but that his tone has a touch of bewilderment about it, and that that bewilderment 
is ingenuous. Certainly it is at this moment in the poem that we see poetry‘s ability to 
redirect our attention, our preconceptions, in operation. Its overall significance, and our 
comfortable assumptions about its title and themes, veer off the course plotted by the 
plough; Heaney has created a diversion on which the entire poem pivots, drawing our 
attention right back to the title, to the beginning of the poem‘s furrow, overturning our 
assumptions along the way as he maps a whole new field of meaning.  
 
III  
The achievement of redress in Heaney‘s poetry is not always – is, in fact, rarely – as 
overt as it is in ‗Follower‘, whose final stanza deliberately upends the poem‘s meaning 
and thus counterbalances it. Frequently, that function is performed so subtly, so 
discreetly, that the reader hardly notices that redress has been accomplished even as he or 
she is satisfied, consoled, by a sense of rightness and equilibrium as a poem concludes. In 
a little known, rarely anthologised poem from his 1972 collection, Wintering Out, 
Heaney enacts the vocal agility Vendler describes when she remarks that his ‗voice, by 
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turns mythological and journalistic, rural and sophisticated, reminiscent and impatient, 
stern and yielding, curt and expansive, is one of a suppleness almost equal to 
consciousness itself‘.25 In ‗Limbo‘, through a hardly noticeable shift in voice, he brings 
an irresolvable predicament to a point of purely poetic resolution; and he does so by 
creating, as it were, an alternative consciousness for the reader. 
‗Limbo‘, as Neil Corcoran points out, receives very little critical attention in 
studies of Heaney‘s work; its narrative, of an unwed, Irish Catholic mother who drowns 
her newborn infant, perhaps does not engage Heaney‘s typical critics as much as his more 
obvious, more unambiguous comments on Irish politics and society.
26
 Whatever the 
reason, it is a poem that goes generally unnoticed by commentators, and thus the 
exquisite manner in which it resolves, and the efficiency, the economy of language with 
which that conclusion is reached, are largely unremarked. It epitomises, in my view, 
however, the redressal provided by poetry, and it does so all the more convincingly for 
the unobtrusive elegance with which its argument is made.  
 
Fishermen at Ballyshannon 
  netted an infant last night 
  along with the salmon. 
  An illegitimate spawning, 
 
  a small one thrown back  
to the waters. But I‘m sure 
as she stood in the shallows 
ducking him tenderly 
 
till the frozen knobs of her wrists 
were dead as the gravel, 
he was a minnow with hooks  
  tearing her open. 
 
  She waded in under  
  the sign of her cross. 
  He was hauled in with the fish. 
  Now limbo will be 
 
  a cold glitter of souls 
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  through some far briny zone. 
  Even Christ‘s palms, unhealed, 
  smart and cannot fish there.
27
 
 
The title and the opening line of ‗Limbo‘ introduce the two figurative components that 
will dominate the poem throughout: the religious, and the piscatory. There is, of course, a 
connection between those two domains in biblical tradition: Christ‘s disciples were 
chosen from among fishermen, and more obviously, more distressingly present is Christ‘s 
commission to those disciples to become ‗fishers of men‘. Here, the fishermen of 
Ballyshannon are, quite literally, catchers of a human being, the body of a drowned infant 
pulled in with the fish; a child whose discovery in the trawler nets gives Heaney the 
literal, and finally figurative platform he needs in order to give the poem closure. 
The opening statement of the poem seems to be one of fact: we imagine that 
Heaney has read this item in a newspaper, perhaps in the very words that constitute the 
first three lines of the poem. An element of what could be poetic interpretation emerges 
as he refers to the child‘s illegitimacy in the first of three images comparing him to a fish, 
in this case one too small to be caught, and hence tossed back into the ocean. It is not the 
fishermen, however, who have rejected this infant; rather, it is his own mother, a woman 
who, Heaney suggests, has borne him out of wedlock. She is Catholic – that much is clear 
from the title of the poem – and we assume, too, perhaps, that the fishing village in which 
she lives is small, pious, ready to pass judgment. Her act, in Heaney‘s poem, becomes 
one of desperation: for herself and her reputation, perhaps also her livelihood, and, by 
implication, the future of the child she drowns; and the poem reveals to us, through 
careful, restrained empathy, how painful, how difficult, the mother‘s action is for her. 
Heaney allows her, as she drowns her child, more than a single dimension, more than a 
role confined to that of agent of death, which would be her fate in a newspaper editorial. 
She dips her child gently into the ocean, maternally, in an action poignantly, ironically, 
reminiscent of baptism. We feel the cold of her wrists in the icy water, and by extension 
the necessary ‗icing over‘ of her heart, her affective life; and the child she finally leaves 
to be washed out with the tide wounds her, hurts her, with every downward thrust of her 
arms. These descriptions depict her – contrary to Tobin‘s assertion that ‗her natural 
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motherly instinct‘ has been lost to her – as suffering precisely because her maternal 
feelings persist.
28
 The agony of her decision, its impossible pull on her heart, is further 
emphasised by the parallel descriptions of mother and child in the penultimate stanza: she 
‗wades‘ into the water, pushing against the tide that washes towards the shore, that would 
wash her away from the place in which she will drown her baby; he is ‗hauled‘ in by the 
fishermen, dragged from an element in which he was never meant to find himself into 
one in which he can no longer exist. 
Heaney thus amends our tendency to condemn the mother, automatically, as cruel 
and inhuman, as inherently unlike ourselves, by forcing us to view her as human, as 
sentient, within the confines of her deed. This last point is of particular importance, 
because Heaney‘s treatment of that deed is a signal instance of the imagination‘s 
coordinates matching those of the real circumstances. Heaney doesn‘t create for the girl 
(and in my reading she is just that) an existence beyond the moment in which she drowns 
her infant. He takes the instant in which we imagine her, the only moment in which we 
feel able to lay claim to any knowledge of her, and he redresses the imbalances of our 
judgement and attention in that instant, within its field of gravity, if you like. The only 
detail with a referent external to that moment is the assertion that she entered the water 
‗under / the sign of her cross‘, a statement which acts as further reparation by 
foregrounding the reason, in a sense, for the infanticide; that cross represents both the 
Christian moral code that the girl feels is forcing her to conceal the proof of her sin, and 
also the judgment that awaits her if she fails to do so. Heaney‘s reminder of those beliefs, 
of the community mores that govern the mother‘s behaviour, only fixes the coordinates of 
the event more exactly in reality. 
The poem‘s final image is simultaneously an acknowledgement of the irresolvable 
nature of the situation Heaney has described, and, paradoxically, a resolution, I would 
argue, a poetic redemption of that situation. Limbo, the place to which, according to 
Catholic dogma (until recently), dead unbaptised infants were sent, is compared with the 
sea.
29
 Christ is rendered as a fisherman, but one who, having been crucified, has wounds 
in his palms that prevent him from reaching into the ‗cold glitter of souls‘ – like a shoal 
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of fish beneath the water – in the salty expanse that is limbo.30 The giver of the great 
commission to be fishers of men, Christ himself, can do nothing to save the children in 
that place; even his sacrifice, finally, is inadequate, and despite his being the 
personification of love, there is still, in his creation, ‗a region of absolute indifference‘.31 
God‘s own hands, and those of the poet himself, are rendered ineffectual by the numb, 
bony wrists of the mother holding her child underwater. This, then, is the poem‘s final 
emphasis, and it is one which lends it an almost unbearable pathos as it concludes. 
 The remarkable manner in which Heaney achieves poetic redress here is easily 
overlooked, so subtly, yet so fully, does he transform reality in these twenty lines. While 
never losing sight of the tangible horror of the drowned infant – indeed, it is within the 
current of that tragedy that the poem moves from start to finish – Heaney alters our 
perception of it in a number of unexpected ways. Not least among these is his persistence 
in bringing to our attention the role of religion in the mother‘s act. The drowning of a 
newborn baby is an action that should exclude the transcendent completely; it is 
transcendent only in the sense that it is something beyond redemption, and beyond the 
forgiveness that even religion promises, just as limbo itself is the realm of the 
unredeemed. The murder of a child – by anyone, but most of all by his own parent – is an 
act always unmitigated. Heaney, however, highlights the contradiction underlying the 
mother‘s deed, the inescapable presence, in his view, of the transcendent in this most 
sordid of circumstances; the entire poem, as I have said, is couched in biblically allusive 
terms, from the very first line. ‗Limbo‘ therefore redresses our refusal to consider factors 
that might moderate the repugnance, the unforgivable nature of the act, and, crucially, it 
redresses our tendency to exclude the transcendent except where it brings resolution. The 
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presence of Christ, Heaney implies, does not always equate with consolation and relief, 
or with judgment and punishment. Heaven and hell are not, it seems, the only domains of 
the spiritual; and it is the unsettling effect of this knowledge, of the idea of limbo itself, 
that Heaney counterweighs with his closing image.  
The total efficacy of that image depends on the way in which Heaney develops 
the poem‘s ‗argument‘, an argument which moves continually, as does the language of 
the poem, towards a plane of regard that is wholly poetic, and yet unbreakably anchored 
in the actual. Heaney begins the poem with a statement which, as I have said, we accept 
as fact; he then immediately suggests that the drowned child is illegitimate, and has been 
discarded, as it were, as a result – a suggestion which, given the circumstances of the 
mother as we have already been able to deduce them, seems reasonable. Halfway through 
the second stanza, Heaney shifts our position as readers ever-so-slightly; the ‗detached, 
journalistic account of events‘, as Vendler describes it, gives way to the voice of the 
imagination – ‗but I‘m sure‘, he writes, she must have suffered, too.32 We hardly notice 
this shift, this small movement into poetry, and by the beginning of the fifth stanza and 
Heaney‘s next sentence, ‗I‘m sure‘ has been forgotten and we are beginning to read 
Heaney‘s imagined account of the scene as truth. In part, this is because his statements 
make good sense: the girl‘s inability to avoid this decision, as she makes it under the 
shadow of her faith, speaks once more to our assumptions about the community in which 
she lives. ‗He was hauled in with the fish‘ is a restatement of the opening assertion of the 
poem, and we know this to be fact. And on the strength of these carefully guided 
remarks, Heaney moves us at last right out of ‗factual‘ reality and into a logic that is 
purely poetic; that is, a logic and a resolution which exist only within this poem.  
In his closing lines, Heaney offers an explanation for the fact that Christ cannot 
remove infants from limbo, and this resolution depends wholly on Heaney‘s image of 
limbo as seawater, as salty; it is, in other words, a reconciliation that takes place entirely 
through poetry itself. Christ, with his palms unhealed from the crucifixion, cannot reach 
into that saliferous place, because his wounds sting; and by this stage in the poem, we are 
ready to accept that argument. Heaney has drawn us from the reality of the situation, 
from the labyrinth of the actual event, into an alternate reality, a transcendent one, in 
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which we see and experience the twists and turns of this mother‘s impossible maze, but 
do so from a higher plane of regard. In the moment in which we are completely 
convinced by the poem‘s own reality, in which we set down on that new plane, the poet 
offers a kind of poetically rational resolution. Emotionally, outside of this logic, 
resolution is impossible, limbo is inexplicable, and this is the power of Heaney‘s poem: it 
is about those things which cannot be redressed, not least in poetry. Limbo is a place, as 
Andrews describes it, ‗beyond redemption, beyond the available languages which could 
make it comprehensible‘– and yet, as becomes clear, the poem redresses even in 
providing us with a due and fitting image of that which cannot be redressed.
33
  
‗Limbo‘ is an example of Heaney‘s craft at its best; it is a relatively short poem – 
five stanzas of four lines, each three or four feet long – and its language is precisely 
calibrated to its purpose. In its clean, short lines we find what the art critic Peter Fuller 
calls ‗redemption through form‘, a kind of salvation available through the aesthetic 
shaping of a moment, in this case a moment that seems to defy language and form, into 
something tangible, something crafted and moulded.
34
 The sensation of this poem is 
nothing so much as that of the freezing seawater in which mother and child find 
themselves; the distance, the repellent chill of the scene – even as it is rendered with 
profound pity – evokes limbo long before Heaney has presented his final image to the 
reader. Part of what enables Heaney to achieve this sense of coldness and loneliness is the 
subtlety of the phonic devices that he uses. The tides, the wash of seawater against the 
side of the fishing-boat, are echoed in the alternating ‗sh‘ and nasal sounds of the opening 
line – ‗Fishermen at Ballyshannon‘ – and that soft swash is overlaid, in the next line, by 
an insistent stutter, like a sudden increase in heartbeat – ‗netted an infant last night‘. 
There are slant rhymes in places, over, for example ‗Ballyshannon‘ / ‗salmon‘ and ‗souls‘ 
/ ‗zone‘; but Heaney‘s use of auditory devices is matched exactly with the tone and 
content of the poem as a whole, and achieves the necessary level of poetic cohesion 
without becoming excessive or inappropriately lavish. There is a silence about the 
mother‘s act of drowning her child during the night, a silence transposed into the image 
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of the mother‘s wrists being ‗dead as the gravel‘. We do not hear the child whimper, or 
the mother weep; we hear nothing more, perhaps, than the water lapping against them. 
 
IV  
Between 1972 and 1975, Seamus Heaney lived in Glanmore, County Wicklow, earning 
money as a freelance writer while concentrating on his poetry. This move, as Rachel 
Buxton suggests, was significant for Heaney as both writer and Irishman, as it brought 
unavoidable focus – his own and that of others – to the tension between his political, 
communal obligations and his artistic ones.
35
 These years resulted in North, one of his 
best-known collections, which includes his famous ‗bog poems‘ – ‗Bog Queen‘, ‗The 
Grauballe Man‘ and ‗Punishment‘ to name a few – and the six-poem sequence ‗Singing 
School‘. 
 The title ‗Singing School‘ is a Yeatsian phrase, and Heaney signals this by using, 
as his second epigraph, a passage from Yeats‘ Autobiographies in which the latter 
describes experiencing ‗the pleasure of rhyme‘ for the first time, reading ‗a book of 
Orange rhymes‘.36 Acutely aware of Heaney‘s Roman Catholicism and his resulting 
political position – the other poems in North have brought these to our attention 
repeatedly – we are confronted with a moment in the young, Protestant Yeats‘ life in 
which he dreams of ‗fighting the Fenians‘. Undercutting this political schism between the 
poets are the implications of the title, ‗Singing School‘, which Yeats uses with reference 
to his influential predecessors, the poets who have been his ‗singing-masters‘; by quoting 
Yeats and his delight in rhyme under this title, Heaney appropriates the reference and 
acknowledges Yeats as one of his singing-masters, while reminding us of their opposing 
political views.
37
 In this choice of epigraph, Heaney establishes the tension between 
political and artistic fealty that defines ‗Singing School‘ and reaches its conflicted 
conclusion in the final poem of the sequence, ‗Exposure‘. 
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 ‗Singing School‘ is about violence, and terror, and the place of poetry within a 
context described by Heaney in its first poem as ruled by ‗the ministry of fear‘.38 Its first 
two poems are about the boy Heaney, first at boarding-school at St Columb‘s College, 
with a view of Bogside, the site of Bloody Sunday, and secondly at home with his father 
when ‗A Constable Calls‘ to record ‗tillage returns‘.39 The constable is Protestant, or so 
we assume, as he is a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and armed with a 
revolver. The young Heaney is transfixed by ‗the polished holster‘ on his hip, filled with 
dread and guilt during what should be a mundane agricultural exercise. The third poem in 
the sequence, ‗Orange Drums, Tyrone, 1966‘, is a short poem marked, too, by a sense of 
fear, here induced by the sound of drums at a Protestant parade, whose ‗battered signature 
subscribes ―No Pope‖‘.40 ‗Summer 1969‘, finds Heaney in Spain while the unrest in 
Ireland continues unabated. Everywhere around him in Madrid, Heaney senses home, and 
senses death: ‗stinks from the fishmarket‘ are like ‗the reek off a flax-dam‘, and the 
Spanish Guardia‘s ‗patent leather … gleam[s] like fish-bellies in flax-poisoned waters‘. 
His guilt here, the guilt now of an adult and a poet, is profound, and felt most powerfully 
as he sits before Goya‘s paintings in the Prado. The painter did what Heaney feels ever 
more pressured to do, but finds he cannot: ‗he painted with his fists and elbows, 
flourished / the stained cape of his heart as history charged‘. 
‗Fosterage‘, the penultimate poem in the sequence, recounts Heaney‘s meeting in 
1962 with the Irish novelist Michael McLaverty and the advice of the older writer to 
Heaney – ‗Go your own way. / Do your own work.‘. This, then, is what Heaney does, 
feeling ‗words / imposing on [his] tongue like obols‘, feeling his responsibility to 
language and poetry outweighing, in this moment, the political responsibility and anxiety 
that has plagued him throughout ‗Singing School‘. ‗Exposure‘, finally, the only poem to 
be written in the present tense, brings us to Heaney at the time of writing in 1975. It is 
one of Heaney‘s most famous poems, ‗a finely rueful self-portrait of the poet‘, as Bloom 
describes it, as he considers his vocation, his isolation, and the question of the artist‘s 
responsibility.
41
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As a result of these predominant themes, ‗Exposure‘ is particularly interesting to 
consider in light of Heaney‘s defence of poetry, a defence motivated primarily by the 
charge brought against the art form by those for whom political considerations are 
uppermost. This poem from North deals with the question of political and poetic duty 
more saliently than any of Heaney‘s other poems, and as such it becomes an enactment in 
verse of the struggle to which Heaney bears witness in his prose writing. There is an 
important difference, and a perhaps unsurprising one, between the nature of that conflict 
in its prose and poetic forms. In his essays, as we have seen, while Heaney acknowledges 
consistently the difficulty of being a poet in a politically-defined society such as Ireland, 
he is concerned above all to argue that poetry itself overcomes those difficulties, defeats 
the oppositions which govern our daily lives. In ‗Exposure‘, however, we see the 
challenges inherent in translating that argument into practice. Heaney has a much harder 
time of it here than in his essays, and he acknowledges, implicitly, that there are, 
ultimately, certain values that cannot be reconciled, even when the underlying melodies 
of the poem reach after a form of resolution. ‗Exposure‘ underscores the fact, so well 
known in reality, whether in politics or poetry, that there is no easy translation of theory 
into practice; indeed, quite the contrary. At the same time, however, it illustrates the truth 
of Heaney‘s defence on one central point: namely, poetry‘s capacity not only to hold in 
one space two opposing forces, but also to offer reconciliation of those forces in an 
auditory, an inherently poetic manner, even as they remain irreconcilable in reality.  
Anguish, the key-note of ‗Exposure‘, is not a characteristic tone in either 
Heaney‘s poetry or prose, and, in fact, the sorts of emotions that govern the poem are not 
really his métier at all. The preceding poems in ‗Singing School‘ establish Heaney‘s guilt 
surrounding his political and poetic choices, and ‗Exposure‘ shows us the poet at the very 
moment when he most lacks confidence in himself, his art and his politics; he is displaced 
not only emotionally and spiritually, but also physically in his self-imposed exile in 
County Wicklow. The poem embodies writing, Seamus Deane argues, as both ‗a form of 
guilt and a form of expiation from it‘, which is perhaps one way of describing the 
coexistence of musical resolution and actual irresolution.
42
 Heaney has his back to the 
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wall here in a way which is rare in his work; but in rendering poetically such an 
unavoidably conflicted situation, he manifests the Keatsian notion of ‗negative 
capability‘ – the capability of some  (primarily, according to the Romantic poet, great 
writers) to flourish in the midst of uncertainty, to accept that there are irreconcilable 
difficulties in life.
43
 His ability to do so in a manner that constitutes, perhaps, the only 
possible form of reconciliation available in such cases is testament both to his skill as a 
poet and to the strength of his defence. It is with the latter in mind that we turn, then, to 
the poem itself: 
 
  It is December in Wicklow: 
alders dripping, birches 
inheriting the last light, 
the ash tree cold to look at. 
 
A comet that was lost 
should be visible at sunset, 
those million tons of light 
like a glimmer of haws and rose-hips, 
 
and I sometimes see a falling star. 
If I could come on meteorite! 
Instead I walk through damp leaves, 
husks, the spent flukes of autumn, 
 
imagining a hero 
on some muddy compound, 
his gift like a slingstone 
whirled for the desperate. 
 
How did I end up like this? 
I often think of my friends‘ 
beautiful prismatic counselling 
and the anvil brains of some who hate me 
 
as I sit weighing and weighing 
my responsible tristia. 
For what? For the ear? For the people? 
For what is said behind-backs? 
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Rain comes down through the alders, 
its low conducive voices 
mutter about let-downs and erosions 
and yet each drop recalls 
 
 
the diamond absolutes. 
I am neither internee nor informer; 
an inner émigré, grown long-haired 
and thoughtful; a wood-kerne 
 
escaped from the massacre, 
taking protective colouring 
from bole and bark, feeling 
every wind that blows; 
 
who, blowing up these sparks 
in their meagre heat, have missed 
the once-in-a-lifetime portent, 
the comet‘s pulsing rose.44 
 
Like ‗Singing School‘ as a whole, ‗Exposure‘ deals, as I have said, with the poet‘s 
relationship to politics; but, unlike the preceding poems, it is set in a place empty of other 
people and of obvious political reference.  The poem‘s title has numerous possible 
references: it refers to the revelation of the comet Kohoutek as well as to the poet‘s 
presence in an unprotected rural environment;
45
 to Heaney‘s own raw self-exposure in the 
poem; to the involuntary exposure to the ‗anvil brains‘ of his enemies and the media that 
he feels he is suffering as a writer, and particularly as an Irish writer.
46
 Heaney is out 
walking in Wicklow, waiting to see a comet which will appear as the sun sets. The poem 
begins with both a sense of conclusion – it is the end of the year and it is winter – and one 
of isolation. Heaney‘s only companions are the trees, wet alders, pale birches whose bark 
is aglow in the last of the sunlight, and an ash tree to which Heaney transfers the epithet 
‗cold‘. The significance of the comet in this setting is more than that of a passing beauty: 
in an environment characterised by cold and barrenness, ‗those million tons of light‘ will 
appear to the watching poet as ‗a glimmer of haws and rose-hips‘, an image of fruit, of 
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life and growth, the only hint of such possibility in this place. Even the shooting stars that 
he sees from time to time are an image of death, of ending, although one which inspires 
in him a longing to ‗come on meteorite‘, thereby breaking free of his current situation.  
The first word of the next line, however, brings both poet and reader back down 
to earth after the exclamation of that desire for freedom and distance: ‗instead‘ of on 
meteorite, his feet move among soggy fallen leaves, an autumnal graveyard characterised 
by emptiness and desolation. The extent and aptness of Heaney‘s use of natural imagery 
in ‗Exposure‘ are frequently noted by critics of the poem. Waterman, for example, praises 
the way in which it ‗so felicitously makes natural landscape luminously symbolic of 
complex concepts and issues‘ – this is no run-of-the-mill pathetic fallacy.47 Heaney‘s 
description of the fallen leaves and husks as autumn‘s ‗spent flukes‘ is the first of a series 
of images related to violence, each of which is heavy with symbolism. Here, he walks in 
the aftermath of a battle, among used and discarded arrowheads; even the peaceful 
country setting in which he now lives is tainted with his inner struggle, seen in its terms. 
Underlying this meaning of ‗fluke‘ is another, namely ‗a stroke of luck‘, and thus there is 
also a sense of missed opportunity in the line, which foreshadows the poem‘s conclusion. 
 Heaney seeks to escape imaginatively – once again – from the pall of his 
surroundings by conjuring the poem‘s second violent image, a biblical allusion, in one 
reading, to David and Goliath: he is  
 
  imagining a hero 
  on some muddy compound 
  his gift like a slingstone 
  whirled for the desperate. 
 
The hero Heaney imagines here is himself, in the mud of this Wicklow forest, and his gift 
is his poetry; Parker suggests, too, that the reference to a ‗compound‘ brings to mind the 
suffering of political prisoners (such as Heaney is in an entirely figurative sense), or, in 
retrospective readings, Osip Mandelstam, who features more obviously in later stanzas.
48
 
The poet longs for his writing, indeed, for his life, to achieve resolution and victory as 
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simply and decisively as a stone striking the enemy‘s temple; in this isolated place, 
however, poetry seems to lack significance, and its force is never as straightforward as a 
physical equivalent. In comparison with a poem like ‗Follower‘, ‗Exposure‘, Edna 
Longley argues, ‗falls a long way short of identifying the artist with the man of action‘; 
the image of a hero creates a contrast between writer and warrior rather than convincingly 
establishing their likeness.
49
 That, one might argue, is, however, only one kind of action, 
and in the achievement of the poem itself, Heaney produces an instance of another type 
of action, of accomplishment, altogether; one which is, if we take his defence into 
account in a reading of the poem, finally more effective than the action he describes – 
albeit for the purposes of metaphor – in ‗Exposure‘. Within the confines of this image, 
however, Longley‘s reading is correct: without the certainty of his beliefs as later 
expressed in prose, the writer cannot see how poetic activity can fulfil his responsibility 
to the helpless and undefended. He cannot believe, no matter how much he might desire 
to, that poetry can be as efficacious as the decisive, violent, political gesture of David. 
 Heaney‘s frustrated desires – to ride a shooting star and thus be removed from the 
gravitational pull of his circumstances, to use his talent as he might a weapon – give way 
at the start of the fifth stanza to the anguish that has been building from the first line of 
the poem. ‗How did I end up like this?‘, he asks; how has he reached this unendurable 
position in spite of the counsel of his friends? Heaney depicts the advice of his associates 
as lucid and well-defined, composed of the clear planes and angles of a prism, refracting 
life into its complete spectrum of colours. Yet in this description of the advice as 
something purely visual, there is a sense, too, of distance; such counsel fails to help the 
poet, remaining a scheme, a plan, to which he is an audience, an observer, but in which 
he is not a participant. Of more help to Heaney are the ‗low conducive voices‘ of the rain, 
two stanzas further. At this point, however, he is concerned equally with the seductive 
advice of his friends and with the criticism of his enemies. The two images he uses to 
depict these parties are wholly opposed to one another: the heavy, unyielding, iron ‗anvil 
brains‘ of his detractors and the nuanced, complex spectra of his friends‘ ‗prismatic 
counselling‘. It is the latter that Seamus Deane identifies as responsible for the ‗missed 
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visionary opportunity‘ in the poem: ‗the rational or rationalising explanations of his 
friends, attempting to account for the political crisis and for Heaney‘s … role within it‘ 
distract the poet from the vision that concludes the poem. I would argue that Heaney‘s 
glance away from the comet in the final stanza is not the consequence of oversight, of a 
momentary lapse of attention, but of a decision the agony of which he experiences 
throughout the poem.
50
 The conflict between the voices of colleagues and those of his 
enemies is used to characterise, rather, Heaney‘s internal conflict as he contemplates, 
assesses, his obligations as man and as poet – his tristia – though neither chorus presents 
him with a solution.  
 ‗Tristia‘ is the title poem of a collection by Osip Mandelstam, in the preface to his 
translation of which Bruce McLelland explains the poet‘s choice of title and its meaning: 
 
Tristia – ‗sad things‘, ‗sorrows‘ – is the condition of these poems not because of 
some personal ego loss … The sadness of Mandelstam … is the sadness of the 
alienated true poet, the one who has mastered language and its powers only to 
discover that his voice has not been heard above the rush of history's wave … 
These are not ‗sad‘ poems, as a whole … But collectively, they convey the pain of 
an isolation caused by the maintenance of absolute integrity …51 
 
This is the isolation Heaney feels in ‗Exposure‘; and the sorrow, the burden of 
responsibility to more than one party that makes such isolation unavoidable, natural even, 
baffles him here, even as he recognises the necessity of that isolation to his poetry.
52
 For 
what final cause, he demands, is he suffering, is he responsible – poetry, politics, or to 
quell the judgments of those who hate him? Their sniping, gossipy criticism shifts the 
scales in the weighing of that responsibility; even at this remove he is not immune to their 
depiction of him, and he cannot measure the degree to which he should submit himself to 
the downward pull, the impossible pressure of those people and their opinions. He, like 
Mandelstam, wants to retain an ‗absolute integrity‘ in his poetry and in his humanity; in 
‗Exposure‘, he cannot see how the two can be synonymous, cannot yet conceive of a 
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poetic integrity that will answer fully enough to the range of obligations he feels.
53
 These 
questions are those with which, of course, Heaney deals so eloquently, ten years later, in 
The Government of the Tongue. He is caught here between his loyalties to song and 
suffering: is his ‗responsibility to sound rather than to the state‘, as he puts it in that prose 
collection?
54
 By the time Heaney publishes those essays, his questions have been 
answered; they are asked in ‗Exposure‘, however, with fresh agony and uncertainty. 
 Then, in the seventh stanza of the poem, Heaney takes a step back from his tristia, 
from the pitch of his distress, to describe how 
 
  Rain comes down through the alders, 
  its low conducive voices 
  mutter about let-downs and erosions 
  and yet each drop recalls 
 
  the diamond absolutes. 
 
The sound of the rain contrasts with the presumably fine-sounding advice of the poet‘s 
peers, which, though lovely, is not helpful. In the rain falling through the trees, Heaney 
finds a kind of forthrightness that he admires: even as the raindrops acknowledge, 
perhaps even predict, difficulty and disappointment, they are reminiscent of the purity, 
the structure, the unyielding sureness of diamonds. There is a pun at work here in 
Heaney‘s use of ‗let-downs and erosions‘: the sound he hears is that of the drops falling 
through the tree branches, and as they wash into the ground they will erode it; those same 
movements also symbolise the failures and disintegrations of Heaney‘s life. Where the 
raindrops, however, in their shape and substance, are reminiscent of something 
unwavering and untainted, Heaney himself struggles to lay claim to such certainties. The 
rain (like Goya in the earlier poem from ‗Singing School‘) accomplishes what Heaney 
cannot: recognition of the deterioration and confusion that are part of living, as well as an 
ability to retain a sense of what is unchanging and uncompromising. Each raindrop 
embodies unproblematically a binary – disintegration and wholeness – which Heaney 
himself finds it impossible to attain; given what he has experienced of politics at its most 
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destructive, he cannot see that poetry might offer a coherence, a unity, adequate to the 
worst of life‘s chaos. 
 The contrast between Heaney and the diamond-sharp clarity of the rain is 
heightened by the way in which he goes on to describe himself, as existing in an in-
between place that is a no-place: he is neither one thing nor another, and he is neither 
here nor there, slipping between trees, between identities. It is in this no-man‘s-land, 
however, that Heaney begins, in a small way, to find his direction, suggested by his use 
of the verb ‗to be‘ in the second line of the eighth stanza – the only instance of it here in 
relation to the speaker. With its position in the line giving it added emphasis, and in light 
of the struggle for self that has been taking place, that ‗I am‘ becomes an echo, however 
faint, of God‘s own ‗I am‘, the original and omnipotent declaration of independent being. 
The best Heaney can manage at this point is to declare what he is not, but that assertion 
begins to delimit, by necessity, what he is and what he values; the incipient certainty in 
these lines (a certainty that does not find completion in the poem) is evident in the 
persistent push of the nasals in ‗I am neither internee nor informer; / an inner émigré‘.  
His loyalty is not to politics in whatever form, or to religion, or to society. He has a third 
loyalty, and ‗Exposure‘ serves, in a sense, as his own declaration of independence, his 
statement of allegiance to another possibility – namely, what Paz calls ‗the other voice‘, 
poetry itself in its position ‗between revolution and religion‘.55  
Heaney has not pledged fidelity to a cause at any cost, and neither has he betrayed 
one. Rather, he has turned inwards, towards that other voice, thus distancing himself from 
the political conflict around him. Like Osip Mandelstam, he is ‗within the state yet 
removed from it‘, and the extent of that withdrawal is demonstrated in his external 
changes: he becomes scruffy and preoccupied, creating a sense of time passing without 
his intervention or involvement.
56
 In an interview with George Morgan, Heaney has 
described the sense in which he uses the phrase ‗inner émigré‘ here: 
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I meant to suggest a state of poetic stand-off, as it were, a state where you have 
slipped out of your usual social persona and have entered more creatively and 
fluently into your inner being. I think it is necessary to shed, at least to some 
extent, the social profile that you maintain elsewhere. ‗Inner émigré‘ once had a 
specific meaning, of course, in the 1920s and 30s in Soviet Russia. It referred to 
someone who had not actually gone into exile but who lived at home disaffected 
from the system. Well, to some extent that was true of myself. Certainly, in 
relation to Northern Ireland.
57
 
 
The description of the poet‘s unkemptness leads into the following image – that of 
a ‗wood-kerne‘, one of the semi-nomadic people living in ‗the Debatable Land between 
Scotland and England‘ in the sixteenth century, surviving by violence and theft.58 This 
third image of physical force in the poem, of ‗the massacre‘, is one from which Heaney is 
fleeing, seeking to avoid exposure so he does not stand out and is not attacked. In 
identifying with his natural surroundings, he inherits the strength, the endurance, of the 
organic – which is, of course, one of his characteristic poetic themes. The sound and fury 
of literary-political debate no longer interest the poet; he has found it impossible to 
situate himself within the conflict, and has instead retreated into the Wicklow woodland 
to suffer the sequestration of Mandelstam.
59
 His retreat in ‗Exposure‘ has not been 
effected without anxiety, however: he seeks imaginative protection from his 
surroundings, and he experiences every breeze as a threat. Furthermore, he cannot avoid a 
sense of responsibility for those who did not manage to flee from the massacre, his own 
kind of survivor‘s guilt.60 
 Heaney‘s final vision of himself in the poem is not a coherent one, and nor is it a 
consolatory one for the reader; it could not be otherwise given the trajectory of the poem. 
While Heaney has been gathering together this poem, coaxing it into life, he has  
 
   … missed 
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  the once-in-a-lifetime portent, 
  the comet‘s pulsing rose. 
   
Eyes downcast as he composes, as he measures his obligations in ‗Exposure‘, Heaney has 
forfeited his one chance to see the comet‘s sign, to witness its meaning. Once more, that 
asteroid is the only part of his surroundings described in vital terms; here, it is a ‗rose‘, a 
flower both alluring and throbbing with a heartbeat, a life, of its own, a beat established 
by the three iambs that constitute the line. There is life, too, and hence promise, however 
slight, however overlooked, in Heaney‘s description of his modest act of creation, a 
description that echoes the final lines of Eugenio Montale‘s ‗Little Testament‘: 
 
Each man knows his own: pride 
was not flight, humility was not 
cowardice, that faint glow catching fire 
beneath was not the striking of a match.
61
 
 
Poetry, in ‗Exposure‘, is an indistinct glimmer, a pale reflection of the comet and what it 
represents – wasted opportunities, perhaps a missed message or directive – but it has, 
nonetheless, a radiance of its own; moreover, it is begun and sustained by Heaney himself 
while he is, as Harmon suggests, ‗about the proper business of the poet‘.62 There is both 
loss and resignation in the final lines of ‗Exposure‘, but there is also a helpless 
commitment to something from which Heaney cannot separate himself; he regrets having 
missed the comet, but he does not and cannot despise the small fire he has lit instead. The 
attentiveness implied by the image of a man crouched over a tiny blaze, feeding its 
flames with his breath, is a warmer, more intimate image than that of the distant asteroid. 
The latter neither shares its heat nor needs the care, or indeed attention, of anyone at all to 
sustain itself, even as it remains a magnificent, luminous vision. The difference between 
these two fires, the celestial and the terrene, is a measure of the sacrifices it is necessary 
for Heaney the poet to make: the distance between the one and the other forces a choice 
on the writer that cannot be ignored, and cannot be resolved in compromise.  
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Along with the loss, the unsatisfied longing of the final stanza, however, there is a 
sense, embodied in the cadence of the lines, of a climax being reached, a consummation 
like that created by all effective acts of closure. The approach of the comet is adumbrated 
by the word ‗blows‘ in the fourth line of the penultimate stanza, which will rhyme, as the 
poem concludes, with ‗rose‘, and that rhyme, not least, brings the poem to a rhythmically 
logical finish. The subordinate clauses that begin, in the third stanza from the end, to 
amass, allow the poem to gather a steady momentum until its last syllable – its lingering 
diphthong and the delicate flicker of its final consonant – sounds; until the heartbeat of 
the comet, embodied in the alliteration of ‗comet‘s pulsing rose‘, fades from sight and 
hearing. And it is in this visual and aural display of the comet‘s arrival and departure that 
the poem reaches another kind of resolution. The reader, unlike Heaney, does not miss 
the comet, but senses its approach in the tempo and music of the poem, and then watches 
it pass over the writer‘s bent head; and the possibility of our being witness to the omen 
which the poet himself has missed is crucial to what lies at the very centre of poetry‘s 
accomplishments. The reality of the poet‘s situation is one of being caught between two 
incommensurable demands, and the wisdom of his choice at the end – no matter how 
involuntarily that choice is made – is evidenced by the power of this poem to allow the 
reader, though not the poet, to gaze upon both the tiny fire and the blazing comet. 
That power is, of course, one of the defining characteristics of poetry in Heaney‘s 
defence of the art form: the ability to transcend the limitations of the actual, and of the 
personal, through an independent set of operations. ‗Exposure‘ is exemplary of the way 
in which poetry does this while matching the complexity and difficulty of our lived 
experiences, without resorting to wish-fulfilment or fantasy. Even as it deals with failure 
and uncertainty, however, it provides a poetic response adequate to the experience, an 
answer given most effectively and clearly when the poem is most natural and least self-
conscious, when the tongue is allowed to govern. In the shifting and balancing of 
Heaney‘s images in ‗Exposure‘, so evocative of the shifting and weighing of his guilt and 
responsibility, we see that very naturalness, and hear the stammering hesitation of the 
poet through the certainty and decisiveness of his artistic tongue; we see, too, his 
inclination, and the unstoppable inclination of the poem itself, towards resolution, 
towards equilibrium of a distinctly poetic kind. ‗Exposure‘ is most inevitable, most 
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indispensable, in its final three stanzas, which move into each other with the unfettered 
momentum of genuinely achieved poetry. Here is poetry‘s self-justifying capacity at full 
stretch, and in its bringing of the poem to a close even as the dilemma of the poet remains 
unresolved – and, indeed, in the very nature of that dilemma – ‗Exposure‘ becomes 
Heaney‘s version of Zbigniew Herbert‘s ‗To Ryszard Krynicki – a Letter‘:63 
 
 Not much will remain Ryszard really not much 
 of the poetry of this insane century certainly Rilke Eliot 
 a few other distinguished shamans who knew the secret 
 of conjuring a form with words that resists the action of time without which 
 no phrase is worth remembering and speech is like sand 
 
 those school notebooks of ours sincerely tormented 
 with traces of sweat tears blood will be 
 like the text of a song without music for the eternal proofreader 
 honourably righteous more than obvious 
 
 too easily we came to believe beauty does not save 
 that it leads the lighthearted from dream to dream to death 
 none of us knew how to awaken the dryad of a poplar 
 to read the writing of clouds 
 this is why the unicorn will not cross our tracks 
 we won‘t bring to life a ship in the bay a peacock a rose 
 only nakedness remained for us and we stand naked 
 on the right the better side of the triptych 
 the Last Judgment 
 
 we took public affairs on our thin shoulders 
 recording suffering the struggle with tyranny with lying 
 but – you have to admit – we had opponents despicably small 
 so it was worth it to lower holy speech 
 to the babble of the speaker‘s platform the black foam of the newspapers 
 
 in our poems Ryszard there is so little joy – daughter of the gods 
 too few luminous dusks mirrors wreaths of rapture 
 nothing but dark psalmodies stammering of animulae 
 urns of ashes in the burned garden 
 
  in spite of fate the verdicts of history human misdeeds 
  what strength is needed to whisper 
  in the garden of betrayal – a silent night 
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  what strength of spirit is needed to strike  
  beating blindly with despair against despair 
  a spark of light word of reconciliation 
 
  so the dancing circle will last forever on the thick grass 
  so the birth of a child and every beginning is blessed 
  gifts of air earth and fire and water 
 
 this I don‘t know – my friend – and is why 
 I am sending you these owl‘s puzzles in the night 
 a warm embrace 
       greetings from my shadow 
 
Like ‗Exposure‘, Herbert‘s poem ends in a perfectly resolved irresolution, an 
irresolution so expressed as to allow the poem to become as satisfyingly ‗resolved‘ as any 
in which closure is unproblematically achieved. ‗Exposure‘ is a series of weights and 
balances, of elements redressing each other continually – most obviously in Heaney‘s 
measuring of his responsibility and sorrow, but present also in the different voices that 
plague him, his various self-depictions (and self-deprecations) and, finally, the unlikely 
choice of a small, sheltered fire over a massive astral flame. This final imbalance, the 
impossibility of Heaney‘s ultimate position, are like Herbert‘s ‗owl‘s puzzles‘, which 
reveal far more to us about art, life and the poet himself than a complacent solution to the 
problem would have done. 
‗Exposure‘ is generally recognised as one of Heaney‘s most accomplished works, 
but the nature of that achievement differs from critic to critic; they are understandably 
varied in their reading of the poem‘s conclusion. There are those, like Waterman, who 
suggest that Heaney‘s dilemma is resolved right from the outset – the poem itself, crafted 
and contained, implies by its very existence a resolution having been reached in the mind 
of the poet, a position attained from which he might comfortably consider the difficulties 
he once faced.
64
 Others, like Morrison, see no neat or foregone resolution in the poem; 
‗but for all its tentativeness‘, he writes, it ‗does seem to move towards a position of 
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strength: irresolution but independence‘. Harmon, similarly, describes ‗Exposure‘ as ‗a 
drama of internal irresolution, in which much is revealed and little is resolved‘.65  
Certainly, within the poetic and musical closure of the poem‘s concluding lines 
there remains, as in ‗Limbo‘, an apparently irresolvable paradox, a sense of the 
impossibility of Heaney both seeing the comet and tending his own small flame. The 
problem of his position in relation to each cannot be solved, the two cannot be reconciled, 
and, finally, Heaney cannot pay what he considers his dues both to his compatriots and to 
his art form; he cannot look both ways at once, and he has known this from the first step 
of his walk through the woods. Elmer Andrews describes Heaney‘s distance from his 
home and kin as allowing him a wider, less inescapably subjective perspective on the 
matters at hand; even at that remove, however, he cannot free his imagination from 
reality, and hence he cannot escape to the comet, even by gazing at it. The ‗ideal of 
imaginative integrity‘ which he has been chasing remains out of reach, remains 
essentially idealistic.
66
 Andrews fails to realise, however, that Heaney never seeks that 
kind of imaginative liberty in the writing of his poetry, even as he may express a longing 
for it; his defence of poetry emphasises time and again the importance of a relationship 
between reality and the imagination, and his notion of imaginative integrity incorporates 
an inextricable link with the actual. This link, though represented in ‗Exposure‘ as a 
burden (and no doubt felt by Heaney, at this stage in his life, precisely thus) is part of the 
balance he later requires of poetry. No matter the difficulties of achieving that 
equilibrium, he will not – even here, even in the midst of the struggle – sacrifice it for 
complete imaginative freedom and hence irrelevance. Without that burden as experienced 
by him, without the ineluctable draw of the sparks and twigs at his feet, the reader‘s view, 
like his, would be limited to the comet itself: a mesmerising, ultimately unsatisfying 
vision of beauty.  
 
V      
‗Exposure‘ is a kind of self-elegy; but Heaney‘s body of work is characterised as well by 
more conventional instances of the form. In his 1987 collection The Haw Lantern, he 
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published a sequence of eight sonnets in memory of his mother, entitled ‗Clearances‘, 
sonnets which would become some of the most popular of his elegies. The poems 
collapse the intervening years between moments from Margaret Heaney‘s earlier life and 
the days around her death, juxtaposing the most memorable (for her son), most vivid 
experiences of her life with the experience of her death. In this sequence, Heaney brings 
together, also, two of his familiar domains, the domestic and the religious, both in 
harmony and in opposition. The title of the poem comes from the penultimate sonnet, in 
which Heaney describes the moment of his mother‘s death and the moment just after, 
when 
 
  The space we stood around had been emptied 
  into us to keep, it penetrated  
  clearances that suddenly stood open. 
  High cries were felled and a pure change happened.
67
 
 
The rendering of that ‗pure change‘ in poetry, the artistic coming-to-grips with the 
fact of someone‘s death, make the elegiac form the ultimate achievement, as it were, of 
redress: a poem of mourning that, in its very composition, its form and music, seeks to 
repair the absence of the one mourned. The reality and its alternative that are contained in 
the elegy are nothing less than death and life, a concluded existence and a continuing one; 
as Deane describes it, the form grieves even as it conjures the absent one, manages to 
hold in a single space the two opposite forces that define human existence, and pay each 
one due respect.
68
 By their very nature, therefore – their elegance as achieved poems 
notwithstanding – the sonnets from ‗Clearances‘ are examples of poetry redressing, 
repairing, an intolerable reality. 
The focus of those sonnets is, in large part, the effortless, unexpressed intimacy 
between mother and son as recalled by Heaney, a closeness embodied in the sequence by 
their sharing of chores around the house. These domestic duties take on an emotional 
significance, a ‗precious radiance‘, as Parker calls it, for the young Heaney.69 In the third 
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sonnet of the sequence, the one which I will be discussing, mother and son are described 
working quietly together in the kitchen, in a scene suffused with that radiance: 
 
When all the others were away at Mass 
I was all hers as we peeled potatoes. 
They broke the silence, let fall one by one 
like solder weeping off the soldering iron: 
cold comforts set between us, things to share 
gleaming in a bucket of clean water. 
And again let fall. Little pleasant splashes 
from each other‘s work would bring us to our senses. 
 
So while the parish priest at her bedside 
went hammer and tongs at the prayers for the dying 
and some were responding and some crying 
I remembered her head bent towards my head, 
her breath in mine, our fluent dipping knives –  
never closer the whole rest of our lives.
70
 
     
In keeping with the Petrarchan sonnet form, there is a clear turning point in this poem, at 
which there is a shift across time – we move from Margaret Heaney‘s kitchen, in which 
the boy Heaney helps her peel potatoes, into her home many years on, as she lies on her 
deathbed. The octet establishes an intimacy between mother and son in its opening two 
lines, and the repetition of ‗all‘ emphasises the companionship of mother and son to the 
exclusion of everyone else. Together, they peel potatoes, and the rest of the octet focuses 
on those vegetables as Heaney uses them to demonstrate the closeness that, for him, 
defines this memory. This is a closeness created without language – the potatoes, 
dropping one at a time, interrupt a silence which is allowed to settle between the pair as 
they work. Heaney compares the potatoes being dropped from their hands into the water 
to ‗solder weeping off the soldering iron‘, an image conveying both the movement of the 
potatoes slipping from their hands and Heaney‘s sense of the activity uniting him with his 
mother, joining them together as solder would two fragments of metal. Welch describes 
the world of the poem as ‗a world transformed and translated from singleness and 
separateness, to integrity‘ through the depiction of ‗total absorption and trance‘, a state 
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that lasts until the poem‘s volta.71 There are already hints of what is to come: ‗weeping‘ 
clearly foreshadows the ‗crying‘ and mourning years on as his mother dies. There is a 
quietness, a dignity to ‗weeping‘, however, that is characteristic of the scene as a whole, 
with its intervals of silence disturbed only by the soft splashing of the potatoes.  
Heaney‘s choice of ‗cold comforts‘ as a description for those potatoes, while 
being a pun on the coldness of the potatoes themselves, also reveals that the relationship 
between mother and son is not wholly and consistently close; their chore unites them, but 
the outer harmony of activity does not translate into a consistent equal harmony of 
thought and feeling. There is evidence of the complexity of the mother and son 
relationship in the next sonnet of ‗Clearances‘, in which Heaney describes how his 
mother‘s sense of the gap between her education – embodied in her speech – and that of 
her poet son manifested itself in an affectation of ignorance when it came to 
‗pronouncing words ―beyond her‖‘. As a consequence, Heaney ‗governed [his] tongue / 
in front of her‘, and would ‗decently relapse into the wrong / grammar which kept us 
allied and at bay‘.72 The sense of concord being achieved and discord, perhaps, being 
withheld or avoided by the act of peeling potatoes in the third sonnet is here confirmed, 
and indeed strengthened; Heaney‘s compromise, the government of his tongue, is a cold 
comfort that maintains the equilibrium of his relationship with his mother. Notably, the 
harmony accomplished in that third poem is also achieved through distinctly non-
linguistic means, in a silence that dominates even the clamour of the sestet. By contrast 
with the following sonnet in the sequence, however, in the potato-peeling poem in 
‗Clearances‘ the overwhelming impression is one of intimacy, of mutual affection and 
enjoyment; the chilly compromise of the potatoes is the only discordant note sounded.  
There is, moreover, a purity to the scene (a result not least of the pair‘s silence) 
that seems to distil from it an innocent, archetypal closeness quite lovely: the potatoes 
shine in the bucket of water, and their white glow, their coldness and the cleanness of the 
water reflect the simplicity and naturalness of the bond between mother and son. In an 
earlier poem dedicated to his mother, Heaney once again surrounds her with clean, light, 
elemental objects:  
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  There was a sunlit absence. 
  The helmeted pump in the yard 
  heated its iron, 
  water honeyed 
 
  in the slung bucket 
  and the sun stood 
  like a griddle cooling 
  against the wall … 
 
 
  … And here is love 
  like a tinsmith‘s scoop 
  sunk past its gleam 
  in the meal-bin.
73
 
    
Here the gleaming scoop, unseen beneath the grain, is a symbol of love, precisely 
the feeling evoked by the gleam of the submerged potatoes in ‗Clearances‘. In both 
poems, love is associated with work, with domesticity and food – with baking in 
‗Sunlight‘, and with peeling potatoes in ‗Clearances‘. In the latter, however, the work is 
shared by Heaney and his mother as they peel and release the potatoes; and just as the 
sound of the potatoes falling into the bucket rouses the pair from their reverie, so the 
reader is brought to his or her senses by the repetition of ‗let fall‘ in the penultimate line 
of the octet. In the time since Heaney described the dropped vegetables first breaking the 
silence, while he has been contemplating the clear water and the bright potatoes, another 
one has been peeled and has plopped into the water. There is a strong impression of 
parent and child being brought together by their work, and yet remaining sunk in separate 
contemplation; the silence between them is comfortable, the silence of two people with 
their own thoughts, and it is this very separateness that unites them. They are startled 
from their reflection by ‗each other‘s work‘, and there is a thus a rhythm to their private 
thinking and to their awareness of one another. Heaney portrays, in this poem, one of 
those ‗sacred‘ moments of silent communion between two people sharing a common 
task, which, in the sharing of it, enables them to express a love otherwise unspoken or 
else inexpressible. 
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 Until the beginning of the sestet, the first stanza of the poem seems an isolated, 
self-contained description of a memory clearly precious to Heaney. The ‗so‘ which 
introduces the turn of the poem, however, makes us aware that that memory has become 
the reason for something else, has had some more lasting impact on Heaney than simply 
the recollection of a particularly close moment; that effect, as we discover, is to decide 
the way in which he mourns his mother, to locate his grief at her passing. In the second 
stanza of the poem, he remembers the house filled with people as his mother lay on her 
deathbed, a scene of chaos and noise. The hubbub of the last rites and the loud 
participation of those gathered at the house stand in stark contrast to the silence of the 
first stanza. The clanging, unyielding ‗hammer and tongs‘ are weighed against the 
molten, softer metal on the soldering iron, and the ‗crying‘ of those present drowns out in 
volume, if not in import, the voiceless ‗weeping‘ of the solder, the potatoes. The quiet of 
the octet, broken only by occasional splashes, is here replaced by ceaseless, unbroken 
noise, and the wordlessness of Heaney and his mother is replaced by prayers and replies 
to the last rites. In the midst of this, Heaney turns to the memory he has just described: 
 
  I remembered her head bent towards my head, 
  her breath in mine, our fluent dipping knives –  
  never closer the whole rest of our lives. 
 
The companionship, the closeness of the first stanza is summoned immediately, 
fully, by this description of mother‘s and son‘s heads bent together; the distance between 
the adult Heaney and his dying mother, expressed in the cacophony of her final moments, 
is instantly closed by this reminder of their physical – and not verbal – proximity. That 
intimacy is emphasised by the following two images, which, like the first, establish the 
two as reflections of each other as they work. Their heads bend towards each other, their 
breath mingles, and their knives work in rhythm together: they cooperate as do the mirror 
image and the real person. The fluency of the knives provides a further contrast with the 
inarticulate clamour of the priest and mourners; there is a grace and dignity to the silent 
conversation of those implements which is lacking in the frantic praying and wailing of 
those about to be bereaved. And it is in the memory of this silence, in which they were 
closer than ever before or since, that Heaney finds comfort, finds redemption. 
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The final note sounded by the third sonnet of ‗Clearances‘ is an appropriately 
elegiac balance of comfort and bereavement, of sorrow and tranquillity. At its conclusion, 
what should have been a lament becomes a lullaby; becomes, in fact, a love poem. There 
is also a deep sense of poignancy, however, in the admission that the peeling of Sunday 
potatoes should have been the closest moment experienced between mother and son. 
This, like the question of language in the next sonnet in ‗Clearances‘, complicates, 
however much in passing, however slightly, what would otherwise be a straightforward 
poem of loss and remembrance. In doing so, this line – like the ‗cold comforts‘ of the 
first stanza –becomes one of the ways in which Heaney ensures the honesty, the 
coordination with the actual, of his poem: he does not simplify, does not reduce, and 
avoids the nostalgic sentiment that must always tempt the elegy-writer. It is for this 
reason, of course, that the poem is able to redress the reality of his loss as fully as it does. 
Death, as Corcoran argues, remains an unwanted event in the poem, remains the dread 
event it must always be in reality, but it becomes, poetically, also a ‗necessary 
enlargement of imaginative capacity‘, an enlargement enacted in the poem‘s final lines as 
they manage both to console and to desolate. Heaney establishes a perspective from 
which death is more than simply loss and destruction, and he does so without recourse to 
the transcendent; his only recourse is to poetry itself.
74
 Religion appears in the poem, in 
fact, only as another kind of distancing noise between mother and son: in the octet, it is 
away from the recitation of mass that they find the silence of their greatest intimacy, and 
in the sestet the imposition of the deathbed rites is one of discord, of tumult.  
 The manner in which Heaney captures that intense intimacy throughout the poem 
turns our expectations of the sonnet on their head, and the poem becomes a form of 
redress in its ability to direct our attention in unexpected ways. In the context of a 
sequence with the epigraph ‗In memoriam M.K.H., 1911-1984‘, we do not expect to 
encounter what amounts to upliftment. Heaney, showing himself master of the elegy, 
accomplishes its most essential purpose: the poem creates a powerful sense of lasting 
presence, of unbroken communion, and this redirects not only our expectations of the 
poem, but also our own feelings of bereavement and loneliness. At another level, it turns 
our focus away from itself. The main conflict in the sonnet is between the silence of the 
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kitchen and the pandemonium of the mourning household, and in figurative and literal 
terms (that is, in the sheer number of lines allotted to celebration of it), the silence 
dominates. The poem is a verbal artefact; it is a noise on the page; and Heaney uses this 
noise – no matter how beautiful its music – to point us and himself back to silence and 
wordlessness, back to the primitive intimacy of things shared without words. The poem 
redresses its own resonance by gesturing towards silence with all the force fourteen lines 
can muster.
75
 
The contradiction inherent in such an action – the evocation of silence through 
fundamentally acoustic means – is typical of the oppositions which, Heaney argues, can 
be surmounted by poetry at full stretch, and in ‗Clearances‘ we find that argument 
bolstered by his own practice. The third sonnet in the sequence is, like any elegy, a 
lament; it is a poem motivated by sorrow and loss. That lament is not, however, plangent 
or whimpering in tone, and does not rely on the familiar music of sadness, the hitched 
breath of sobbing or even the slow progress of the dirge. Instead, it has all the dignified 
quietude of the potato-peeling scene it recalls. The opening stanza of the poem follows an 
aabb rhyme scheme, but the rhymes are slant rhymes – ‗Mass / potatoes‘, ‗one / iron‘, 
‗share / water‘, ‗splashes / senses‘ – and they are appropriate here not only as a way of 
maintaining the ‗silence‘ by preventing the dominant chime of exact rhyme, but also as a 
phonetic counterpart to the inexact relationship Heaney describes, a relationship in which 
both parties find their greatest intimacy, their communion, in the separation implied by 
that ‗silence‘. The opening lines of the octet, already noted for their repetition of ‗all‘, are 
echoes of one another: 
 
  When all the others were away at Mass 
  I was all hers as we peeled potatoes. 
 
‗Hers‘ rhymes internally with ‗others‘; ‗away‘ and ‗at‘ alliterate (though imprecisely) as 
‗peeled‘ and ‗potatoes‘ do. The stanza as a whole is filled with these echoes, primarily in 
the form of alliteration and repetition. I have already mentioned the recurrence of ‗let 
fall‘ (the very action, of course, that these duplications mimic); the potatoes are like 
‗solder weeping off the soldering iron‘, and they are also ‗cold comforts‘ between 
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mother and son. There is less audible alliteration, owing to the function words, on ‗and 
again‘ and ‗work would‘. Heaney initiates a string of assonances in the second line of the 
poem, sounding from ‗peeled‘ through ‗weeping‘, ‗between‘ and ‗gleaming‘ to ‗clean‘, a 
thread of high-pitched, softly keening music that holds the stanza together.  
 The sestet, with the partial exception of ‗bedside / head‘, consists of a full rhyme 
on ‗dying / crying‘ and ‗knives / lives‘, which serves two purposes. Firstly, the stanza as 
a whole resonates at a greater volume than the first because of the full rhyme: it has none 
of the quietness of the octet, and in this way it mimics the noise it describes. Secondly, 
perhaps more interestingly, it manages to reaffirm and strengthen the closeness described 
by Heaney in the octet, as well as the almost talismanic power of that memory for the 
poet as an adult. Even as we hear the wailing concomitant with ‗dying‘ and ‗crying‘, we 
are aware that it is bested by the quietness of the ‗fluent dipping knives‘ that bring the 
pair nearer than ever as the poem concludes. This contrast between the two occasions is 
made clearer by the presence, in the first lines of the sestet, of the same repetition that 
punctuates the octet. Here we find ‗some were responding and some crying‘ as the 
‗parish priest‘ prayed, and in line 12, Heaney depicts ‗her head bent towards my head’, 
playing one scene off against the other through structural parallelism.  
 This sonnet from ‗Clearances‘ is, like ‗Limbo‘, not one of Heaney‘s richest poems 
in terms of the almost overabundant music he is capable of producing, and with good 
reason; it is an example of perfect harmony between theme and score. The way his 
images cohere, not only with each other, but also with the poem‘s music, shapes the 
poem into something which seems wholly predestined. Its pitch modulates appropriately 
between octet and sestet, and somehow the poem leaves an impression of nothing so 
much as the potential warmth and expressiveness of silence in the face of even the 
profoundest and most complex of emotions – love. This is Heaney at his quiet, exquisite 
best, enabling us, and himself, to achieve in the face of loss what Wallace Stevens called 
‗Seelenfriede durch Dichtung‘: ‗soul-peace through poetry‘.76 
  
VI  
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The Spirit Level, like many of Heaney‘s collections, is characterised by a unity of 
purpose, a particular poetic discourse established and maintained throughout; its fluency 
of theme is emphasised by the sense of a dialogue existing between the poems 
themselves, an exchange of energy and ideas.
77
 Two such poems – ‗St Kevin and the 
Blackbird‘ and ‗Whitby-Sur-Moyola‘ – find their narrative in Celtic legends, and their 
telling begins as though mid-conversation. In the former, Heaney narrates the story of 
that Catholic saint in whose palm, legend has it, a blackbird landed one day while he was 
praying and made its nest:
78
 
 
Kevin feels the warm eggs, the small breast, the tucked 
neat head and claws and, finding himself linked 
into the network of eternal life, 
 
is moved to pity: now he must hold his hand 
like a branch out in the sun and rain for weeks 
until the young are hatched and fledged and flown.
79
 
 
The poem begins abruptly, with the word ‗and‘, implying something preceding; 
and it seems part, perhaps, of a series of such myths, even though it is the first such poem 
we encounter in The Spirit Level. It is not the last, however. Twenty pages on, ‗Whitby-
Sur-Moyola‘ starts just as suddenly, the first line‘s ‗too‘ implying that the poem is in 
addition to some other anecdote, with a description of the ‗original‘ English poet, 
Caedmon, who is commonly associated with Whitby. That cowhand-poet, blessed (or 
cursed) with the gift of poetry, becomes in Heaney‘s interpretation of the legend an 
incarnation, a potent symbol, of the binary that is, as we have seen, central to his 
conception of poetry‘s internal processes: the earthly and the spiritual. For this reason, 
not least, it is instructive to examine the poem, which is one of Heaney‘s lesser-known, 
indeed hardly acknowledged, works; the fact that Heaney himself is the son of a 
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‗cowman‘, from a thoroughly rural background, also makes his subject here particularly 
significant, I will argue, as an instance of redress.
80
 
 
Caedmon too I was lucky to have known, 
back in situ there with his full bucket 
and armfuls of clean straw, the perfect yardman, 
unabsorbed in what he had to do 
but doing it perfectly, and watching you. 
He had worked his angel stint. He was hard as nails 
and all that time he‘d been poeting with the harp 
his real gift was the big ignorant roar 
he could still let out of him, just bogging in 
as if the sacred subjects were a herd 
that had broken out and needed rounding up.  
I never saw him once with his hands joined 
unless it was a case of eyes to heaven 
and the quick sniff and test of fingertips 
after he‘d passed them through a sick beast‘s water. 
Oh, Caedmon was the real thing all right.
81
 
 
The story of Caedmon is originally told by Bede in his Historia Ecclesiastica 
Gentis Anglorum, where the historian describes him as ‗particularly glorified and 
honoured with a divine gift, in that he fittingly was accustomed to make songs‘.82 
Heaney, in his poem, does not narrate the myth as he has earlier in the case of St Kevin – 
rather, he speaks of Caedmon after the point where the traditional story concludes. In 
Bede‘s version, Caedmon was a farmhand, a ‗perfect yardman‘ as Heaney would have it, 
and a man who knew no songs. One night at a feast, when it was custom for all to sing 
together to the accompaniment of the harp, Caedmon retreated in shame to the stables 
and fell asleep: 
 
… then some man stood by him in his dream and hailed and greeted him and 
addressed him by his name: ‗Caedmon, sing me something.‘ Then he answered 
and said: ‗I do not know how to sing and for that reason I went out from this feast 
and went hither, because I did not know how to sing at all.‘ Again he said, he who 
was speaking with him: ‗Nevertheless, you must sing.‘ Then he said: ‗What must 
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I sing?‘ Said he: ‗Sing to me of the first Creation.‘ When he received this answer, 
then he began immediately to sing in praise of God the Creator …83  
 
In ‗Whitby-Sur-Moyola‘, Heaney identifies with Caedmon, who comes to represent the 
poet as Heaney sees him at this stage in his career, and as he struggled to see him in 
earlier poems like ‗Follower‘ – as a worker, a rough, strong, grubby farmworker such as 
those among whom Heaney grew up. Caedmon, as both poet and farmer, becomes a 
metaphor for poetry as labour, and by extension for poetry as something worth doing. 
 In the opening line, Heaney establishes the speaker, someone fortunate enough to 
have met Caedmon and whose role in the poem is to share his observations of the man 
with the reader. He seems, from his language and expressive style, to be of the same 
background as the man he describes – that is, a rural, uneducated background – and he 
speaks as Caedmon‘s neighbour might, with familiarity and assuredness, about 
Caedmon‘s habits and manner. He discusses the poet in the aftermath of his time as an 
angelic agent, a poet for God, when he is back at home on his farm doing the work of a 
herder and cattle-man. There, the poet is once more in the place in which he best belongs, 
and we sense his expertise and belonging there from the very earliest lines of the poem. 
He is ideally suited to his work, and he gets the job done without hesitation or error, 
skilled enough at it that he is not preoccupied by his tasks, but able to give consideration 
to his surroundings. In the first five lines of the poem, Heaney‘s descriptions of Caedmon 
are deistic: the ‗full bucket‘ and ‗clean straw‘ take us back to the stable of Christ‘s birth 
and also the overflowing cup of Psalm 23; twice in those few lines he and his actions are 
described as ‗perfect‘; and even as he labours, he is able to observe those around him 
without faltering in his work. In the rest of the poem, however, this metaphor is inverted, 
and his activities during the period of his sacred poetic vocation are compared to the 
coarse, corporeal business of his life among his herds. 
 The second section is introduced with the statement that ‗he was hard as nails‘, 
the ‗nails‘ in this context also a passing reminder of God, of the spiritual; but the spiritual 
clad in flesh. Despite his calling to sing God‘s praises, to be foremost among poets, 
Caedmon‘s most exceptional talents, the speaker tells us, lay in the managing of his yard 
and beasts. His divine gift with words is overshadowed here by a ‗superior‘ talent, the 
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wordless yell he would use to control his herds and which formed part of his artistic 
expression, too; he brought that shout to his worship, treating the spiritual matters of his 
poetry as he did his cows, corralling them into verse. Heaney‘s use of ‗bogged in‘ 
conveys not just the unthinking, natural enthusiasm of Caedmon‘s noise, but also the 
agricultural, mucky setting in which he is most comfortable, which defines him 
regardless of his circumstances, and where he is so much at ease that his roar is itself an 
embodiment of that setting. 
 The final image in ‗Whitby-Sur-Moyola‘ is an even stronger inversion of our 
expectations of the poet in his role as sacred speaker, and one which further emphasises 
the profoundly terrestrial way in which Heaney conceives of one part of the poetic act.  
The closest posture to that of prayer assumed by Caedmon, and recounted by the narrator, 
is as he tests by smell the urine of a sick animal, his fingertips together and his eyes 
raised heavenwards as he assesses the reek and feel of the liquid. Here the chasm between 
the notion of the divinely-gifted poet making music with his harp, and the rough, crude 
labourer is at its greatest: communion with God is replaced by communion with the 
basest functions of the body.
84
 The poem concludes immediately after this image, 
however, with a declaration that ‗Oh, Caedmon was the real thing all right‘. The real 
what, we ask? This conclusion has been reached via the deliberately worldly, decidedly 
untranscendent picture of Caedmon that precedes it; which aspect of his life is the 
speaker affirming as genuine? 
 The answer, of course, is that he is ‗real‘ in a number of ways that Heaney sees 
here (and in his prose) as complementary, but which in previous collections he has 
battled to reconcile. The concluding lines of ‗Digging‘, in which Heaney states his 
intention to match his family‘s agricultural labour with the labour of his pen, are 
overwhelmed by the weight of wistful description before them, in which Heaney admires 
the farming capabilities of his father and grandfather. ‗Follower‘, like ‗Whitby-Sur-
Moyola‘, brings together art and working the land in a single metaphor; but it highlights 
the separateness and mutual strangeness that exists between those two occupations more 
than it manages to bind them together. In his portrayal of Caedmon, however, Heaney 
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achieves what he has been unable to with himself as overt subject, under the scrutiny of 
his own ancestors: he unites labour and poetry, the fleshly and the spiritual, in such an 
unassailable oneness that each is imbued with the qualities of the other as well as their 
own. The grimy activities of the farmyard become sacred, ‗perfect‘, ‗clean‘ and ‗full‘; 
and the transcendent vocation of the poet is brought soundly down to earth by Caedmon‘s 
‗big ignorant roar‘, by the prayer of those smelly fingers raised to his nose. Caedmon is 
wholly man and wholly poet, worker and singer in equal measure.
85
  
 The vocabulary of ‗Whitby-Sur-Moyola‘ is richly evocative of its speaker, its 
colloquial, narrative style conjuring for us a man no doubt a herdsman himself, certainly 
someone with experience of farm labour. His use of phrases like ‗angel stint‘ and 
‗poeting with the harp‘ is dismissive in the way one might be dismissive of the 
unfamiliar, the mysterious, and the awkwardness of the latter phrase is all the more 
noticeable when compared with the deftness and eloquence of his description of the urine 
check. The ‗poeting‘ seems clumsy, the ‗sniff and test‘ rapidly and efficiently graceful; 
the speaker‘s admiration is for, and his familiarity with, Caedmon‘s expertise with 
animals, not his brief aberrance with poetry. In this way, Heaney redresses the original 
myth and its central emphasis, which is on Caedmon‘s spiritual, poetic gift; he does so, 
too, by writing in the voice of Caedmon‘s neighbour, and not his own voice, unavoidably 
that of a poet rather than a farmer. It is an ultimately inescapable awareness of Heaney‘s 
presence in the poem, however, which layers the last line with additional significance. 
Even as we hear the voice of that neighbour throughout the poem, we know, because we 
are reading a poem at all, that Heaney is using his narrative as a means to another end 
altogether; and that end is so fully achieved by the poem‘s conclusion that we hear the 
voice of Heaney chiming in with that of the character he has created. For the narrator, 
Caedmon is a genuine herdsman, a man who knows his livestock intimately and cares for 
them fully; for Heaney, Caedmon is the epitome of ‗poet‘, not merely because he is the 
first English poet, but, more importantly, because he combines poetry and hard labour in 
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such a way as to make them a single act – an achievement that Heaney himself has 
strived for from his very earliest work.  
 There is redress occurring in two directions at this point: a traditional view of 
poetry as a rarefied occupation and the speaker‘s concern with Caedmon as cattle farmer 
redress each other. The speaker‘s tendency to see Caedmon‘s true talent as that of 
herding and the common view of poetry as an entirely spiritual, ethereal exercise balance 
each other out to produce ‗the real thing‘ – Caedmon as Heaney, as poet-labourer, 
metaphorical mucker-in and ‗hard as nails‘. The whole poem is about balance, about 
counterweighting, about uniting two seemingly disparate vocations into one. In another 
sense, the poem‘s last line redresses the notion of myth; ‗real‘ can mean ‗true‘, and the 
reader is challenged to accept Bede‘s myth (and also Heaney‘s version of it) as true, as a 
genuine historical account just as he or she is about to set it aside.  
The poem‘s most significant redressing action, however, is in its redressing of 
poetry as an art form, which I argue it does in a manner quite unlike that which Heaney 
describes in his prose explanation of that phrase. For Heaney, this kind of redress is 
concerned primarily with a poem‘s music, its ability to provide that melodic, rhythmic 
answer to reality, and its purpose is to establish poetry as a very particular, necessarily 
autonomous use of language. ‗Whitby-Sur-Moyola‘ accomplishes this, but not primarily 
by means of its aural qualities (although they are of course there); more plainly, and 
paradoxically more grandly, it establishes the art form as an independent, essential 
process by redefining what poetry is. Heaney returns to the earliest story of the very first 
English poet, a story involving an angel and a blessed transformation from cowhand to 
poet, and he reshapes it, seizing on the value of Caedmon‘s yard work and showing that 
poetry is labour of this very sort, tough and dirty and worthwhile as any manual labour. 
In this reworking of the myth, he redresses the craft of poetry as thoroughly as one could. 
 This reworking is achieved fully not least because it differs from other artistic 
renderings of Caedmon, the best-known of which is Denise Levertov‘s 1987 poem named 
after the mythical figure. Levertov‘s poem is written in the first-person voice of 
Caedmon, and is a retrospective of his life before the visitation, rather than after: 
 
All others talked as if 
talk were a dance. 
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Clodhopper I, with clumsy feet 
would break the gliding ring. 
Early I learned to 
hunch myself 
close by the door: 
then when the talk began 
I'd wipe my 
mouth and wend 
unnoticed back to the barn 
to be with the warm beasts, 
dumb among body sounds 
of the simple ones. 
I'd see by a twist 
of lit rush the motes 
of gold moving 
from shadow to shadow 
slow in the wake 
of deep untroubled sighs. 
The cows 
munched or stirred or were still. I 
was at home and lonely, 
both in good measure. Until 
the sudden angel affrighted me – light effacing 
my feeble beam, 
a forest of torches, feathers of flame, sparks upflying: 
but the cows as before 
were calm, and nothing was burning, 
                  nothing but I, as that hand of fire 
touched my lips and scorched my tongue 
and pulled my voice 
                                      into the ring of the dance.
86
 
 
Levertov‘s emphasis – and the emphasis, one might say, of even Bede‘s account – is on 
the ungainliness of Caedmon, his being out of place among others, and his artlessness, 
like that of the animals themselves. Heaney‘s Caedmon is a master not only of words, but 
of his farmyard; his expertise in his original environment (as humble and rural as 
Heaney‘s own) is admirable and praiseworthy, and it is not an expertise of dull instinct. 
That ‗big ignorant roar‘ is a red herring, its nescience present only in its wordlessness 
contrasting with the poems he creates; it is also the tongue truly ungoverned. This 
Caedmon is canny: even as he does his duty, he is keeping an eye on you, and there is 
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intelligence and awareness in his gaze. Furthermore, there is no sense in the speaker‘s 
description of Caedmon that he has changed in his abilities since his holy summons – he 
is celebrated for what he was before and after that period of his life. In a single poem, 
therefore, Heaney redresses our expectations, our impressions, of a triad: Caedmon in his 
traditional representation, Heaney himself as a cowman‘s son and poet, and the art of 
poetry itself. 
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Conclusion 
      … smile 
    as you find a rhythm 
    working you, slow mile by mile, 
    into your proper haunt 
    somewhere, well out, beyond… 
     
       Seamus Heaney, ‗Casualty‘1 
 
I 
‗Poetrybiz‘, as Robert Klein Engler puts it, ‗is big business‘ in the United States – and for 
this reason alone it seems unlikely that the literary defence of poetry will become an 
obsolete genre in the near future.
2
 Even outside of that thriving, yet segregated racket, 
poets will inevitably continue to experience the writer‘s guilt that is, in the instance of 
Heaney‘s defence as much as any other, such a powerful motivator for the defender. 
Recent defences have not, however, added much to the genre.  
 Jay Parini‘s Why Poetry Matters, published in 2008, is a case in point. In a book 
whose tone is matter-of-factly declarative throughout, Parini rehearses a few centuries‘ 
worth of popular defences in summary form, patch-working writers together in a manner 
that serves as an excellent foil for Heaney‘s brilliant marriage and interpretation of many 
of the same ideas. ‗Poetry doesn‘t matter to most people,‘ Parini begins. ‗That is, most 
people don‘t write it, don‘t read it, and don‘t have any idea why anybody would spend 
valuable time doing such a thing‘. Even by the end of his introduction, however, he has 
asserted that poetry in fact does matter, because ‗without it we can live only partially, not 
fully conscious of the possibilities (emotional and intellectual) that life affords‘.3 The 
writers whose ideas feature in Parini‘s discussion are the usual suspects, including Plato, 
Sidney, and the Modernists. Almost all his ideas, similarly, have a now-familiar ring. 
Poets are ‗responsible for the speech if not the life of their tribe, for they are the 
custodians of language‘, and they also provide ‗a place to stand where the pressure of 
reality will not overcome the imagination, thus limiting possibilities‘.4 Parini covers the 
entire spectrum in the range of his claims for poetry; the art form is beneficial 
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intellectually, linguistically, spiritually and psychologically. But the task of proving his 
central thesis – that poetry matters – by amassing and restating the (mostly well-known) 
ideas of others proves an impossible one. There is none of the fine discrimination 
exercised by Heaney, his unfailing ability to select precisely the most effective quotations 
from the work of others, and Parini‘s commentary is more a matter of paraphrase than the 
fusion of interpretation and amplification so characteristic of the Irishman‘s work. 
Parini‘s discussion (for it is not an argument), on the other hand, is somewhat stolid, and 
one‘s sense is that – particularly in the wake of Heaney‘s defence – Why Poetry Matters 
achieves nothing much at all for poetry or for the genre of the defence. 
 A more focused argument for poetry‘s place in the world is contained in Robert 
Pinsky‘s recent Democracy, Culture and the Voice of Poetry. The American ex-poet 
laureate advances an argument in this short book which answers, he writes, the problem 
presented by two opposing kinds of anxiety evoked by the idea of culture. The first of 
these is the fear of ‗undifferentiation, a loss of cultural diversity‘ resulting from the 
existence of a single, shared American culture; the second is a fear of a ‗vicious, 
tribalized factionalism‘, ‗fragmentation‘ caused by a plurality of wholly distinct cultures.5 
Poetry, Pinsky argues, is the medium through which these anxieties can be allayed, 
because it holds both the individual and the social within its frame of reference.
 
He goes 
on to demonstrate the way in which this is so: 
 
lyric poetry has been defined by the unity and concentration of a solitary voice … 
It is singular, if not solitary. But the vocality of poetry, involving the mind‘s 
energy as it moves toward speech, and toward incantation, also involves the 
creation of something like – indeed, precisely like – a social presence. The 
solitude of the lyric, almost by the nature of human solitude, invokes a social 
presence.
6
 
 
In this conception, by its very nature a poem is a social event; while the poem speaks 
with a particular individual voice, the very facts of its language, its cadences and syntax, 
summon up the idea of a shared life. Thus, Pinsky invokes a paradox: the ‗vocal 
imagining‘ that defines poetry, while being the product of an individual in his or her 
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solitary labour, is not divorced from the social realm and the idea of society. As such it 
encapsulates the essence of democracy, which, in his terms, is a balance between the self 
and the other.
7
 Already we can see that Pinsky‘s defence falls into the category of those 
which are answering to an implicit or explicit social, political charge. 
 Critics have variously described Pinsky‘s long essay as ‗foggy‘ and ‗succinct and 
sparkling‘; in my opinion, both judgements are justified.8 The book is certainly 
interesting, if somewhat repetitive; but set within the tradition of defences of poetry, it 
falls far short of its predecessors and, I would argue, its most significant contemporary, 
Heaney. Pinsky‘s concern seems, as some critics have also observed, fundamentally more 
political than poetic, and the ultimate importance of his argument for poetry is less than 
obvious. Poetry may indeed be essentially democratic, and on this point Pinsky is 
certainly convincing. But while the art form may quell a specifically American cultural 
anxiety to some degree, Pinsky‘s defence of it does not answer any of the other 
accusations that poetry faces in the twenty-first century – has faced, indeed, in every 
century. Moreover, he limits his defence both with his political focus and his national 
one: he is, perhaps understandably, concerned primarily with American poetry.  
 There are parallels to be drawn, nonetheless, between Pinsky‘s position and 
Heaney‘s. In his blurb for Pinsky‘s debut collection of poems, Sadness and Happiness, 
Robert Lowell describes him as ‗belonging to that rarest category of talents, the poet-
critic‘, a category which, I argue, Heaney has come to exemplify in his lifetime.9 While 
Heaney holds no official position as Ireland‘s national poet, he is widely recognised to be 
that country‘s favourite son, and, as Cliona Ni Riordain points out in a recent essay, he is 
in ‗a category of his own‘ in terms of literary fame. In 1997, for example, many Irish 
people in fact wanted Heaney to put himself forward for election as president.
10
 Six years 
later, in 2003, Amnesty International introduced the annual ‗Ambassador of Conscience 
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Award‘ which was inspired by one of Heaney‘s poems, ‗The Republic of Conscience‘.11 
Portraits of Heaney can be bought on the streets in Dublin, and, for a small consideration, 
performance poets will recite your Heaney poem of choice. In the 1990s – and it may still 
be the case – Heaney was more popularly taught in English educational syllabi than 
Shakespeare; and his books continue to account for two-thirds of the sales of living poets 
in Britain.
12
 As Rand Brandes affirms, the degree to which Heaney‘s work is embraced 
by the academic world is matched only by the unrelenting media scrutiny of his every 
professional move.
13
 Heaney is, in short, a ‗pop star‘, and an ambassador for poetry 
second to none in this historical moment.
14
  
He has achieved this, in part, by being both highly esteemed by critics and a 
favourite with the general public; he is reputed to be ‗a simple, straightforward, readily 
accessible writer‘.15 In the wake of the 1995 Nobel Prize for Literature, as one might 
expect, Heaney‘s books vanished from the shelves. Faber & Faber, Ni Riordain reports, 
reminded journalists at the time that Heaney was a consistently popular poet whose books 
inevitably went into reprint. 
 
But even Faber must have been astonished to see his book of critical essays on 
poetry, The Redress of Poetry, enter the bestseller lists at number five, jostling up 
there alongside Lester Piggott who was a length ahead at number four, with Delia 
Smith leading the field at number one [with] her trusty Winter Collection … 
Dizzy heights indeed for a form which represents only 2% of annual sales in the 
book trade.
16
 
 
Joel Brouwer might be able to say with confidence of Robert Pinsky that ‗no other 
living American poet — no other living American, probably — has done so much to put 
poetry before the public eye‘; but his confidence surely rests on that careful geographical 
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distinction.
17
 Globally speaking, Heaney is, indeed, in a league of his own. He has – both, 
no doubt, to his benefit and to his detriment – been saddled with the uneasy distinction of 
being everybody‘s celebrity poet in a culture obsessed with fame and stardom. The 
almost automatic exposure, and indeed boosting of his work, whether poetry or prose, 
cannot be gainsaid. Heaney has attained a status such that he has literally come to be 
identified with poetry, in the same way that Oprah Winfrey is identified with talk-show 
television. None of this can be laid at the poet‘s own door. As the argument of this thesis 
has attempted to demonstrate, there are very real reasons for his distinction, not to say his 
pre-eminence. In any case, Heaney himself has constantly tried to shoulder off the 
particular mantle of celebrity as diplomatically as possible, confessing, in an interview 
with Dennis O‘Driscoll, that it is both ‗joy‘ and ‗burdening‘.18  
Clearly this celebrity status cannot have played no role at all in the prominence of 
Heaney‘s critical writing. It does not account, however, for the extraordinary salience of 
his best ideas and most acute perceptions; these would retain that salience whether he was 
in the public eye or not. Doubtless more attention should be paid to the fact that, when an 
art form is in eclipse, it is all too convenient for one person to come to stand, sound-byte 
style, for that art form itself – at least in the eyes of the general public. This is a way of 
having your cake and not merely eating it, but eating it in one bite. Heaney has, no matter 
how reluctantly, been billed as the most readily consumerable face of poetry. The actual 
mechanisms of this, and their full implications, await a further study. 
 
II 
Adam Zagajewski‘s ‗A Defense of Ardor‘ is in part a defence of poetry‘s defenders, 
specifically those who are prepared to represent the art ardently. This thesis has taken 
something of the same form, a defence of a defence, as I have considered the significance 
of what Heaney has accomplished for poetry and how he has done so. There are parts of 
the project deserving of further exploration, which obvious constraints, length primarily, 
have prevented me from conducting here. Among these is Heaney‘s use of the auditory 
imagination, the connection he draws between our humanity and our exposure to the 
                                                 
17
 Brouwer, 2008. 
18
 Heaney, Stepping Stones, 369. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 200 
primordial sounds of poetry – a connection that, as I have indicated, is the aspect of his 
argument most frequently criticised by commentators. The issue deserves a further 
chapter of its own, and a measure of close attention that I have been unable to afford it 
here. It would be rewarding, for instance, to examine the notion in light of 
psychoacoustic research – that is, research into the ‗psychology of sound‘ – and as well 
as anthropological findings regarding the use of sound in religious and other rites.
19
 The 
relationship between ritual chanting, including traditional liturgical repetition, and the 
effects of poetic music could prove an interesting field for comparative study.
20
 
 Heaney himself provides numerous examples of his defence in practice, citing 
those poets and poems which exemplify that which the art form ought to (and does) 
accomplish, and in Chapter 5 I have demonstrated how a sampling of Heaney‘s own 
poems does likewise. A glance at Heaney‘s favoured exemplars immediately reveals that 
his focus is, primarily, lyric poetry, and it has been suggested that one of his critical 
objectives is in fact to ‗define lyric poetry itself, to say what kind of thing it is‘.21 He does 
not address, for instance, what so many other commentators have drawn attention to: 
namely, that poetry is not always found in poems as such. One suspects he might concede 
that there is, in fact, a kind of poetry in, for instance, the lyrics of Bob Dylan, as there 
might well be in the lyrics of hip-hop and other modern pop music. But one of the 
perhaps unintended consequences of Heaney‘s particular focus – which is, as I have said, 
lyric poetry over the last five centuries, and mostly in the English tradition – is the degree 
to which it reveals that, however our definitions of poetry might vary, it is more 
abundantly, as well as more satisfyingly, present in the traditional poetic forms than in 
other places. Though he does not provide us at any point with a reading, for instance, of 
Dylan‘s ‗Visions of Johanna‘ (from the latter‘s Blonde on Blonde), one has every reason 
for suspecting that he would not find in it, divorced from Dylan‘s music, those endlessly 
resonant properties – thus meaningfulness – that become apparent when he offers us a 
reading of an Elizabeth Bishop lyric. In this regard, it might be said that Heaney‘s 
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orientation is fundamentally a conservative one. But, as sometimes happens with such 
orientations, the conservative stance (if that is what it is) produces for us, the readers, 
some radically convincing results. 
Of course, this raises questions about the degree to which Heaney‘s defence is a 
defence of all poetry, and to what degree its criteria hold for poetry that is not 
fundamentally lyrical. My own view is that Heaney‘s defence very deliberately does not 
embrace everything called ‗poetry‘ in the current era, and that it is advisedly exclusive in 
this one sense – although not necessarily limited, I think, to lyric poetry. His adherence to 
the canonical – or ‗almost-canonical‘ – is not because of a backward longing. It is within 
the tradition of the last seven hundred years or so that poetry, if it is to be found, will be 
unearthed, or not at all. Such would seem to be his implicit line of reasoning. Heaney 
responds, as much as Sidney or Eliot did, to the unique pressures of his time, and 
recognising the degree to which his defence denies, as much as affirms, different kinds of 
writing is another area deserving of further discussion.
22
  
 
III 
In 1990, the year he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, Octavio Paz published 
The Other Voice: Essays on Modern Poetry, in which he also considers the current state 
and future prospects of poetry. 
 
Sociologists, academics, journalists and managing editors tell us that they are 
armed with irrefutable statistics. Pointing to statistics, they maintain that poetry is 
an art destined to disappear or become yet another curiosity in the museum of 
antiques. They have boldly formulated a sort of law of the progressive decline of 
poetry: poems have fewer readers today than they did thirty years ago, and thirty 
years ago they had fewer readers than they did seventy years ago, and so on, back 
through time.
23
 
 
Using Donald Hall‘s foreword to The Best American Poetry, 1989, however, Paz 
demonstrates that poetry is in fact better off than it has been in some decades – sales are 
higher than they were in the 1950s, and there has been a surge in the popularity and 
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regularity of public readings.
24
 Those predicting poetry‘s demise have forgotten, he 
claims, that literature in the Western world has historically been characterised by 
minority movements, small groups of writers who were responsible for revolutionising 
the art form.
25
 Our current skewed perspective of poetry‘s status is a result of the 
economic lens through which we now view the arts. The expansion of the publishing 
industry, its domination by corporations, has resulted in the metamorphosis of traditional 
artistic exchange into a ‗modern financial market‘. Simultaneously, individuals have 
become consumers. Paz insists, furthermore, that ‗the logic of the marketplace is not the 
logic of literature‘.26 The real value of a poem is not monetary, and has nothing to do 
with profit and loss, with bestseller lists and rates of sale. Rather, that value lies in 
poetry‘s ability to connect us with our past and our future, to guide us through the present 
with a sense of what has been and what will be.
27
 In the current ethos of consumption, 
that ability is compromised. 
 What, then, are poetry‘s prospects for the twenty-first century? Paz, like many 
another writer, wisely decides not to offer a clear prediction; rather, his depiction of 
poetry‘s place in the contemporary world is, as he is concerned to point out, a sketch: 
 
no, poetry is not in the throes of death. It gives the impression that it is tired, or 
even suffering from a certain sterility; and, true, for the first time since the 
Romantic era, no poetic movement of major scope has appeared in thirty years. 
But the same can be said of the other arts. This phenomenon has not prevented the 
appearance of good poets and artists: every generation produces its own.
28
 
 
Poetry‘s essential purposes remain what they have always been – to elucidate and give 
structure to our daily experience of life; to bring to our attention, persistently, those 
realities which we would ignore or conceal from ourselves; and to reflect our potential as 
human beings, individually and as a society.
29
 In so doing, Paz writes, poetry becomes 
‗the antidote to technology and the market‘, the latter an invention which must, like all 
such creations, run its course. If we are, in the face of the world economy that now 
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imbues every aspect of our lives, to retain that within us which is most human and least 
quantifiable, we must look to poetry.
30
 
 As a writer myself, and as a reader of poetry, I share some of the gloom of the 
number-wielding sociologists and academics, some of the fear – which Paz acknowledges 
as common to every generation – that ours will produce no groundbreaking, significant 
literary movement. That fear, however, as Paz points out, is unfounded precisely because 
it is characteristic of every century; and, to my view, it also places undue emphasis on 
literary innovation, on artistic revolution. My own poetic tastes veer towards the lyric, in 
its neo-Romantic, Heaneyesque conception. Radical novelty is not really to my taste, and 
Heaney‘s defence demonstrates, in its wider implications, how very incidental such 
novelty is, anyway, to the achievement of a poem. Poetry‘s raison d’être has always been 
the same, although it has never, as I have argued, been as fully and memorably expressed 
as it is in Heaney‘s work. His defence, ultimately, is more than an answer to the charges 
against poetry. It is the culmination of centuries‘ worth of debate about the art form, a 
manifesto with sufficient heft, I believe, to withstand the gravity of the century before us, 
as well as confront the further challenges that will undoubtedly face the art form in the 
future. Changes in form and rhythm, in vocabulary and perspective, are, in a lasting 
sense, mere fripperies compared with poetry‘s fundamental purpose. Poems that 
accomplish redress, that embody the ungoverned tongue and above all celebrate the 
efficacy of song itself, have been written in every age, and will continue to be written. 
Indeed, the purpose of Seamus Heaney‘s defence is not only to prove the validity of 
poetry as an historical art form, but to suggest that poetry itself is an archetype (I use the 
term here in the loose, descriptive sense); which is to say, it is generically, genetically 
human, and indeed part of any adequate description of what it means to be human.  
 So memorably resonant are Heaney‘s own formulations of the way in which 
poetry operates that one is tempted, in conclusion, to break with the conventions of 
academic citation and isolate (even if this involves repetition) those key formulations on 
which his defence turns: 
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… the cultural depth-charges latent in certain words and rhythms, that binding 
secret between words in poetry that delights not just the ear but the whole 
backward and abysm of mind and body; … the energies beating in and between 
words that the poet brings into half-deliberate play; … the relationship between 
the word as pure vocable, as articulate noise, and the word as etymological 
occurrence, as symptom of human history, memory and attachments. 
 
… the efficacy of song itself, an emblem of the poet as potent sound-wave; and 
when one thinks of the note of the soprano which cracks glass, one has yet 
another image of the way purely artistic utterance can put a crack into the 
officially moulded shape of truth in a totalitarian society. 
 
Art is not an inferior reflection of some ordained heavenly system but a rehearsal 
of it in earthly terms; art does not trace the given map of a better reality but 
improvises an inspired sketch of it. 
 
in the activity of poetry too, there is a tendency to place a counter-reality in the 
scales – a reality which may only be imagined but which nevertheless has weight 
because it is imagined within the gravitational pull of the actual and can therefore 
hold its own and balance out against the historical situation. 
 
… in the rift between what is going to happen and whatever we would wish to 
happen, poetry holds attention for a space, functions not as distraction but as pure 
concentration, a focus where our power to concentrate is concentrated back on 
ourselves. 
 
Heaney himself has proceeded throughout his career by using liberally the principle of 
exemplification. Looking over these quotations again, one realises afresh that not only are 
they unfailingly illuminating as to the point and purpose of poetry, but they are 
themselves, in fact, touchstones as steadfast as any others available to us in this 
contemporary moment. 
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